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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
 
In general terms the full title / name is given in the first instance with the chosen 
abbreviation following in parentheses.  Thereafter the abbreviation features although, for 
clarity and consistency of style, the full title / name is used on occasions.  John F. Kennedy is 
ŽƌĚŝŶĂƌŝůǇƌĞĨĞƌƌĞĚƚŽĂƐ “<ĞŶŶĞĚǇ ?ŝŶĂďďƌĞǀŝĂƚĞĚĨŽƌŵĂƚ ?ďƵƚƐŽŵĞƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƐĂŶĚ
ƋƵŽƚĂƚŝŽŶƐƵƐĞ “:&< ?ĂŶĚƚŚŝƐŚĂƐďĞĞŶƌĞƚĂŝŶĞĚŝŶƐƵĐŚŝŶƐƚĂŶĐĞƐ ?dŚĞhŶŝƚĞĚ^ƚĂƚĞƐŽĨ
America may be abbreviated as either US or USA. 
American Friends of Vietnam AFV 
Army of the Republic of Vietnam ARVN 
Assassination Records Review Board ARRB 
Associated Press AP 
Balsillie School of International Affairs BSIA 
Central Intelligence Agency CIA 
Centre for International Governance Innovation CIGI 
First World War WWI 
Government of North Vietnam GNV 
Government of South Vietnam GSV 
Hukbalahap Rebellion Huk  
John F Kennedy Kennedy / JFK 




Joseph P Kennedy JPK 
US Military Assistance Command for Vietnam MACV 
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Military Assistance Advisory Group MAAG 
New York Journal American Journal American 
Non-Aligned Movement NAM 
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation NATO 
Policy Brief No. 5 PBN5 
WĞŽƉůĞ ?ƐZĞƉƵďůŝĐŽĨŚŝŶĂ PRC 
Second World War WWII 
South East Asia Treaty Organisation SEATO 
United Nations UN 
United States of America US / USA 






 “KƵƌŶĂƚŝŽŶƐĂƌĞƚŚĞƉƌŽĚƵĐƚŽĨĂĐŽŵŵŽŶstruggle, the revolt from colonial rule.  And our 
ƉĞŽƉůĞƐŚĂƌĞĂĐŽŵŵŽŶŚĞƌŝƚĂŐĞ ?ƚŚĞƋƵĞƐƚĨŽƌƚŚĞĚŝŐŶŝƚǇĂŶĚƚŚĞĨƌĞĞĚŽŵŽĨŵĂŶ ? ?1 
 
 
 “To me, John Kennedy was the first American President who really understood the 
nationalist revolution and the revolution of modernization in the under-developed areas 
and the necessity of both adjusting to it and feeding it in order to guide it in directions that 
ƐĞƌǀĞĚŽƵƌŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚƐ ? ?2 
 
In the course of the twentieth century the position of the United States of America (US / 
USA) as a world power shifted.  From the time of the Declaration of Independence the US 
had managed to keep more or less detached from European affairs, but entrance into the 
First World War (WWI) in 1917 brought home the problems of the nations that many of its 
population had left behind.  It was the political and economic realities of the modern age 
that had made participation in the war inevitable and it was President Woodrow Wilson 
who not only recognised this, but also came to the view that counter actions under US 
leadership would be required if the future of mankind was not to be blighted by further, 
more devastating conflicts.  To deflect this possibility he revived the age old concept of 
World Peace. 
 
It does not pay this study to examine the origins and development of World Peace, but 
there is value in asserting that its philosophical fundaments had, by the 20th century, been 
supplemented by an urgency and compulsion created through the discovery and application 
of weaponry which carried sufficient destructive force to threaten the existence of 
civilisation as it had become known.  Wilson strived to address the issue of World Peace by 
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promoting the League of Nations, but witnessed his ambitions subside as the United States 
Senate held out against the sacrifice of sovereignty that was at the heart of his proposals.3  
Events then took place much as he had foreseen with the coming of the Second World War 
(WWII) that was more destructive and costly in human terms than even WWI.  Wilsonian 
thinking, which was sustained by the predisposition that the United States was a nation 
created from out of the will of the people, thereafter gained currency and the League of 
Nations was reborn in the shape of the United Nations.  It was at this time that John F. 
Kennedy (Kennedy) was considering entering public life and the question of World Peace 
occupied much of his thinking until the time of his death in November 1963.  Indeed, it was 
in June 1963 that he made what might be considered his last great speech  W the 
commencement address at American University, in which he put forward his ideas for World 
Peace and how he would seek to govern should he be re-elected to the Presidency in 1964.4 
 
That the concept of World Peace in the 20th century should be so strongly associated with 
ƚŚĞhŶŝƚĞĚ^ƚĂƚĞƐŽĨŵĞƌŝĐĂŝƐŶŽƚĂƚĂůůƐƵƌƉƌŝƐŝŶŐ ?ƚƚŚĞƚŝŵĞŽĨtŝůƐŽŶ ?ƐĞŶĚĞĂǀŽƵƌƐƚŚĞ
USA, as a democratic nation, had entered the consciousness of other peoples in ways that 
were unprecedented; modern communications (such as the development of cinema) had 
given the nations of the world a clear picture of how the US conducted its affairs, how it had 
expanded and become wealthy and what this meant for the everyday lives of its citizens.  
This transparency, together with WilsoŶ ?ƐĂƚƚĞŵƉƚƐƚŽƉůĂĐĞƚŚĞh^at the forefront of 
world affairs, also conveyed a more oblique reference: the United States had once been a 
subject nation, a colony.  It had broken the shackles of imperial domination through 
revolution (violent revolution it may be said, though a violence that sought peaceful 
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independence) and it had grown to become rich, peaceful, authoritative and influential; the 
most powerful nation on earth. 
 
ƐtŝůƐŽŶ ?ƐĚƌĞĂĚƐĐĞŶĂƌŝŽŽĨĞǀĞƌŵŽƌĞĚĞƐƚƌƵĐƚŝǀĞǁĂƌƐĞǀŽůǀĞĚĂŶĚƚŚĞƉĞŽƉůes of the 
world became ever more aware of their relative well-being, then movements for 
independence and self-determination became more potent and assertive.  Decolonisation 
spread with rapidity following the creation of the United Nations in 1945 and the latter half 
of the 20th century is marked by the number of new nations that came into being and were 
tested as independent, self-functioning entities. 
 
Yet this remarkable transformation, a restructuring of the geopolitical map of the world, 
receives relatively little attention in historical treatments of the second half of the twentieth 
century, where the dominant force of change is ordinarily considered to be the Cold War.  
There is an irony in this: the United States, a former colony, made fighting the Cold War and 
halting the spread of communism its foreign policy priorities.  In the intensity of its 
endeavours, it took a detached, even indifferent, attitude towards the hundreds of millions 
of peoples whose first concerns were not the ideological entanglements of communism and 
capitalism, but the simple objective of free determination.  So concentrated was this 
approach that much of US foreign policy management became formulated, encased by 
legislation and assumed axioms, leaving little room for debate and contrary views that are 
often considered to be necessary for a thriving democracy. 
 
There was, for example, the strategy of Containment,5 a structured and accepted 
requirement for the continued security of the nation.  Further, there was the Domino 
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Theory - an extension of Containment that drew the hand of the United States at any point 
where the reach or influence of the Soviets (and their ideological associates) was seen to be 
overbearing.6  Because these impulsions of foreign affairs management operated ahead of 
policies relating to decolonisation the United States would frequently disavow its traditional 
maxims regarding democracy and the conduct of nations.  But for John Kennedy this was an 
erroneous approach: 
 
 “Strangely enough, the home of the Declaration of Independence has not understood this 
ŵŽǀĞŵĞŶƚ ?[the revolt against colonialism].  Tied too blindly and too closely to the policies 
of England, France and other colonial powers, we have permitted the Soviets to falsely pose 
as the world ?s anti-colonialism leader, and we have appeared in the eyes of millions of key 
uncommitted people to have abandoned our proud traditions of self-determination and 
independence. Thus arrogant extremists and communists now seek to exploit the most 
powerful new force to shape the world since World War II - not an atomic weapon, not a 
military pact, but - more powerful than these - the force of a surging African-Asian 
nationalism. In my opinion, the tragic failure of both Republican and Democratic 
administrations since World War II to comprehend the nature of this revolution, and its 
potentialities for good and evil, has reaped a bitter harvest today - and it is by rights and by 
necessity a major foreign policy campaign issue that has nothing to do with anti-
communism. ?7 
 
To suggest that Kennedy adopted a nationalist stance in relation to US foreign policy 
management presents a thesis that stands in contrast to the views of many authoritative 
observers who have, over the years, portrayed him as a Cold War protagonist.  Michael 
K ?ƌŝĞŶŶŽƚĞĚĂůŝŵŝƚĞĚƐƵƉƉŽƌƚĨŽƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůŝƐŵǁŚĞŶ<ĞŶŶĞĚǇŵĂĚĞĂŬĞǇŶŽƚĞƐƉĞĞĐŚ
regarding Vietnam in 1956: 
 
 “<ĞŶŶĞĚǇ ?ƐĂĚĚƌĞƐƐƐƵŵŵĞĚƵƉƚŚĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĂůĞĨŽƌƚŚĞŵĞƌŝĐĂŶƉŽůŝĐǇŝŶsŝĞƚŶĂŵ ?ƐŚĂƌĞĚďǇ
almost all U.S. policymakers of the time.  In it he showed the limitations of his support for 
ŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůŝƐŵ ?^ƚĂƵŶĐŚĐŽŵŵŝƚŵĞŶƚƚŽĐŽŶƚĂŝŶŝŶŐĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƐŵŚĂĚƉƌŝŽƌŝƚǇŝŶŚŝƐƚŚŝŶŬŝŶŐ ? ? 8 
 
<ĞŶŶĞĚǇ ?Ɛ^ĞĐƌĞƚĂƌǇŽĨ^ƚĂƚĞĞĂŶZƵƐŬ ?ǁŚĞŶŝŶƚĞƌǀŝĞǁĞĚĨŽƌƚŚĞKƌĂů,ŝƐƚŽƌǇWƌŽŐƌĂŵ
created by the John F. Kennedy Museum and Library, makes a similar, though more 
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extensive statement along these lines when discussing the Laotian crisis that flared in the 
ĞĂƌůǇĚĂǇƐŽĨƚŚĞŶĞǁĂĚŵŝŶŝƐƚƌĂƚŝŽŶ ?tŚĞŶĂƐŬĞĚďǇŝŶƚĞƌǀŝĞǁĞƌĞŶŶŝƐ: ?K ?ƌŝĞŶǁŚĞƚŚĞƌ




the thinking of President Kennedy and that he was more resolved after the Bay of Pigs than 
he was before about stemming the movement of communism in Southeast Asia.  But I think 
the historian, again, will want to look very carefully at the public record - for example, in the 
Public Papers of President Kennedy and look at the actual statements that he made and the 
actual decisions he took to get the reflection of this deep concern about Southeast Asia, the 
sense of our commitment to Southeast Asia, and an indication that we were not going to let 
Southeast Asia be overrun, because those were themes that ran all through President 
Kennedy's statements during the period when he was President. And he took the initial 
major decision to increase our forces in South Vietnam beyond the levels that were more or 
less permitted by the Geneva agreements of 1954 when he started moving in fifteen to 




Though a cautious statement, RuƐŬĐůĞĂƌůǇĞŵƉŚĂƐŝƐĞƐŚŽǁŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚǁĂƐ “ƐƚĞŵŵŝŶŐƚŚĞ
ŵŽǀĞŵĞŶƚŽĨĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƐŵ ?ƚŽ<ĞŶŶĞĚǇ ?dŽĂŶĂůǇƐĞĂůůZƵƐŬ ?ƐĐŽŵŵĞŶƚĂƌǇŽŶĂƐƉĞĐƚƐŽĨh^
foreign relations while Kennedy was President is beyond the scope of this study (eight 
interviews of considerable extent are lodged with the Kennedy Library), but some 
observation is instructive.  Three aspects stand out: 
 
x For Rusk, Kennedy was chiefly concerned about spreading communism; 
x Rusk indicates that Kennedy sustained the US military commitment to South Vietnam, 
maintaining an advisory position prior to one of active engagement;10 
x Rusk remained in post after Johnson became President and served until 1969.  By 
agreeing to be interviewed for the Kennedy Library he was, in effect, appraising his 
own performance over two administrations during which time the role of the USA in 
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Vietnam changed dramatically.  These factors must be weighed for a reasonable 
ĂƐƐĞƐƐŵĞŶƚŽĨZƵƐŬ ?ƐǁŽƌĚƐ ? 
 
These three points illustrate a more general aspect of assessments regarding John Kennedy 
and how he is viewed in different ways.  Rusk was the most senior spokesperson on foreign 
affairs during the time of the New Frontier and his words must be considered carefully.  The 
extract quoted in endnote 10 above suggests that he sees Kennedy as little different from 
those who came before him and those who followed him in the White House, dealing with 
the great foreign affairs issues of the day within the demands of Containment, the Domino 
Theory etc.  W ǁŚĂƚŵŝŐŚƚďĞĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞĚĂƐĂ “ŽůĚtĂƌƌŝŽƌƉƉƌŽĂĐŚ ? ? This assessment 
must, equally, be set against the knowledge that Rusk was speaking after having served as 
Secretary of State during the most catastrophic military failure in US history.  It certainly 
would not have paid his reputation in history foƌZƵƐŬƚŽŚĂǀĞƐƵŐŐĞƐƚĞĚƚŚĂƚ<ĞŶŶĞĚǇ ?Ɛ
ambitions for South East Asia could have avoided the American disaster in which he had 
been a major figure.11 
 
Challenging this interpretation, this study seeks to examine the point of view that, unlike 
Truman, Eisenhower and Johnson, for whom the Cold War was the central and dominant 
driver of foreign affairs management, John Kennedy stood out as a President of the United 
States who conducted foreign affairs management in a manner and style that, alongside the 
imperatives of Containment and its associated policies, was conditioned to a discernible 
extent by an awareness and understanding of the importance of the processes of 
decolonisation  W ǁŚĂƚŵĂǇďĞĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞĚĂƐĂ “ŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůŝƐƚĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚ ?.  It also looks into the 
proposition ƚŚĂƚ<ĞŶŶĞĚǇ ?ƐŽǁŶĞǆĞƌƚŝŽŶƐĨŽƌtŽƌůĚWĞĂĐĞǁĞƌĞŝŶƚƌŝŶƐŝĐĂůůǇůŝŶŬĞĚƚŽŚŝƐ
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ideas about how the United States should conduct relations with the newly created nations 
and the necessity for it to avoid becoming a neo-colonial power  W a position that would 
imperil World Peace at a time when nuclear weaponry had made total destruction of 
civilisation a reality. 
 
The above reference (see page 9) is not an isolated quotation by Kennedy; it is a theme that 
is repeatedly found in his communications, whether through speeches, broadcasts or 
writings.  In order to understand the extent to which Kennedy came to adopt an alternative 
point of view it is necessary to examine his background and upbringing.  Aspects of his 
experiences as a young man before entering public life give clear indications as to the 
reasons why his thinking may have set him apart from his contemporaries; they also shed 
light on the building blocks that collected his thoughts into a consistency that might 
accurately be described as a philosophy or, at least, a set approach, in how he came to view 
US foreign affairs, both as a commentator (while in the Senate) and as chief executive. 
 
Kennedy had, as a student in London at the outbreak of WWII, become close to senior 
figures in the British government and learnt much about how imperial power was 
administered.  As a newspaper reporter in 1945, he had been present at the inception of the 
United Nations (UN) when the declaration regarding the self-determination of all peoples 
was affirmed.  As a sitting member of the House of Representatives he travelled, in 1951, to 
Israel, India and Vietnam (among other places) where he witnessed the birth pains of new 
nations and was able to evaluate at first hand the efforts of the French in preserving their 
ĞŵƉŝƌĞ ?&ŽůůŽǁŝŶŐƚŚŝƐĞŶůŝŐŚƚĞŶŝŶŐĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞ<ĞŶŶĞĚǇ ?ƐƉƵďůŝĐĐŽŵŵĞŶƚƐ- in speeches, 
interviews, broadcasts and written works - repeatedly emphasised the shortcomings of the 
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ŝƐĞŶŚŽǁĞƌĂĚŵŝŶŝƐƚƌĂƚŝŽŶ ?ƐƉŽƐitioning in foreign affairs management, particularly its 
failure to recognise the significance of how the world was changing as a result of 
decolonisation. 
 
In the course of his time as an elected official Kennedy acquired a reputation for speaking 
out, repeatedly challenging the Truman and Eisenhower administrations on foreign policy 
ŵĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚ ?ŶƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐŽĨ<ĞŶŶĞĚǇ ?ƐǀŝĞǁƐĂƐƚŚĞǇĞǀŽůǀĞĚƚŚƌŽƵŐŚƚŚĞ ? ? ? ?ƐĂŶĚ
1950s is central to comprehending how he came to deal with foreign affairs matters in the 
White House, particularly in regard to Vietnam, and the more so in the light of how events 
transpired following his death. 
 
<ĞŶŶĞĚǇ ?ƐĐŽŶĐĞƌŶƐƌĞŐĂƌĚŝŶŐh^ĨŽƌĞŝŐŶĂĨĨĂŝƌƐŵĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚƵŶĚĞƌŝƐĞŶŚŽǁĞƌǁĞƌĞ
tempered by the view that policy had been created on the basis of fears about spreading 
Communism and there is no suggestion that Kennedy did not share those fears.  But the 
response of the United States and its allies to this situation was shaped in part by the events 
that had preceded WWII, namely the discredited approach of Britain, France and other 
nations in meeting the threat presented by Nazi Germany.  Appeasement during the time of 
the Cold War was (and for many still is) a disreputable word12 and the United States, in its 
new role as an active world power, was conscious both of the failings of Appeasement and 
the extent to which it had become disgraced in the eyes of ordinary people.  This made 
negotiating ways out of international problems more challenging, yet John F Kennedy, in the 
course of his Presidential inaugural address spoke the words: 
 
 “>ĞƚƵƐŶĞǀĞƌŶĞŐŽƚŝĂƚĞŽƵƚŽĨĨĞĂƌ ?ƵƚůĞƚƵƐŶĞǀĞƌĨĞĂƌƚŽŶĞŐŽƚŝĂƚĞ ? ?13 
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How much this statement can be said to have raised the spectre of Appeasement is 
debatable.  Kennedy spoke of negotiation, not Appeasement as such, and he was careful to 
include other parts in his speech that emphasised the importance of the USA maintaining its 
power and strength while not fearing to negotiate.  Nevertheless, his words are remarkable 
for the fact of the time and circumstances of their enunciation.  While there were many 
influential individuals in the United States at that time who would have understood and 
supported such a notion, it was extraordinary for an incoming President at the height of the 
Cold War even to have suggested that it might be advantageous to negotiate with the Soviet 
Union or other communist powers. 
 
Notwithstanding this indirect reference to a modern form of Appeasement, there is a 
further question as to why the new President should have chosen to use these words, for 
they did not sit well with the bellicose and uncompromising approach that Kennedy had 
taken in debating foreign affairs and the Cold War in the course of defeating Richard Nixon.  
At this time he had argued the case as an unreconstructed Cold Warrior, berating the 
Eisenhower administration (and, by implication, his opponent), for failing in Vietnam, for 
allowing the Soviets to gain advantages in space and military technologies and, most 
famously, highlighting the precarious state of homeland security due to the non-existent 
 “ŵŝƐƐŝůĞŐĂƉ ? ?,ĂǀŝŶŐƐĞƚƚŚĞƚŽŶĞĨŽƌĂŵŽƌĞĂŐŐƌĞƐƐŝǀĞ ?ŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇ-based response, as might 
ĂĐŽŶĨŝƌŵĞĚ “ŽůĚtĂƌƌŝŽƌ ? ?he now spoke of the importance of negotiation. 
 
It seems that Kennedy used the hard line stance for the immediate purposes of winning the 
race to the White House.  His statements on foreign policy before the campaign (and 
throughout his career in Congress) had looked to engendering a different approach that 
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would secure the position of the United States in a world that was changing, not solely 
because of the Cold War, but also because new nations were rapidly emerging as a 
consequence of the disappearing European empires.  During the Eisenhower years Kennedy 
made repeated pronouncements on how important it was for the US to establish good 
relations with the developing world and, once he had defeated Nixon, he reverted to a style 
that was consistent with this approach by seeking conciliation as the first means for 
addressing difficulties.  He met frequently with leaders of the new nations and also held out 
on using the military might of the United States, other than as a symbol of his resolve should 
his negotiating position be viewed as a weakness by the Soviets and others who might seek 
to spread their own influence.  There is, of course, a famous exception to this thesis  W the 
matter of The Bay of Pigs in April 1961, and what came to be seen as a great failing of 
<ĞŶŶĞĚǇ ?ƐWƌĞƐŝĚĞŶĐǇ ?Yet even this incident can be explained within the consistency of 
<ĞŶŶĞĚǇ ?ƐƉƌŽŶŽƵŶĐĞŵĞŶƚƐŽŶĨƌĞĞĚŽŵĂŶĚƚŚĞƵŶĨĞƚƚĞƌĞĚĚĞƚĞƌŵŝŶĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƉĞŽƉůĞƐ: it 
appears that he viewed the army of Cuban exiles who participated in the invasion as a 
liberating force - the representatives of a Cuba that would be freed from dictatorial 
domination, opening the way to government created from out of the will of the people.14  
Though this may have been a fanciful notion, when set in the context of actual events, 
(particularly his insistence that US military forces should not be engaged in the operation), it 
conforms to the ideas that Kennedy had repeatedly expressed in terms of the role the 
United States should take to assist indigenous peoples in securing independence and free 
determination for their homelands.15 
 
As well as The Bay of Pigs Kennedy encountered several other situations during his time in 
the White House, some of which were full crises, which tested his resilience in balancing the 
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demands of containment and liberation against his avowed willingness to negotiate.  Most 
prominent were the events in Laos in early 1961, Berlin later that year, Cuba again in 1962 
and, on and off throughout the time of his Presidency, Vietnam.  Less well observed, but 
important to the President, were developments in the Middle East, India, Indonesia and 
Africa.  Robert Komer was a senior staff member of the National Security Council from 1961 
until 1965 and recalled: 
 
 “/ƚƐƚƌŝŬĞƐŵĞƚŚĂƚƚŚĞŵŽƐƚŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚŝŶŐĐŽŶƚƌŝďƵƚŝŽŶ/ŵŝŐŚƚŵĂŬĞĨŽƌƚŚĞŽƌĂůŚŝƐƚŽƌǇŝƐŽŶ
the subject of Kennedy and the neutralists. This is, to me, one of the most interesting but 
certainly least known aspects of the President's foreign policy, largely because it didn't get a 
great deal of press attention, which is a story in itself and a blessing in disguise to some of us 
at any rate. But to me it was an extremely significant and highly successful aspect of the 
shift in American policy which took place under the New Frontier.  What I mean by 
Kennedy's policy toward the neutralists is, at least as far as I was involved in it, his policy 
toward the major neutralists personalities--largely the Nassers, the Nehrus, the Sukarnos, 
the Ben Bellas of this world. An additional personality that comes into play is [Kwame] 
EŬƌƵŵĂŚ ? ?16 
 
It is notable that on each occasion a crisis arose the President came under pressure to 
engage military forces for resolving matters and that, on each occasion, he considered the 
military options but ultimately resisted the urging of his advisers17 and sought to manage 
situations through other means.18  It is recognised that Kennedy ?ƐĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚ, in part at least, 
was fashioned by the need to avoid the ultimate conflict of nuclear war and the devastating 
consequences such would bring about.  This is most clearly illustrated in the manoeuvres 
that the President adopted for settling the Cuban Missile Crisis in October 1962, his 
avoidance of confrontation, the efforts he made to maintain communications with his Soviet 
counterpart and the means employed for resolving the (immediate) situation itself.  But 
ďĞŚŝŶĚ<ĞŶŶĞĚǇ ?ƐĚĞĨŝĂŶĐĞŽĨƚŚĞŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇ ?ĂŶĚĂǁĂǇĨƌŽŵŚŝƐĚŝĨĨŝĐƵůƚŝĞƐǁŝƚŚĂĚǀŝƐĞƌƐǁŚŽ
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tried to press for actions he did not wish to take, was the consistent thread of his thinking 
that had been shaped by his experiences.  In essence this meant: 
 
x keeping the United States out of military situations where the consequences, counter 
actions and reverberations could not be calculated with certainty; 
x taking care in all forms of intervention (economic, social, political as well as military) 
to avoid the error of turning the United States into a dominant, neo-colonial power, 
an approach which would endanger peace in the modern world; 
x engaging with new and emerging nations, maintaining a genuine concern for their 
welfare and developing ties that would serve mutual interests, delivering prosperity 




conducted.  TheǇƐŝƚŝŶĐŽŶƚƌĂƐƚƚŽƚŚĞƚǇƉĞŽĨ “ŽůĚtĂƌƚŚŝŶŬŝŶŐ ?ƚŚĂƚdominated the 
conduct of US foreign affairs under Truman, Eisenhower and, later, Johnson.  For these 
Presidents the predominant driver of US operations was the need to stem or turn back the 
spread oĨŽŵŵƵŶŝƐŵ ?<ĞŶŶĞĚǇ ?Ɛƚhinking was not new or original; the ideological basis of 
it was that free nations functioned best and that the United States of America provided 
demonstrable evidence of this; more precisely, the USA was living proof that prosperity and 
stability can be won once the chains of domination are broken.  In this regard Kennedy 
made little distinction between the imperialist domination of the dying European Empires 
and the modern hegemony of Communism.20 
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It is upon this premise - that Kennedy set his decisions on the basis of his own experiences 
and understanding, that encapsulates the terms and framework of reference through which 
this study will be conducted: 
 
To explore how John F Kennedy was influenced by matters of imperialism and 
decolonisation and how these came to bear upon his thinking on issues of foreign affairs, 
with particular reference to Vietnam. 
 
In attempting to give a meaningful analysis of this subject this study will explore avenues 
that are not commonly reported in Kennedy appraisals.  For example, Kennedy is often 
ĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞĚĂƐĂ “ƉƌĂŐŵĂƚŝƐƚ ?21  W an elected official for whom the strictures of Party were not 
always compelling and there is ample evidence to support this thesis, not least the fact that 
several Republicans were appointed to prominent positions as the New Frontier took hold.  
Notwithstanding, this does not exclude the possibility that his thinking may have had an 
ideological base; it should be noted that there is something of a revival of interest in the 
idea that pragmatism may be juxtaposed with ideology as political forces that shape the 
modern world.22  This text does not seek to counter or contradict this point of view - it is not 
aimed at proving or expounding a theory; it is primarily set to examine the proposition that 
colonialism and de-colonisation were key considerations that ĐŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶĞĚ<ĞŶŶĞĚǇ ?Ɛ
approach to foreign affairs management to the point that he took policy decisions according 
to a preconceived manner of thinking that constituted the basis of an ideology.  There is no 
question, within this analysis, that Kennedy regarded the Cold War as the central plank of 
US foreign affairs concerns throughout his life as a public representative.  There is no 
ƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶĞŝƚŚĞƌƚŚĂƚŚĞǀŝĞǁĞĚƚŚĞ “ŽŵŵƵŶŝƐƚƚŚƌĞĂƚ ?ĂŶǇůĞƐƐ ĞƌŝŽƵƐůǇƚŚĂŶĚŝĚŚŝƐ
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political colleagues and opponents or that he was less than pragmatic in meeting its 
challenges.  What is different about this study is that it seeks to uncover a line of 
ĐŽŶƐŝƐƚĞŶĐǇŝŶ<ĞŶŶĞĚǇ ?ƐĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚƚŽwaging the Cold War, the great issue of his times, in 
ways which contrast strongly with how many of the written assessments of his actions 
portray him and the ways in which his political contemporaries looked at Cold War issues. 
 
/ŶŝƚƐƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĂůĨŽƌŵƚŚŝƐƐƚƵĚǇŝƐƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĞĚďǇǁĂǇŽĨĂŶĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐŽĨ<ĞŶŶĞĚǇ ?ƐůŝĨĞĂƐĂ
representative politician, which part is broadly chronological.  To begin there is an 
ĞǆĂŵŝŶĂƚŝŽŶŽĨ<ĞŶŶĞĚǇ ?ƐůŝĨĞďĞĨŽƌĞŚŝƐĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶƚŽƌƵŶĨŽƌƉƵďůŝĐŽĨĨŝĐĞ ?/ƚŝƐǁŽƌƚŚǇŽĨ
note that, from about the time he became a university student up to the point where he set 
upon gaining election to the House of Representatives, Kennedy benefited from a unique 
insight into world affairs as they were developing.  This time in the life of Kennedy is marked 
by three distinct phases  W his attachment to the United States Embassy in London from 
1939, his experiences as an enlisted man during WWII and his short career as a journalist.  It 
is evident that each of these phases of his life contributed to the ideas and beliefs that he 
took into public office and, in particular, shaped his thinking on matters of foreign affairs.  
Evidence for this conclusion is given in those parts of the text that record his 
pronouncements while in the House of Representatives and later as a Senator, as well his 
public statements and broadcasts.  It is to be hoped that this part of the study, together 
with the corroborative statements of friends and associates, provides a clear demonstration 
ŽĨŚŽǁŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚ<ĞŶŶĞĚǇ ?ƐǀŝĞǁƐŽŶĚĞǀĞůŽƉŝŶŐŶĂƚŝŽŶƐĂŶĚƚŚĞƉĂƌƚƚŚĞǇǁŽƵůĚƉůĂǇŝŶ
the world was to his general thinking on foreign affairs and his ideas on how the US should 
manage the Cold War. 
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Apart from the narrative study, further research material is presented by way of a review of 
how writers have sought to explain John Kennedy and this aspect of his political career.  
Unusually, this part of the text is included as reflective content - following the historical 
account; the text has been structured in this way due to the fact that, had the review been 
included beforehand, cross-referencing and the necessary inclusion of an abundance of 
notes of explanation would have made it unreadable.  It is apparent, from the extracts that 
are examined and the contexts ŝŶǁŚŝĐŚƚŚĞǇĂƌĞƐĞƚ ?ƚŚĂƚǁŚŝůĞ<ĞŶŶĞĚǇ ?ƐĂĨĨŝůŝĂƚŝŽŶƚŽƚŚĞ
developing world has been recognised and commented upon by many prominent scholars, 
there is not an extensive or definitive work that ties this aspect of his thinking to his foreign 
ƉŽůŝĐǇƐƚĂƚĞŵĞŶƚƐĂŶĚĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶƐ ?/ŶĚĞĞĚ ?ŵŽƐƚƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƐĂƉƉĞĂƌƚŽĐŽŶǀĞǇ<ĞŶŶĞĚǇ ?Ɛ
reasoning as political manoeuvring for handling difficult domestic matters that he faced as a 
member of a political party that was divided on several issues.23  Importantly, it is to be 
hoped that the reader is provided with sufficient understanding to weigh that evidence in 
balance with opinions and other indications that may give cause to believe that 
ĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐŽĨĐŽůŽŶŝĂůŝƐŵĂŶĚŝŵƉĞƌŝĂůŝƐŵĚŝĚŶŽƚŚĂǀĞĂŐƌĞĂƚďĞĂƌŝŶŐŽŶ<ĞŶŶĞĚǇ ?Ɛ
decision making in foreign affairs. 
 
dŚĞƌĞŝƐĂůƐŽĂďŽĚǇŽĨƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚŵĂƚĞƌŝĂůƚŚĂƚƌĞĨĞƌƐƚŽ “ŽƚŚĞƌĨĂĐƚŽƌƐ ?ƚŚĂƚŵĂǇŚĂǀĞ
influenced Kennedy;24 this is included to give as complete a picture as possible of how 
<ĞŶŶĞĚǇ ?ƐƚŚŝŶŬŝŶŐand beliefs evolved.  This sits alongside the chronology, rather than as a 
part of it, but there are good reasons for this.  There are ŵĂŶǇĂƐƉĞĐƚƐŽĨ<ĞŶŶĞĚǇ ?ƐůŝĨĞƚŚĂƚ
might be considered as important influences and which helped shape his political outlook: 
his background, his family, his education, his associates, the times in which he grew up and 
the experiences that he went through as he matured.  There is not sufficient scope in this 
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body of work to examine and analyse all of these factors and, consequently, there is an 
element of selection in the detail that is included to explain the conclusions.  The chapter 
which deals with Books and Ireland is included as a selective piece for the following reasons: 
 
It is extraordinary to note that Kennedy repeatedly used books as a medium for 
communication.  He would often give books to ŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůƐŽƌŐƌŽƵƉƐĂƐŝĨƚŽƐĂǇ P “ƌĞĂĚƚŚŝƐ ?
ŝƚǁŝůůĞǆƉůĂŝŶǁŚĂƚ/ĂŵƚŚŝŶŬŝŶŐ ? ?,ŝƐƚŽƌŝĂŶƐŚĂǀĞŶŽƚĞĚŽĐĐĂƐŝŽŶƐǁŚĞŶŚĞŐĂǀĞďŽŽŬƐƚŽ
others in this way, but there is no apparent record of how his repeated use of this type of 
action was a communicative statement on the part of Kennedy.  The importance of this 
point is made emphatic by the nature and content of the books that he gave  W all of which 
reflected his thinking as espoused in his statements and writings. 
 
Ireland is examined as a special case because it has the quality of being the exception that 
ƉƌŽǀĞƐƚŚĞƌƵůĞŝŶĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĂƚŝŽŶŽĨ<ĞŶŶĞĚǇ ?ƐƚŚŝŶŬŝŶŐĂďŽƵƚŵĂƚƚĞƌƐĐŽůŽŶŝĂů ?/Ĩ<ĞŶŶĞĚǇ
wanted to make a forceful statement about the evils of imperialism then Ireland presented 
a case study rich with content.  He pointedly chose, however, to avoid commenting on 
/ƌĞůĂŶĚ ?ƐƉĂƐƚĂƐĂŶĂƚŝŽŶƵŶĚĞƌŝŵƉĞƌŝĂůĚŽŵŝŶĂƚŝŽŶ Wa curiosity that warrants investigation 
in a limited study such as this because of its exceptionality. 
 
As indicated below,25 there is ample material for creating a variety of images of Kennedy, 
ďŽƚŚƚŚĞŵĂŶĂŶĚƚŚĞƉƵďůŝĐĨŝŐƵƌĞ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞƌĞĂƌĞƉůĞŶƚŝĨƵů “ĨĂĐƚƐ ?ƚŽƐƵƉƉŽƌƚǁŚĂƚĞǀĞƌ
profile a writer may choose to put forward.  In the course of the last thirty years or so the 
 “ƌĞǀŝƐŝŽŶŝƐƚ ?histories that have gained such prominence26 have tended to interpret Kennedy 
according to patterns of supposed behaviour and conduct rather than in relation to any 
Christopher John Hurley  W MA Research, 2016 - 2018 22 
philosophical basis that he may have developed.  What this means is that much of what we 
have come to know and learn about Kennedy has been contextualised as driving forces that 
inform his actions and decisions.27  This study does not investigate the validity of these 
assertions, but it is to be hoped that the material presented here may give the reader cause 
for caution in accepting such interpretations of Kennedy for, by contrast, a theme of this 
analysis is to examine whether it was a developed ideology and set of beliefs and values that 
guided his decision making.  In broad description this ideology encompassed the view that 
the domination of peoples led to war and poverty and that disenfranchisement acted as a 
ďƌĂŬĞŽŶƉĞĂĐĞ ?ƉƌŽƐƉĞƌŝƚǇĂŶĚƚŚĞƉƵƌƐƵŝƚŽĨŚĂƉƉŝŶĞƐƐ ?dŚĞĂĚĚŝƚŝŽŶĂůƐƚƵĚǇŽĨ<ĞŶŶĞĚǇ ?Ɛ
relationships with books and Ireland is put forward as an examination of how strongly this 
philosophy was embedded in his personality. 
 
Finally, it should be stated that some emphasis is placed in this work on the extent to which 
Vietnam (and more broadly, Indochina) featured in the considerations of Kennedy.  There 
are two general reasons why this approach has been taken.  Firstly, Vietnam was prominent 
ŝŶ<ĞŶŶĞĚǇ ?ƐŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚƐŝŶĨŽƌĞŝŐŶĂĨĨĂŝƌƐƚŚƌŽƵŐŚŽƵƚŚŝƐƉƵďůŝĐůŝĨĞ ?&ƌŽŵƚŚĞƚŝŵĞƚŚĂƚŚĞ
visited the country in 1951 it remained a major concern of his and was an area about which 
ŚĞĨƌĞƋƵĞŶƚůǇǀĞŶƚƵƌĞĚŽƉŝŶŝŽŶƐ ?^ĞĐŽŶĚůǇ ?ĂĨƚĞƌ<ĞŶŶĞĚǇ ?ƐĚĞĂƚŚsŝĞƚŶĂŵďĞĐĂŵĞĂ
central concern of US foreign affairs and the most high profile expression of how overseas 
relations were conducted.  Without speculating on what Kennedy might or might not have 
done in relation to Vietnam had he lived longer it is instructive for an understanding of the 
beliefs that guided him in dealing with foreign affairs to recognise how matters transpired 





EVENTS AND EXPERIENCES THAT SHAPED KENNEDY 
 
From an historical perspective it is a challenge to consider the post WWII world as anything 
other than a prismatic expression of the Cold War and its many facets: the development of 
atomic weapons, the endeavours employed either to convert or preserve comparable and 
contrasting political and economic systems, the enduring propaganda, the points of near 
confrontation, the proxy conflicts and so forth. 
  
A further observation is that, although decolonisation has been widely studied and there are 
extensive and authoritative examinations of its impacts,1 the attention it has received from 
historians and commentators as a force for political reconstruction in the world, apart from 
and alongside the Cold War, has been relatively minor.  There are many reasons for this, but 
one that stands out is the fact that none of the nations that managed to cast off foreign 
domination in the years following WWII has yet attained a status of world supremacy.  It is 
only in very recent times that the economic (and, to a degree, military) prowess of nations 
such as China and India have seriously challenged the dominance of the United States as the 
worůĚ ?Ɛ superpower. 
 
It was the Cold War that was the doŵŝŶĂŶƚĨĂĐƚŽƌĚƵƌŝŶŐ<ĞŶŶĞĚǇ ?ƐĐĂƌĞĞƌĂƐĂŶĞůĞĐƚĞĚ
politician  W how to fight it, the strategy for containing and rolling back the spread of 
Communist influences and, in particular, how the United States should react to the various 
challenges that the Cold War threw up as it evolved in the 1940s and 1950s.  It is ironic to 
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note, therefore, that in the areas where the United States was directly involved, whether by 
military intervention, support for allies or political manoeuvring, in places such as Korea, 
Iraq, Guatemala, South East Asia, Algeria, Cuba and elsewhere, matters of self-
determination and national identity were often the more pertinent issue for the indigenous 
populations than the machinations of the Cold War.  Concern in the United States became 
less focused upon assisting such areas of the world to become independent, self supporting 
nations and more set upon ensuring they did not come under the influence of the 
Communist powers.  John Kennedy, although not unique in his approach to US foreign 
affairs management during the 1950s, came to recognise the disparaging effects of the 
failures that arose on account of this unbalanced standpoint and sought throughout his time 
in the House of Representatives and the Senate to change the direction of US policy.  In 
speaking out on the need for the United States to change its approach to the new nations 
he found himself at odds with both the Truman and Eisenhower administrations and 
sometimes isolated as a spokesperson. 
 
This study seeks to examine how and why Kennedy took this alternative line in foreign 
affairs, an aspect of his life and career that has received relatively little attention from 
ŚŝƐƚŽƌŝĂŶƐĂŶĚĐŽŵŵĞŶƚĂƚŽƌƐ ?dŽŐĂŝŶĂĨƵůůĞƌƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐŽĨ<ĞŶŶĞĚǇ ?ƐƐƚĂŶĐĞĂŶĚŚŽǁ
he arrived there it is necessary to reach back into the experiences and factors that 




That John Kennedy enjoyed the benefits of a privileged upbringing is well known.  His father, 
Joseph P Kennedy (JPK), was not merely wealthy, but applied his fortunate position and 
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used his wealth to gain prominence and exercise influence.  It is not necessary to provide 
biographical details of JPK but it is instructive to observe the extent to which he harboured 
ambitions for his children, particularly his two eldest, Joseph Jr. and John.  These aspirations 
tended to be geared towards creating the circumstances by which they might gain positions 
of power in their own right, especially political power.2  It was this ambition, combined with 
an attitude that encouraged his children to expand their knowledge and understanding of 
the world that contributed to the opportunities provided for Kennedy to travel overseas and 
kindled his interest in foreign affairs generally. 
 
Kennedy first visited Europe in autumn 1935, a journey postponed from a year earlier when 
he was supposed to accompany his father and brother on an excursion to meet European 
political leaders.  When he did ultimately arrive in London Kennedy met with 
representatives of the London School of Economics with a view to taking up a place there 
after completing his school career.  In the eventuality this did not materialise but Kennedy 
returned to Europe in July 1937 accompanied by school friend KirŬ>ĞDŽǇŶĞ “>Ğŵ ?ŝůůŝŶŐƐ
for an extended tour of the main European countries.  Over the following two months he 
kept a diary of his experiences that demonstrates much about his developing ideas on the 
direction and future of the European powers.  It should be noted that the contrast between 
the evolving dictatorships, the class structures of British society and the democratic nature 
of politics in the USA greatly impressed Kennedy. 
 
In the autumn of 1938 Kennedy managed to persuade the Dean (Chester Harford) at 
Harvard to allow him to undertake a secondment to the US Embassy in London (where his 
father was now Ambassador) in lieu of part of his degree studies.  This extraordinary 
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opportunity provided him with direct access to the diplomatic and foreign relations circles 
of London and other European capitals, an experience that gave him an insight not 
ordinarily available to any individual let alone an aspirant and future politician.  Here he was 
able to learn, at first hand, how the British approached the affairs of Empire and managed 
their overseas policies.  He also visited Moscow and other East European capitals, just at the 
time when WWII broke out, gaining an exceptional insight into how events were transpiring 
and the fears, ambitions and insecurities of the protagonists 
 
It was his observations of a Europe heading towards war that led him to question the 
effectiveness of democracy in meeting the challenges of the world at that time, as 
demonstrated in his university dissertation, Why England Slept.3  Notwithstanding the 
central theme of the work, it also served to act as a warning to the United States and 
identified the shortcomings of democracy as a system of government that was slow and 
unresponsive to fast moving events, incapable of decisiveness and liable to leave its 
adherents ill Wprepared for the most dangerous of situations. 
 
So it was that the USA became drawn into the conflict and Kennedy found himself on the 
front line.  In October 1943, as a Naval Lieutenant commanding a torpedo patrol boat, PT 
109, Kennedy encountered the full impact of life as someone in the crucible of war when his 
small vessel was broken in two by a Japanese destroyer.  In an incident that quickly became 
well known, subsequently became legendary and ultimately became controversial, Kennedy 
established a reputation as a war hero.  Whatever the reasons or occurrences that led to the 
incident, and however heroic or incompetent Kennedy was in what took place and what 
followed, it was without doubt a life changing event that had a long-lasting impact on how 
Christopher John Hurley  W MA Research, 2016 - 2018 27 
Kennedy viewed the military and how he dealt with military leaders during his time in the 
White House.  It also had consequences for the US Navy, the tactical use of torpedo patrol 
boats and how they were deployed.  When the rehabilitated lieutenant returned to active 
duty in October of that year his new command, PT59, had been re-equipped, was better 
armed and carried improved defence systems. 
 
/ƚŚĂƐďĞĞŶǁŝĚĞůǇƐƵŐŐĞƐƚĞĚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞŝŶĐŝĚĞŶƚĞǆĂĐĞƌďĂƚĞĚĚĂŵĂŐĞƚŽ<ĞŶŶĞĚǇ ?ƐďĂĐŬ4 and 
may have led to the several operations that he undertook in years to come.  More 
ƉĞƌƚŝŶĞŶƚůǇ ?ŝƚŚĂƐĂůƐŽďĞĞŶĐŝƚĞĚĂƐĂĨĂĐƚŽƌƚŚĂƚĚĞĞƉĞŶĞĚƚŚĞǇŽƵŶŐŵĂŶ ?ƐƐƵƐƉŝĐŝŽŶ
ƌĞŐĂƌĚŝŶŐƚŚĞǁŽƌĚƐĂŶĚǁŝƐĚŽŵŽĨ “ĞǆƉĞƌƚƐ ? ?:ĂŵĞƐ' ?ůŝŐŚƚĂŶĚ:ĂŶĞƚD ?>ĂŶŐŚĂǀe 
ǁƌŝƚƚĞŶĂďŽƵƚƚŚŝƐĂƐƉĞĐƚŽĨ<ĞŶŶĞĚǇ ?ƐƚŚŝŶŬŝŶŐŝŶĂŶĂƌƚŝĐůĞƚŝƚůĞĚ  “Black Swans / White 
,ŽƵƐĞ PtŚǇ:&<DĂƚƚĞƌƐ,ĂůĨĂĞŶƚƵƌǇĨƚĞƌĂůůĂƐ ?.5 
 
This extended paper presents a synthesis of decision making in the Kennedy White House 
based upon the theory of the Black Swan, a concept that has deep historical roots and which 
was popularised in the 20th century by the philosopher Karl Popper.  Black Swan events, in 
terms of the theory, have three elements: firstly, they occur without expectation or 
anticipation; secondly, they are characterised by extreme consequences and, thirdly, they 
are explained retrospectively (as if they could have been anticipated).  According to Blight 
and Lang Kennedy showed aspects of Black Swan thinking, a manner of consideration that 
had been brought about by the PT 109 incident, together with the persistent illnesses and 
pain that Kennedy experienced and which had imbued him with a scepticism of those who 
purported to be experts.  Shortcomings in his own life taught him that those with the 
answers seldom had the solutions: 
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 “:&<ǁĂƐĚĞĞƉůǇƐŬĞƉƚŝĐĂůŽĨƚŚĞĐůĂŝŵƐŽĨĞǆƉĞƌƚƐŽĨĂůůŬŝŶĚƐ ?,ŝƐĚŽĐƚŽƌƐĚŝĚŶŽƚŬŶŽǁŚŽǁ
to treat his many illnesses.  His surgeons exacerbated his debilitating back pain with botched 
surgeries.  His military commanders sent him and his fellow sailors into battle in the Pacific 
during World War II without understanding the horrific implications of their orders.  As 
WƌĞƐŝĚĞŶƚ ?ŚĞƌĞĨƵƐĞĚƚŽĂĐƚŽŶƚŚĞĂĚǀŝĐĞŽĨŚŝƐĞǆƉĞƌƚŚĂǁŬŝƐŚĂĚǀŝƐĞƌƐ ? ?6  
 
 
Evidence for the truth of this deduction is demonstrated in the many foreign affairs 
decisions that Kennedy made during his time in the White House which upset and annoyed 
his advisors, particularly when he was pressed to consider taking military action to resolve a 
siƚƵĂƚŝŽŶ ?dŚŝƐĂƐƉĞĐƚŽĨ<ĞŶŶĞĚǇ ?ƐĚŝƐƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶŝƐŝůůƵƐƚƌĂƚĞĚĨƵƌƚŚĞƌŝŶŚĂƉƚĞƌƐdǁŽ ?dŚƌĞĞ
and Four, below. 
  
After discharge from military service Kennedy embarked on a short career as a journalist.  
Writing for the Hearst paper the New York Journal American (Journal American), he covered 
a number of matters pertinent to foreign affairs, most prominently the establishment of the 
United Nations in May 19457 and the Potsdam Conference which took place soon after the 
end of hostilities in WWII. 
 
dŚŝƐďƌŝĞĨƉĞƌŝŽĚŽĨ<ĞŶŶĞĚǇ ?ƐůŝĨĞǁĂƐŶŽƚƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌůǇĚŝƐƚŝŶŐƵŝƐŚĞĚĂŶĚŚŝƐŽƵƚƉƵƚĂƐĂ
correspondent is not much remembered; there are, notwithstanding, one or two aspects 
that are noteworthy.  Firstly, the by-line that was used for the articles that he wrote for the 
Journal American included (on each recorded occasion8), words that described Kennedy as a 
ǁĂƌŚĞƌŽ ?ĂƐƚŚĞƐŽŶŽĨ:W<ĂŶĚ ?ŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚŝŶŐůǇ ?ĂƐǁƌŝƚŝŶŐ ?fƌŽŵĂƐĞƌǀŝĐĞŵĂŶ ?ƐǀŝĞǁƉŽŝŶƚ ? 
 
In several articles Kennedy attempts to explain how matters are managed rather than the 
substance of the issues at hand.  In one piece concerning the establishment of the UN and 
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dated 7th May, Kennedy takes ƚŚĞƐĞƌǀŝĐĞŵĂŶ ?ƐǀŝĞǁƉŽŝŶƚ more literally and uses his 
platform to set out something of a political agenda that serves to signal his intentions 
regarding a future in government: 
 
 “EŽ-one can set himself up as a spokesman for the men in ƐĞƌǀŝĐĞ ? 
 
 “/ƐĂǇƚŚŝƐďĞĐĂƵƐĞ/ĂŵŐŽŝŶŐƚŽƚƌǇƚŽƚĞůůǇŽƵŚŽǁĂŐƌŽƵƉŽĨƐĞƌǀŝĐĞŵĞŶĂŶĚǀĞƚĞƌĂŶƐǁŚŽ
are working at this conference as consultants and secretaries feel about it. 
 
 “/ŶƚŚĞŝƌĐŽŶĐĞƌŶ ?ĂŶĚĂƐĂƌĞƐƵůƚŽĨƚŚĞŝƌŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚ ?ĂŶĚďĞĐĂƵƐĞƚŚĞǇǁŝƐŚ above all else to 
spare their children and their brothers from going through the same hard times, it is 
perhaps natural that they would be disappointed with what they have seen in San 
&ƌĂŶĐŝƐĐŽ ? 
 
 “ ?dŚĞƌĞŝƐŚĞƌĞ ?ŚŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ŽŶĞƌĂǇŽĨƐŚŝŶŝŶŐďƌŝŐŚƚůŝŐŚƚ ? That is the realization, felt by all 
ƚŚĞĚĞůĞŐĂƚĞƐ ?ƚŚĂƚŚƵŵĂŶŝƚǇĐĂŶŶŽƚĂĨĨŽƌĚĂŶŽƚŚĞƌǁĂƌ ? ?9 
 
 
In a further article, dated two days later, Kennedy writes about Russian security concerns 
and comments that: 
 
 
 “ ?dŚĞǇ ?ƚŚĞ^ŽǀŝĞƚƐ ?ĂƌĞƚŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞŐŽŝŶŐƚŽŵĂke their western defences secure.  No 
countries hostile to Russia will be permitted in the countries along her borders. 
 
 “dŚĞǇĨĞĞůƚŚĞǇŚĂǀĞĞĂƌŶĞĚƚŚŝƐƌŝŐŚƚƚŽƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇ ?dŚĞǇŵĞĂŶƚŽŚĂǀĞŝƚ ?ĐŽŵĞǁŚĂƚŵĂǇ ? ?10 
 
Writing on 16th May Kennedy makes reference to how the Russian delegation was able to 
exploit the dilemma that the United States faced in keeping with its allies and not being 
seen to advocate policies that would run counter to the principles of the Charter of the 
United Nations, to which it subscribed: 
 
 “dŚĞǇ ?ƚŚĞ^ŽǀŝĞƚƐ ?ƚŚĞŶĨƵƌƚŚĞƌĐŽŵƉůŝĐĂƚĞĚƚŚĞƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶŽĨ ƚƌƵƐƚĞĞƐŚŝƉďǇĂĚǀŽĐĂƚŝŶŐ
independence for all dependent people be written into the charter. 
 
 “/ƚƉƵƚƚŚĞƌŝƚŝƐŚŝŶĂŶĞŵďĂƌƌĂƐƐŝŶŐƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶ ?dŚĞƌŝƚŝƐŚŚĂǀĞŶŽŝŶƚĞŶƚŝŽŶŽĨůŝƋƵŝĚĂƚŝŶg 
ƚŚĞŵƉŝƌĞĂŶĚǁĞĐŽƵůĚŶŽƚĐŽŵĞŽƵƚĂŐĂŝŶƐƚĂƉƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞůŝŬĞ “ŝŶĚĞƉĞŶĚĞŶĐĞ ? ? 
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On 18th May Kennedy writes of the possibility that the USA and the Soviet Union will be at 
war in  “ ?ƚŚĞŶĞǆƚ ? ?Žƌ ? ?ǇĞĂƌƐ ? ?12 
 
It is apparent, from this piece, that Kennedy understood the contradiction that faced the 
United States as it sought to support its allies in Europe while not being openly complicit in 
their attempts to recover and hold on to colonial possessions.  He also recognised that the 
path being taken by the Soviet Union could lead to conflict with the United States.  This 
factor was made the more real to Kennedy when, in his capacity as a journalist, he attended 
the conference at Potsdam in October 1945.  It was here, in close observation of the 
decision making that would shape the post war world, that Kennedy was able to discern 
how geopolitical considerations were forcing the hands of world leaders as they 
ĞŶĚĞĂǀŽƵƌĞĚƚŽĨŝŶĚĐŽŵŵŽŶŐƌŽƵŶĚŽŶƚŚĞŐƌĞĂƚŝƐƐƵĞƐŽĨƚŚĞĚĂǇ ?WƌĞƐŝĚĞŶƚdƌƵŵĂŶ ?Ɛ
principal concern at Potsdam was to settle matters relating to the future of Germany, such 
that it would not again become a threat to the peace of Europe and drag the US into further 
wars.  Secretary Stalin was intent upon ensuring the security of European Russia by 
determining Soviet control of the lands that Nazi Germany had colonised in its expansion 
eastwards.  And Winston Churchill, followed by Clement Atlee, was most concerned with re-
stabilising the economy of the United Kingdom, whatever this might have meant in either 
prolonging the British Empire or cutting back on its commitments.  For France, Potsdam 
presented an opportunity for establishing itself in a position as the pre-eminent power of 
continental Western Europe, capable of ensuring that its eastern borders would not again 
be breached. 
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The Potsdam Conference, the explosion of the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki13 
and the end of the Second World War all took place within a matter of days and John 
Kennedy was extraordinarily privileged to have been a close witness as these events 
unfolded.  In his subsequent life as a representative in public office Kennedy frequently 
referred to the need for the United States, and the world in general, to avoid war.  His 
predominant interest was foreign affairs and he became recognised, particularly during his 
time as a Senator, for taking a counter-line in his recommendations for how the United 
States should conduct its foreign affairs in the post-war world.14  At the core of this 
alternative approach was his stated belief in the benefits to be gained for the United States, 
the former empire states and the new, emerging nations, by promoting the free 
determination of peoples in keeping with the declaration of the United Nations, the 
existence of which would contribute to the demise of old style imperialism.  These 
assertions are explained more fully in the ChĂƉƚĞƌƐƚŚĂƚĚĞĂůǁŝƚŚ<ĞŶŶĞĚǇ ?ƐƚŝŵĞĂƐa 
member of the House of Representatives, as a Senator and as President.  It is important, 
nevertheless, to position ƚŚŝƐǀŝĞǁŽĨ<ĞŶŶĞĚǇ ?Ɛdeveloping ideas in the context of the world 
situation as it was evolving; the Appendix to this text (see p140) sets out the competing 
motivations of the main participants at the Potsdam Conference, giving some insight into 
the positions of the prominent powers in respect of the issue of decolonisation at the time. 
   
It was with this background that John Kennedy developed his thinking on matters of politics 
ĂŶĚŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůĂĨĨĂŝƌƐ ?<ĞŶŶĞĚǇ ?ƐĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞĂƐĂũŽƵƌŶĂůŝƐƚŝƐŝŶĨŽƌŵŝŶŐďŽƚŚĨŽƌƚŚĞ
nature of his work and the fact that he was present at the birth of the United Nations and 
saw, first hand, the difficulties that were presented in establishing an effective organisation 
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based upon universal principles.  He developed an understanding of the devastation that 
had resulted from world conflict, learned about Soviet concerns for border security, was 
conscious of the dangers of a future war with the Soviet Union and specifically identified the 
problems that self-determination posed for all delegations involved in the conference.  For 
the Russians, self-determination conflicted with its objectives for border security, for the 
Europeans, self-determination ran counter to their wishes to retain their imperial 
possessions and, for the United States, self-determination created a dilemma that it could 
not easily resolve  W to support the principle while, simultaneously, retaining the trust of its 
allies. 
 
When Kennedy came to face these problems and contradictions as an elected 
representative he sought to drive US foreign affairs management in a way that would break 
the quandary  W he pressed for independence and self-determination for colonial 
possessions while endeavouring to persuade the imperial powers that their interests need 
not be compromised.  In pursuing this path, Kennedy also coloured Soviet domination of its 
border states as a ĨŽƌŵŽĨŵŽĚĞƌŶŝŵƉĞƌŝĂůŝƐŵ ?ǇĨŽůůŽǁŝŶŐƚŚŝƐƉĂƚŚ<ĞŶĞĚǇ ?ƐƚŚŝŶŬŝŶŐ
was conditioned to the idea that imperialism was a moribund and unsustainable concept 
and the United States must position itself to be best placed to befriend the nations that 
would emerge from its denouement  W regardless of the fact that non-alignment could mean 
some states might not wish to establish committed relations. 
 
/ƚƐŚŽƵůĚŶŽƚďĞĨŽƌŐŽƚƚĞŶƚŚĂƚ<ĞŶŶĞĚǇ ?ƐƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůŝĚĞĂƐǁĞƌĞƐŚĂƉĞĚĨƌŽŵŚŝƐĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞƐ ?
as outlined above and that he had no doubts about the threat posed for the future of the 
United States by the Soviet Union and the widening influence of world Communism.  His 
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views on the iniquities of colonialism were based upon his observations (in Indochina and 
elsewhere) and the extent to which the Truman and Eisenhower administrations paid little 
heed to the importance of winning over new nations as they broke free from imperial 
oversight.  There was a certain simplicity to this way of thinking  W if the United States was 
not willing to win over the developing world, then the path was open to the Soviet Union to 
fill the void, a situation that would weaken the position of the United States in the Cold War.  
As an elected representative Kennedy pronounced widely and frequently on the base 
desires of peoples for freedom, an interpretable concept but one which he often linked to 
the history of the United States, how it was created and what it meant for a nation that had 
emerged from out of an imperial past.  Besides this simple understanding, Kennedy also 
gained from the experiences of his youth to derive a view of the world that had been 
changed, in many ways, by the Second World War and by the events that led to the Second 
World War, which he had observed at close quarters while his father was Ambassador in 
London. 
 
Kennedy stated that his wartime experiences had left him sceptical about the quality of 
military leaders and their understanding of the implications of their decisions for ordinary 
serving personnel;15 he grew to the conviction that war should be avoided and, most 
importantly, the drift to war with the Soviet Union which was already underway was the 
most dangerous prospect for the United States.  It is not insignificant that Kennedy was 
writing for the Journal American at just the moment when the Manhattan Project was 
realising its objectives, but the world was unaware of the development.  Once the full 
implications of atomic power were apparent (particularly so after the successful detonation 
of thermo-nuclear weapons), the imperative of avoiding the nuclear option in settling 
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disputes was made all the more vital.  Eisenhower resisted the deployment of atomic bombs 
in Vietnam in 1954 and Kennedy steered a careful course in avoiding their introduction 
during the Cuban crisis in 1962.  In each case there was pressure from military advisors to 
authorise their use. 
 
dŚŝƐ ?ŚŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ǁĂƐŝŶƚŚĞĨƵƚƵƌĞ ?<ĞŶŶĞĚǇ ?ƐŝŵŵĞĚŝĂƚĞƚŚŽƵŐ ƚƐǁĞƌĞĨŽĐƵƐĞĚƵƉŽŶŐĂŝŶŝŶŐ





<EEz ?^WWZK,dO FOREIGN AFFAIRS AS CONGRESSMAN 
 
Kennedy ran for the 11th Congressional District in Massachusetts, covering the wards of 
Boston, Somerville and Cambridge.   He overcame ten opponents for the Democratic Party 
nomination and two (a Republican and a Prohibitionist) in the election.1 This was a time 
ǁŚĞŶƉŽůŝƚŝĐƐŝŶŐĞŶĞƌĂůǁĂƐƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌůǇŚŝŐŚŝŶǀŽƚĞƌƐ ?ŵŝŶĚƐĂƐĚĞŵŽďŝůŝƐĂƚŝŽŶĂŶĚƚŚĞ
disruption of the economy brought about by WWII had created difficulties for many 
families. Equally, mĞŵŽƌŝĞƐŽĨƚŚĞ'ƌĞĂƚĞƉƌĞƐƐŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞ ‘ƚŚŝƌƚŝĞƐǁĞƌĞƐƚŝůůĨƌĞƐŚĨŽƌŵĂŶǇ
people and there was a widespread fear that the post-war economy might tip again into 
recession as war production shut down.2 
 
As has been explained in the first section of this document, an argument may be made to 
assert that the processes of decolonisation resulting from the demise of the European 
empires ultimately had more far-reaching consequences for the shape of the 21st century 
world than did the material outcomes of the Cold War.  This suggestion is put forward as a 
paradox in the face of the fact that most treatments of the history of the second half of the 
20th century are framed within the context of the Cold War.  As contributory factors that 
were shaping the changing world at the time that Kennedy entered into federal politics, four 
important developments stand out: 
x firstly, decolonisation, in its most manifest forms, started to take place; 
x at exactly the same time the realities of the developing Cold War began to be felt; 
x thirdly, military strategy was re-defined by the introduction of nuclear weapons and; 
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fourthly, 
x the United Nations was established. 
As explained above, in terms of influence upon foreign affairs management for the major 
powers, these elements pulled in different directions.  Contradictions, particularly in regard 
to the United Nations declaration on self-determination, posed particular dilemmas for the 
US, the Soviets and the Empire powers.   In 1946, as these four phenomena came into 
general consciousness the outcomes remained uncertain and governments tended to react 
to events as they unfolded.  Certainly, in the USA at least, it took several years before a 
coherent policy towards Soviet expansionism and the perceived military threat was 
formulated.  Similarly, as the European powers attempted either to withdraw from or hold 
onto their colonies there were scenes of disruption and sometimes chaos.  For the Soviet 
Union there was a problem of credibility as it gave public support for self-determination 
while taking steps to ensure that states on its borders remained compliant to its security 
needs.  That decolonisation was a major (possibly the principal) driver of geopolitical change 
in the world after 1945 is illustrated by the fact that the UN, in 1946, comprised just 51 
signature nations,3 a number which grew to 132 by 1971.4  A significant part of this increase 
was due to the admission of new, independent states created from out of the former 
European empires. 
 
It was precisely as these extraordinary factors emerged that Kennedy embarked upon a 
political career that saw him embroiled in the affairs of the federal state for the remainder 
of his life.  That he was drawn in his foreign affairs considerations by each of these 
enormous developments may be taken as given, but what is less clear is which factors had 
the greater influence. 
Christopher John Hurley  W MA Research, 2016 - 2018 37 
 
Foreign relations were high on the agenda for the Truman administration and the public as a 
whole.  Developing situations concerning the Near East, the expansion of Soviet influence in 
Europe, the Middle East and other parts of the world, the continuing civil war between the 
Kuomintang and the Communist forces of Mao Zedong, all provided sources of tension and 
concern.  Several factors had changed to add piquancy to the world situation, from the 
point of view of the United States.  Firstly, it was now accepted that the interests of the US, 
for security, economic and ideological purposes, meant its close involvement in world 
affairs; secondly, in formulating a strategy for meeting the demands of this new role, the US 
held a monopoly in nuclear weapons, a factor that both opened and closed options in terms 
of military response.  For the Democratic Party, the problems of managing these issues (as 
well as dealing with domestic matters, which could be equally demanding), were 
ĐŽŵƉŽƵŶĚĞĚďǇƚŚĞWĂƌƚǇ ?ƐƉŽŽƌƐŚŽǁŝŶŐŝŶƚŚĞŵŝĚ-term elections in 1948 that delivered 
Republican majorities in both House and Senate. 
 
Kennedy was restrained in his pronouncements on foreign affairs during his first years in the 
House, seeking to listen and learn before attempting to raise his profile.  He confined his 
attentions to the matters on which he had campaigned: ŚŽƵƐŝŶŐ ?ǀĞƚĞƌĂŶƐ ?ǁĞůĨĂƌĞ ?ůĂďŽƵƌ
relations, education and constituency interests and, notwithstanding his contributions to 
the debates on the Truman Doctrine, aid for Greece and Turkey and the Marshall Plan, did 
not make a major venture into foreign affairs until 1949.   This is not altogether surprising 
for the protocol and dynamics of the House of Representatives did not provide much scope 
for those recently elected to make an impact and he was, anyway, seen as a young, 
inexperienced representative.   When he did first advance strong views on foreign affairs 
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matters he spoke on the situation in China that had resulted in the Communist takeover.  In 
a remarkable statement of dissent, Kennedy made a scathing attack on the Truman 
administration for failing its first major test of resisting Communist expansion.  Using 
uncompromising language Kennedy condemns what he sees as successive US failings in 
China since before the start of WWII, concluding with: 
 
 “This is the tragic story of China whose freedom we once fought to preserve.  What our 
young men had saved, our diplomats and our PresideŶƚŚĂǀĞĨƌŝƚƚĞƌĞĚĂǁĂǇ ? ? 5 
 
This particular episode marks the beginning of a period leading up to and beyond his 
ĞŶƚƌĂŶĐĞŝŶƚŽƚŚĞtŚŝƚĞ,ŽƵƐĞĚƵƌŝŶŐǁŚŝĐŚ<ĞŶŶĞĚǇ ?ƐƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚŝĐĂůǀŝĞǁŽĨƚŚĞƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶ
and role of the United States in the world developed through phases into an approach that 
was often at odds with both political opponents and allies.  This viewpoint was 
characterised by a questioning attitude to the prevailing policy axioms, based upon 
Containment and the Domino Theory, that were created by the Truman administration and 
ŵŽƌĞŽƌůĞƐƐĐŽŶƚŝŶƵĞĚƚŚƌŽƵŐŚƚŚĞŝƐĞŶŚŽǁĞƌĞƌĂ ?<ĞŶĞĚǇ ?ƐĨŽƌĞŝŐŶĂĨĨĂŝƌƐƐƉĞĞĐŚĞƐĂŶĚ
the written articles and broadcasts he made from the time of his later years in the House of 
Representatives and up to when he was elected President in 1960 show a marked 
inclination to dissent from the approaches taken by the Truman and Eisenhower 
administrations in managing foreign affairs.  This is not to state that Kennedy categorically 
rejected Containment or disavowed the Domino Theory; he did not.6  His dissatisfaction was 
expressed on the methods employed to improve the position of the United States, which he 
saw as ineffective and failing.  
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Another factor that features strongly is the extent to which Kennedy appears to emphasise 
ƚŚĞ “ůŽƐƐ ?ŽĨŚŝŶĂƚŽĂŽŵŵƵŶŝƐƚĨŽƌĐĞƚŚĂƚŝƐůŝƚƚůĞŵŽƌĞƚŚĂŶĂƐƚŽŽŐĞŽĨDŽƐĐŽǁ ?ƐŽ
enhancing the reach and prestige of the Soviet Union to the cost of the interests of the 
United States.  The quoted part above is the closing statement of the speech which places 
the matter in the category of loss of freedom, but what precedes this conclusion is a string 
of accusations that point at those in positions of power and influence who had failed in the 




tĂƌƌŝŽƌ ? ?ƌĞĂĚǇƚŽĨĂĐĞĚŽǁŶDŽƐĐŽǁĂŶĚƵƐĞƚŚĞŵŝŐŚƚŽĨƚŚĞhŶŝƚĞĚ^ƚĂƚĞƐƚŽĚŽƐŽ ?7   
This however, is a simplistic analysis of the complex forces at play at the time and is 
insufficient to explain how Kennedy went on to address this issue in years to come.  What it 
does in fact show is that Kennedy was willing to speak his mind on major issues in ways that 
would make him stand out from his fellow politicians (not in ways that necessarily attracted 
approbation) and that he was seeking to develop a different approach to the great issue of 
the day  W the threat of spreading Communism. 
 
Kennedy Becomes Outspoken on US Foreign Policy 
 
Edmund Gullion, a diplomat by profession, made the acquaintance of Kennedy in 1946 and, 
ŝŶŚŝƐŽǁŶǁŽƌĚƐ ?ƚŚĞǇďĞĐĂŵĞ “ĐůŽƐĞĨƌŝĞŶĚƐ ? ?&ŽůůŽǁŝŶŐƚŚĞĚĞĂƚŚŽĨƚŚĞWƌĞƐŝĚĞŶƚŝŶ
1963, Gullion agreed to contribute a spoken history interview for inclusion in the records of 
the Kennedy Library and on July 17, 1964 in Washington, he met with Samuel E. Belk, III and 
related his impressions.  Early on in the discussion Gullion was asked about first meeting the 
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future President and he explained how Dean Acheson, at that time Secretary of State and in 
whose office he was engaged, asked him to make contact with a new young Congressman 
who wished to deliver a speech in the House on foreign affairs.  Gullion described this early 
encounter: 
 
 “/ĐŽƵůĚŐŽon about this speech. I do remember that it was not in the atmosphere of the 
time; one might have expected it to take either the Soviet Union, our gallant ally, who had 
stood off the enemy on the east front, or it might have been one that echoed deep concern 
about Communism. Actually, it was a very realistic and an advanced kind of perspective that 
he had, and it was his own. My own contributions to it were factual, and I volunteered some 
opinions and some sentences, but I was somewhat surprised and, I suppose, my own very 
youthful egoisms somewhat checked when I saw the finished product and realized how 
much of this was Kennedy and how little of it was mine. It was quite an interesting 
ƉƌŽĚƵĐƚ ? ?8 
 
 
When asked about the extent to which the Congressman, Senator and later President took 
an interest in his career, Gullion affirmed that their relationship was such that Kennedy did 
inquire of his assignments and postings and added: 
 
 “^ŝŶĐĞŚĞǁĂƐĂĐƌŝƚŝĐŽĨĚŵŝŶŝƐƚƌĂƚŝŽŶĂŶĚ^ƚĂƚĞĞƉĂƌƚŵĞŶƚƉŽlicy on Indochina and a 
very outspoken and categoric critic and since he knew that I shared his views, he felt that he 
could embarrass me or hurt me in the Foreign Service bureaucracy if he became identified 
with me, and he showed a delicacy or restraint about trying to consult me. He knew that 
could embarrass me with my superiors. And indeed, before he acquired the national stature 
and reputation that he did, it could have been quite damaging and, in fact, one or two times 




demonstrates the extent to which the Congressman was assertive and lacking deference in 
his words.  Even in his earliest public pronouncements Kennedy was taking an individualist 
line, an approach in which he became bolder as he became more established. He was 
ambitious enough to seek higher office and, as he succeeded in his political aspirations he 
gained the recognition and status he needed to press his ideas upon a broader audience.  
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After two terms as a Member of the House of Representatives, he was ready to try for the 
Senate. 
 
Kennedy and Indochina 
 
In Hanoi on 2nd September 1945 Vietnamese nationalist leader Ho Chi Minh stood before a 
gathering of the indigenous population and issued a declaration of independence.  The 
League for the Independence of Vietnam, more widely known as the Viet Minh, had, under 
,Ž ?ƐůĞĂĚĞƌƐŚŝƉ ?ƉůĂǇĞĚĂƉĂƌƚŝŶĚƌŝǀŝŶŐŽƵƚƚŚĞ:ĂƉĂŶĞƐĞŝŶǀĂĚĞƌƐǁŚŽŚĂĚƚĂŬĞŶŽǀĞƌƚŚĞ
South East Asian peninsula from the ruling French.  Ho had been equipped and assisted in 
this task by the United States.  In making the declaration Ho drew from the second 
paragraph of the United States Declaration of Independence, 1776: 
 
 “ůůŵĞŶĂƌĞĐƌĞĂƚĞĚĞƋƵĂů ?dŚĞǇĂƌĞĞŶĚŽǁĞĚďy their Creator with certain inalienable 
ƌŝŐŚƚƐ ?ĂŵŽŶŐƚŚĞŵĂƌĞ>ŝĨĞ ?>ŝďĞƌƚǇ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞƉƵƌƐƵŝƚŽĨ,ĂƉƉŝŶĞƐƐ ? ?
 
Further into his speech, Ho invoked the United Nations charter: 
 
 “We are convinced that the Allied nations which at Tehran and San Francisco have 
acknowledged the principles of self-determination and equality of nations, will not refuse to 
acknowledge the independence of Vietnam. ?10 
 
Ho Chi Minh had been a founder member of the Communist movement in Vietnam and 
there was concern in the United States that power in his hands would draw upon support 
from Moscow (and later the PRC), making him and Vietnam a symbol of spreading 
Communism.   Confusion was widespread throughout what was recognised as the country 
of Vietnam in September and October 1945 with various interests involved (US, Great 
Britain, France, Chinese Nationalists as well as the Vietminh), each pursuing different ends.  
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Vietnam had been discussed at the Postdam Conference earlier in July but only as a minor 
item when it was agreed that France could seek to regain its former colonial status in the 
region. 
 
Kennedy was undoubtedly aware of these events as they unfolded in Vietnam during 1945 
because he reported on the Postdam Conference for the Journal American.  He must have 
known about Ho Chi Minh and his efforts to secure independence from the French and must 
also have been aware of how the colonial war developed and progressed.  One must 
consider what he made of the fact that it was a Communist sympathiser who was drawing 
upon the UN Charter and the American Declaration of Independence for inspiration, rather 
than those factions in Indochina that the United States purportedly supported.  He did not, 
though, choose to comment openly on the matter until after he had visited Indochina and 
witnessed the situation for himself in late 1951, just as he sought to gain higher office. 
 
It was evident to many who knew Kennedy at the time that the Congressman would not 
remain in the House of Representatives for long11 and in 1951 he engaged upon a campaign 
aimed at securing a Senate seat.  To do so presented a challenge to Kennedy, especially as it 
required overcoming the incumbent Henry Cabot-Lodge, a scion of a well established 
Republican family with a high reputation in the State, having represented Massachusetts 
since 1937. 
 
Election matters aside, in September 1951, while still a Congressman, Kennedy, together 
with brother Robert and sister Patricia, embarked upon a fact-finding tour that took the 
group to the Middle East, the Indian Sub-Continent and South East Asia.  This important 
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episode in the life of the future President is especially notable for the number of influential 
people he was able to meet and with whom he discussed world affairs.  In India, for 
example, he had an audience with Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru who, according to 
journalist Seymour Topping: 
 
 “ ?impressed (him) with a seminar on the dynamism and the irreversible nature of the 
anticolonial revolution in Asia. ?12 
 
The Kennedy caravan arrived in Saigon on 19th October 1951.  At this time the US was 
heavily involved (as part of the UN forces) in fighting on the Korean peninsula.  Since the 
end of 1950 the war had moved into a form of stalemate with most of the military action 
taking place around the 38th Parallel, a situation that would continue for a further eighteen 
months.  Vietnam was also in conflict - with French troops engaged in operations to secure 
the country against the Viet Minh, which had retreated from the cities and was operating as 
a guerrilla force based in jungle and mountain encampments.  US involvement in Vietnam 
was conditioned by the Mutual Defense Assistance Act, passed toward the end of 1949, 
which gave the President authority to extend military and other support to friendly nations 
engaged in combating the spread of Communism.  Such support had been made available to 
assist France in its efforts to re-colonise Vietnam (and French Indochina generally) and, by 
the time Kennedy arrived in Saigon, was essential to the French in maintaining their position 
in the country. 
 
For some in the American Legation in Saigon13 it had become clear that the French 
endeavours to recover the position they held in the country prior to WWII were doomed.  In 
particular, Ed Gullion, with whom Kennedy was already acquainted and Robert Blum, chief 
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of the economic mission at the legation had, according to Topping, incurred the wrath of 
both the French and their own superiors in the State Department for speaking too frankly 
about their views on the failings of the French operation in the country.14 
 
Topping described Kennedy and his entourage stepping off the aeroplane in Saigon and 
being greeted warmly by Ed Gullion; he then moved across to Topping himself and asked to 
speak with him about the situation in Vietnam.  Topping agreed and the next afternoon the 
Congressman appeared at his city centre apartment.  Kennedy had by then already been 
briefed by Gullion, both on his views of the impossible prospects for the French prevailing 
and the shortcomings of the United States in failing to recognise this and supporting a 
flawed strategy.  Gullion (and Blum) believed that the US should be much more assertive in 
supporting the claims of non-Communist nationalists for eventual independence of the 
country and should pass aid directly to the indigenous armed forces, something that the 
French high commissioner, General Bernard de Lattre de Tassigny vehemently opposed.15 
 
Topping explained to Kennedy the situation as he viewed it at that time and as he believed it 
might evolve.  He stated that when he had arrived in the city eighteen months previously 
Americans were the most popular of foreigners in Saigon.  This he attributed to the fact that 
the United States had granted what was generally seen as a fair and supportive 
independence to the Philippines16 and having a presence as a force in Vietnam may lead to 
the same there.  But this changed as the months passed and the US was identified simply as 
a bulwark to French ambitions for the restoration of colonial rule; this pushed nationalist 
sentiment towards the Viet Minh, the very situation Washington was seeking to avoid. 
 
Christopher John Hurley  W MA Research, 2016 - 2018 45 
Topping went on to explain to Kennedy that Ho Chi Minh had access to vast supplies of men, 
training and equipment as a result of the links he had established with the PRC and the 
porosity of the border in the north (due in part to the strategy of the French for holding 
towns and forts but having little presence in the villages and areas between).17 
 
Topping stated that Kennedy ended the discussion by remarking: 
 




Kennedy subsequently met and had dinner with Bao Dai,19 ƚŚĞ&ƌĞŶĐŚĂƉƉŽŝŶƚĞĚ “,ĞĂĚŽĨ
^ƚĂƚĞ ? ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞŶƐƉŽŬĞǁŝƚŚĚĞ>ĂƚƚƌĞŚŝŵƐĞůĨ ?dŚŝƐůĂƚƚĞƌŵĞĞƚŝŶŐǁĂƐƵŶƐƵĐĐĞƐƐĨƵů ?ƚŚĞ
'ĞŶĞƌĂůǁĂƐƐŽƵƉƐĞƚďǇ<ĞŶŶĞĚǇ ?ƐƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶƐĂŶĚĂƐƐĞƌƚŝŽŶƐŽŶƚŚĞƐŝƚƵĂƚŝŽn that he wrote 
to US Saigon Ambassador Donald Heath and also to his supporters in Washington to 
ĐŽŵƉůĂŝŶĂďŽƵƚƚŚĞŽŶŐƌĞƐƐŵĂŶ ?Ɛ “ŝŵƉĞƌƚŝŶĞŶĐĞ ? ?20 
 
Following his time in Saigon Kennedy visited Hanoi and gained a first hand experience of the 
situation on the ground where the strength of the Viet Minh forces was at its most 
ĂƉƉĂƌĞŶƚ ?dŽƉƉŝŶŐƌĞĨĞƌƐƚŽ<ĞŶŶĞĚǇ ?ƐƉƌĞǀŝŽƵƐĐŽŵŵĞŶƚƐŽŶƚŚĞĨĂŝůƵƌĞŽĨƚŚĞhŶŝƚĞĚ
States to support Jiang Jieshi ĂŶĚƚŚĞ<ƵŽŵŝŶƚĂŶŐǁŚŝĐŚŚĂĚůĞĚƚŽƚŚĞ “ĨĂůů ?ŽĨŚŝŶĂ ?ŚĞ
writes: 
 
 “/n a speech before the House of Representatives on January 25, 1949,21 he accused the 
Truman administration of crippling Chiang Kai-ƐŚĞŬ ?ƐEĂƚŝŽŶĂůŝƐƚŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚďǇĚĞůĂǇŝŶŐ
needed aid while pressuring it to enter a coalition with the Communists.  It was a 
contention, as regards the supply of military aid, which defied the facts.  His Asian tour, and 
especially his talk with Nehru, spurred him to a reappraisal of what was transpiring on the 
ĐŽŶƚŝŶĞŶƚ ? ?22 
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<ĞŶŶĞĚǇ ?ƐƐƉĞĞĐŚŝŶ^ĂůĞŵŝŶ ? ? ? ?ŚĂĚdemonstrated his anger at the loss of China but was 
used by him to criticise the way the Cold War was being fought at the time by the Truman 
administration.  After his visit to Vietnam in 1951 his views modified to reflect the fact that 
he had come to beliĞǀĞƚŚĞƉƌŽďůĞŵǁĂƐƌŽŽƚĞĚŝŶƚŚĞƉŽƉƵůĂƚŝŽŶ ?ƐĂƐƉŝƌĂƚŝŽŶƐĨŽƌƐĞůĨ-
determination and freedom from colonial oversight  W in whatever form.  This alteration in 
his approach was reinforced by his meeting with Nehru at which the Indian Premier had 
reiterated the shortcomings of colonial oversight. 
 
Edmund Gullion gave his own account of the time that the future President spent in 
Vietnam in 1951.23  ,ĞŵĞŶƚŝŽŶĞĚƚŚĞŵĞĞƚŝŶŐǁŝƚŚĚĞ>ĂƚƚƌĞĂŶĚƚŚĞƐƵďƐĞƋƵĞŶƚ “ůĞƚƚĞƌŽĨ
ĐŽŵƉůĂŝŶƚ ?ƚŚĂƚĐĂŵĞƚŽŵďĂƐƐĂĚŽƌ,ĞĂƚŚ ?'ullion also commented on the extent to 
which the experience of visiting Vietnam provided Kennedy with ideas and a point of view 
that seemed to cast him at odds with what was the accepted role of the United States at the 
time: 
 
 “^ŽŵĞƚŚŝŶŐĂďŽƵƚŚŝƐŵĞƚŚŽĚŽf operation was formed, I think, in Indochina, that not only 
illustrated his method, but, I think, that he learned something from that experience. On 
foreign policy, I think that a great many of the issues that were to preoccupy him have to do 
with the dilemma of the United States as the architect of the Atlantic Alliance and the 
principle defender of freedom, and the United States as a former colonial country and one 
which has always manifested a particular sympathy with the aspirations of new countries of 
emerging peoples. 
 
I think that he came into contact with this in its early and very acute form in Indochina a 
long time before this became one of the very dominant crises, dilemma, if you will, of our 
foreign policy. Remember at that time just after the war, although India and the British 
possessions were going free, a great cascade of colonial authority had not occurred. And 
although President Roosevelt [Franklin D. Roosevelt] had challenged, for example, at least in 
a somewhat offhand way, at least the French thought, the durability, continuity of French 
power in Southeast Asia, still I think that we did not really foresee that there would be this 
general sweeping away of colonial authority, nor did we challenge, really, the way in which 
our allies were doing things. This, in the Far East was particularly true when we came later 
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on to be involved in Korea, and of course I knew the President during this time, too. It 
looked as if we were bearing one burden in Korea, and that our European Allies would be 
bearing something of the same burden in Southeast Asia. Without going into that analogy 
very deeply, it was an extremely false and treacherous one. Our role in Southeast Asia, and 
Korea, is nothing like that of the French at that time in Southeast Asia. I think the French 
learned a tremendous amount from their Indochina experience, which they put to great 
profit in their administration, especially under de Gaulle [Charles A. de Gaulle], with their 
later operations in Africa. 
 
But at that time what the President was doing was in a way challenging the establishment. I 
ĚŽŶ ?ƚůŝŬĞƚŽƵƐĞƚŚĂƚǁŽƌĚƌŝŐŚƚŶŽǁ ?ďƵƚŚŝƐƐƚĂŶĐĞŽŶ/ŶĚŽĐŚŝŶĂĐĞƌƚĂŝŶůǇǁĞŶƚĂŐĂŝŶƐƚƚŚĞ
ƉƌĞǀĂŝůŝŶŐŽƉŝŶŝŽŶ ?/ĚŽŶ ?ƚƚŚŝŶŬƚŚĂƚƚŚĞWƌĞƐŝĚĞŶƚƌĞĂůůǇĞǀĞƌƐĂǁŚŝŵƐĞůĨĂƐĂĨůĂŵŝŶŐ
radical, who was out to tear down walls in this sense. I believe he was, his method of 
political operation at least, was pragmatist. He had certainly long and real liberal goals, but I 
would never have thought that he would feel at home cast in the role as a destroyer of the 
existing order or even preconceptions. Yet his challenge here to what was thought and 
ďĞůŝĞǀĞĚŝŶ/ŶĚŽĐŚŝŶĂǁĂƐƋƵŝƚĞŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚ ? ?24 
 
 
This explanation of Kennedy, his values and beliefs and his approach to the US role in South 
East Asia, is illuminating.  It states (not suggests) that his foreign affairs thinking was 
ĐŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶĞĚďǇƚŚĞhŶŝƚĞĚ^ƚĂƚĞƐ ?ĐŽůŽŶŝĂůƉĂƐƚ ?ƚŚĂƚƚŚĞǁĂƌŝŶ <ŽƌĞĂwas one thing, but the 
issues of Vietnam and its neighbouring states were drawing the United States into situations 
that sat ill with its position in the world and the way decolonisation was changing that 
world.  This position could not be sustained in the manner prevalent at the time and forces 
of nationalism, divesting of the shackles of empires, were a (perhaps, the) determinant for 
the future geopolitical structure of the world.  
 
<ĞŶŶĞĚǇ ?ƐƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐĂŶĚŝŶƚĞƌƉƌĞƚĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞƐĞĨĂĐƚŽƌƐŝƐĚĞŵŽŶƐƚƌĂƚed by the 
comments he made about his travels after returning to the United States.  On 14th 
November 1951 he delivered a radio broadcast over The Mutual Broadcasting Network, 
from New York.  He spoke extensively of the poverty and disparity that he had observed in 
the Middle East, of the attempts by India to take a course of non-alignment to the 
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Communist and capitalist creeds, of the unrest and uncertainty in Burma and Malaysia and, 
of course, of his time in Vietnam: 
 
 “/Ŷ/ŶĚŽ-China we have allied ourselves to the desperate effort of a French regime to hang 
on to the remnants of empire.  There is no broad, general support of the native Viet Nam 
Government among the people of that area and there will be none until the French give 
clear indications that, despite their gallantry, they are fighting not merely for themselves 
but for the sake of strengthening a non-Communist native government so that it can move 
safely toward independence.  These Indo-Chinese states are puppet states, French 
principalities with great resources but as typical examples of empire and of colonialism as 
can be found anywhere.  To check the southern drive of Communism makes sense but not 
only through reliance on the force of arms.  The task is rather to build strong native non-
Communist sentiment within these areas and rely on that as a spearhead of defense rather 
than upon the legions of General de Lattre, brilliant though he may be.  And to do this apart 
from and in defiance of innately nationalistic aims spells foredoomed failure.  To the rising 
drive of nationalism, we have unfortunately become a friend of its enemy and as such its 
ĞŶĞŵǇĂŶĚŶŽƚŝƚƐĨƌŝĞŶĚ ? ?25 
 
 
On 2nd December 1951 Kennedy was interviewed by a panel of journalists on the NBC 
television production, Meet the Press.26  He was asked about his recent tour of the East and 
how the United States stood in the parts of the world that he visited.  Kennedy stated that 
the United States could count upon some friends, Siam, Pakistan and Israel for example, but 
that there existed a neutrality or even latent hostility of views towards the US from other 
nations; he attributed this to the fact that the United States aligned itself with the former 
European imperialists.  Kennedy was asked about some remarks he had made previously 
about AmerŝĐĂŶĚŝƉůŽŵĂƚƐƐƉĞŶĚŝŶŐƚŚĞŝƌƚŝŵĞŝŶƚŚĞƐĞƉĂƌƚƐŽĨƚŚĞǁŽƌůĚ “ĚƌŝŶŬŝŶŐĐŽĐŬƚĂŝůƐ
ĂŶĚƉůĂǇŝŶŐƚĞŶŶŝƐ ? ?27  Kennedy drew back from this statement (without disavowing it) to 
ĞǆƉůĂŝŶƚŚĂƚŚŝƐĐŽŶĐĞƌŶǁĂƐƚŚĂƚƚŚĞhŶŝƚĞĚ^ƚĂƚĞƐ ?ƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂƚŝǀĞƐǁĞƌĞĨĂŝůŝŶŐƚŽbecome 
sufficiently acquainted with the nations that were growing out of the decline of the 
European empires.  There was a failure to learn languages and customs, a lack of 
understanding of the ways and traditions of the peoples and, consequently, there was a 
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failure on the part of the United States in not getting the right people into the Foreign 
Service who could best represent the interests of the USA.  When pressed on how the 
Foreign Service might improve upon its performance he suggested more effective 
propaganda28 and more assistance for social and economic programmes.29 
 
On Indochina specifically, Kennedy remarked that the United States was becoming 
associated with the French colonists and would not secure the support of the nations there 
until the French committed to their self-determination. 
 
dŚĞƐĞĞǆĂŵƉůĞƐƐŚŽǁƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƉĂƚƚĞƌŶŽĨƚŚŝŶŬŝŶŐƚŚĂƚĨŝƌƐƚĂƉƉĞĂƌĞĚŝŶ<ĞŶŶĞĚǇ ?ƐǁƌŝƚƚĞŶ
articles for the Journal American had crystallized into a more coherent philosophy.  His 
central concern was a fear of the spread of Communism in the newly created nations 
brought about by a failure on the part of the United States to convince the people there 
that the ways and approaches of the United States (and, more broadly, benevolent 
capitalism as it was evolving in the post WWII era) would be greater to their advantage than 
would Communism.  Further, the support that the US was extending to such areas was 
tainted by association with the previous colonial masters and was ill-directed for 
predominantly military purposes at the costs of social and economic programmes that 
would cut closer to the aspirations of the people and have a greater and more lasting effect 
in aligning them to US values and political systems. 
 
This record provides an indicative body of evidence for supporting the proposition that 
Kennedy was concerned about issues in the nations that were emerging from colonialism, 
that he was concerned about the role and profile of the United States in responding to this 
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situation and that he was in disagreement with the ways in which US foreign policy had 
adapted to meet the challenges that the ending of WWII brought forth.  Further, that while 
ƚŚĞƌĞǁĂƐĂƌŽůĞĨŽƌƚŚĞŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇŝŶĐƌĞĂƚŝŶŐĂŶĚŵĂŝŶƚĂŝŶŝŶŐĂŶĞǁŶĂƚŝŽŶ ?ƐƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇ ?ŝƚĐŽƵůĚ
not of itself force the issue.  Should the indigenous peoples of the rising states, for whatever 
reason, fail to accept the benefits of progressive capitalism and western ideals (and 
Kennedy suggested poorly directed propaganda may be such a reason for them not to do 
so) then military intervention to impose a particular form of government would, in fact, 
become counter-ƉƌŽĚƵĐƚŝǀĞ ?dŚŝƐďĂƐŝƐŽĨǁŚĂƚĂƉƉĞĂƌƐƚŽďĞƚŚĞŽŶŐƌĞƐƐŵĂŶ ?ƐƚŚŝŶŬŝŶŐ
was reinforced as events in Vietnam unfolded and he advanced his political career in 1952 





KENNEDY AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS 1952  ? 1960 
 
Senator Kennedy Criticises US Foreign Affairs Management in Indochina 
Kennedy was elected to the Senate as representative for Massachusetts after defeating the 
incumbent, Henry Cabot Lodge Jr (Republican) by three percentage points in the 1952 
election. 
 
As a Senator Kennedy commanded a higher political profile and extended his powers of 
political influence.  He was, nevertheless, still regarded as a new entrant to an exclusive club 
and had to tread carefully in order to give himself a firm footing as a member of the 
American political elite.  Despite this Kennedy did not rest on his criticism of US policy 
towards Vietnam after entering the Senate and, although a supporter of the principles and 
many of the practices of the Truman Doctrine and the Mutual Assistance Act, he continued 
ƚŽĂĚǀĂŶĐĞĂŚŝŐŚůǇĐƌŝƚŝĐĂůĂƉƉƌĂŝƐĂůŽĨƚŚĞŽƵƚĐŽŵĞƐĂŶĚƉƌŽƐƉĞĐƚƐĨŽƌƚŚĞh^ ?ƐĞĨĨŽƌƚƐŝŶ
consolidating its position of as leadĞƌŽĨǁŚĂƚďĞĐĂŵĞŬŶŽǁŶĂƐ “ƚŚĞ&ƌĞĞtŽƌůĚ ? ?ůŽŽƐĞůǇ ?
those areas of the world not under Communist domination). 
 
/Ŷ:ƵŶĞ ? ? ? ? ?ũƵƐƚƐŝǆŵŽŶƚŚƐŝŶƚŽŚŝƐ^ĞŶĂƚĞĐĂƌĞĞƌ ?ǁŝƚŚƚŚĞ “ZĞĚ^ĐĂƌĞ ?ĂƚŝƚƐŚĞŝŐŚƚ ?
Kennedy delivered a speech to the Senate expressing concern about assistance being 
extended to the French in Indochina under the terms of the Mutual Security Act which, in 
October 1951, had been passed into law as a consolidation of the measures taken previously 
for extending aid to friendly nations: 
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 “/ĂƌŝƐĞƚŽĚĂǇƚŽƐƉĞĂŬŽŶĂŵĂƚƚĞƌŽĨǀŝƚĂůŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶĐĞƚŽƚŚĞƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇŽĨƚŚĞhŶŝƚĞĚ^ƚĂƚĞƐ
and the entire free world. It is my firm opinion that the expenditure and distribution of the 
funds, equipment, materials, and service authorized under this bill on behalf of the 
Associated States of Cambodia, Laos, and Viet-Nam should be administered in such a way as 
to encourage through all available means the freedom and independence desired by the 
peoples of the Associated States, including the intensification of the military training of the 
Vietnamese. 
 
I say that because it is my opinion, based upon the evidence of the accords and treaties that 
bind the Associated States to the French Union, that genuine independence as we 
understand it is lacking in this area - that local government is circumscribed in its functions - 
that the Government of Viet-Nam, the state of which is of the greatest importance in this 
area, lacks popular support - that the degree of military, civil, political, and economic control 
ŵĂŝŶƚĂŝŶĞĚďǇƚŚĞ&ƌĞŶĐŚŐŽĞƐǁĞůůďĞǇŽŶĚǁŚĂƚŝƐŶĞĐĞƐƐĂƌǇƚŽĨŝŐŚƚĂǁĂƌ ? ? 1 
 
 
Senator Kennedy continued by stating that without the presence of the French fighting 
forces  “ŽŵŵƵŶŝƐƚƐǁŽƵůĚŽǀĞƌƌƵŶŶŽƚŽŶůǇ/ŶĚŽĐŚŝŶĂďƵƚ^ŽƵƚŚĂƐƚƐŝĂ ? ?,ĞƉƵƚĨŽƌǁĂƌĚ
ƚŚĞŽƉŝŶŝŽŶ ?ĂƐĂŵĂƚƚĞƌŽĨĨĂĐƚ ?ƚŚĂƚƚŚĞ&ƌĞŶĐŚƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶŝƐ “ŶŽƚŝŵƉƌŽǀŝŶŐ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞ
ĐŽƐƚƐƚŽƚŚĞhŶŝƚĞĚ^ƚĂƚĞƐŝŶďƌŝŶŐŝŶŐĂďŽƵƚƚŚŝƐƐŝƚƵĂƚŝŽŶ “ ?ĐŽƵůĚǁĞůůĞǆĐĞĞĚ ? ? ďŝůůŝŽŶ ? ?
He continued: 
 
 “The New York Times has stated that we will be paying at least 40 percent of the cost of the 
war, and I believe that it will eventually mount up to a great deal more. Yet regardless of our 
united effort, it is a truism that the war can never be successful unless numbers of the 
people of Viet-Nam are won over from their sullen neutrality and open hostility to it and 
fully support its successful conclusion. This can never be done unless they are reassured 
beyond doubt that complete ŝŶĚĞƉĞŶĚĞŶĐĞǁŝůůďĞƚŚĞŝƌƐĂƚƚŚĞĐŽŶĐůƵƐŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞǁĂƌ ? ?2 
 
 
Kennedy included in the speech an outline history of Indochina following the arrival of the 
French in 1860 and a detailed explanation of the situation of Indochina since WWII.  In 
setting out the prevailing conditions, Kennedy made repeated and cogent remarks about 
the failings of the French authorities to cede powers to the indigenous population in any 
meaningful way, stating that the structures of government in the region were geared 
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towards continued colonial style control.  Kennedy quoted from a letter he had received 
from the Department of State which effectively stated that the aid extended by the US was 
provided to assist the French in their endeavours, an approach that, in his opinion, would 
only work to further their unwarranted control in governing the country.  Towards the end 
of the speech Kennedy drew back from what, up to that point, had been a forceful critique 
of an important and valued ally of the United States: 
 
 “/ĚŽŶŽƚďĞůŝĞǀĞƚŚĂƚƚŚĞ&ƌĞŶĐŚĂƌĞĨŝŐŚƚŝŶŐŝŶ/ŶĚŽĐŚŝŶĂǁŚŽůůǇĨŽƌŵĂƚĞƌŝĂůƚŚŝŶŐƐ ?dŚĞ
war and money alone have already cost them substantially more than their total capital 
investment. Men like General De Lattre fought for the honor of France; and the French now 
are fighting because they know that if they retreat, all of Southeast Asia will go to the 
Communists - that their position in North Africa will become endangered and that the 
security of Metropolitan France itself will be threatened. Thus they fight on, and deserve 
ŽƵƌǁŚŽůĞŚĞĂƌƚĞĚƐƵƉƉŽƌƚ ? 
 
I believe it is of the utmost importance at a time when the United States is committing itself 
deeper and deeper into Indochina, that our influence and prestige with the French be used 
to promote the independence and well-being of the people of the Associated States. If we 
do so, not only would the prospects of victory be substantially enhanced, but the position of 
the United States and France and of the whole Western alliance in Asia will be materially 
ĂĚǀĂŶĐĞĚŝŶƐŝĂ ? ?3 
 
 
Several aspects of this speech stand out.  Firstly, the passion that Kennedy poured into it 
demonstrates a true sense of feeling for the situation as it stood at the time and a measure 
of frustration (sometimes seeming like despair) about how matters had transpired to come 
to such a stage.  Secondly, the Senator appeared not to be seeking to undermine the 
fundamental foreign policy tenets that were current  W to contain Communism and halt its 
infectious spread.  Thirdly, that the language used, the facts as assembled and the opinions 
and interpretations set out for explaining them, are all reflective of the knowledge and 
understanding of the situation of Indochina that Kennedy developed from his time there in 
October 1951 and as were articulated by him in various ways after returning to the United 
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States.  In this last respect Kennedy is emphatic on the need for the people of Indochina to 
be freed from the yoke of French colonial domination in order for them to be fully 
converted to the US requirement for them to resist Communism.  Finally, Kennedy seeks to 
demonstrate that the free determination of the peoples of Indochina is to the advantage of 
all who have an interest in the region  W the Associated States, the United States and France.  
This amounts to more than an opinion of what is best for Indochina, it represents the 
fundamentals of a philosophical base for the conduct of foreign affairs by the US in relation 
to the colonial possessions of its close European allies.  In short form it states that, if the 
post WWII position of the United States as a world power with interests beyond its borders 
is to be successful then some things must change.  The colonial powers must divest 
themselves of their overseas possessions, the principle of self-determination must be 
observed and the developing relationships between the new nations and the old, including 
the United States, must be based upon mutual respect delivering joint prosperity. 
 
The approach taken by Kennedy did not conform to the conventional wisdom of the time 
regarding US policy towards the conflict in Vietnam.  It should be remembered that, as well 
as being a long-standing friend and ally of the United States, France was seen as a vital 
contributor to the struggle for halting Soviet ambitions in Europe.  Further, the domestic 
case for the French maintaining a presence in Vietnam was increasingly difficult to justify in 
the face of a lack of any discernible progress after almost eight years of continual fighting, 
the loss of life and the costs of operations. This state of affairs had been recognised for 
some years in France and there was more than a suspicion that French blood and treasure 
had been sacrificed for US policy goals.4   Further, the developing situation in Algeria 
engendered a change in priorities for French foreign affairs management.  Under these 
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ĐŝƌĐƵŵƐƚĂŶĐĞƐ<ĞŶŶĞĚǇ ?ƐƐƉĞĞĐŚĐŽƵůĚďĞƐĞĞŶĂƐĂŶĂƚƚĞŵƉƚƚŽƵŶĚĞƌŵŝŶĞ&ƌĂŶĐĞ ?Ɛ
position and when his proposal for an amendment to the Mutual Security Act was put to the 
vote it was lost by a large margin.5  This amendment had sought to force the issue on 
making further aid contingent upon France conceding political power in the region. 
 
Apart from antagonising Senate colleagues, the French and the Eisenhower administration, 
<ĞŶŶĞĚǇ ?ƐƐƉĞĞĐŚďƌŽƵŐŚƚŶŽĐŚĂŶŐĞƚŽƚŚĞƐŝƚƵĂƚŝŽŶŽŶƚŚĞŐƌŽƵŶĚŝŶ/ŶĚŽĐŚŝŶĂ ?ǇƉƌŝů
1954 matters had deteriorated to the point that the colonists faced a military disaster at 
Dien Bien Phu.6  Kennedy rose in the Senate to speak again on the matter: 
 
 “Dƌ ?WƌĞƐŝĚĞŶƚ ?ƚŚĞƚŝŵĞŚĂƐĐŽŵĞĨŽƌƚŚĞŵĞƌŝĐĂŶƉĞŽƉůĞƚŽďĞƚŽůĚƚŚĞďůƵŶƚƚƌƵƚŚĂďŽƵƚ
/ŶĚŽĐŚŝŶĂ ? ?7 
 
Kennedy then gave an account of events in Indochina over the preceding few years, setting 
out the repeated assurances of successive US governments, US military advisers and the 
French government and military regarding expected victory over the Vietminh.  His 
chronology of forecasts and situational assessments put forward by each of these agencies 
was itself condemnatory by dint of the fact that all had proved to be misplaced, over-
optimistic and simply wrong.  He named and berated those individuals who had retained 
faith in a French victory while persisting with failed stratagems and condemned the waste of 
lives, materiel and aid support that had brought Indochina to its present state.  He gave an 
outline history of his own efforts to convince the United States government that its 
ambitions for containing Communism in the region could only succeed if the indigenous 
populations were convinced of the need to fight for this objective and that no such 
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conviction would be forthcoming without a credible promise of independence and release 
from French domination: 
 
 “/Ŷ/ŶĚŽĐŚŝŶĂ ?ĂƐŝŶ<ŽƌĞĂ ?ƚŚĞbattle against communism should be a battle, not for 
economic or political gain, but for the security of the free world, and for the values and 
institutions which are held dear in France and throughout the non-Communist world, as well 
as in the United States. It seems to me, therefore, that the dilemma which confronts us is 
not a hopeless one; that a victorious fight can be maintained by the French, with the 
support of this Nation and many other nations - and most important of all, the support of 
the Vietnamese and other peoples of the Associated States - once it is recognized that the 
defense of southeast Asia and the repelling of Communist aggression are the objectives of 
such a struggle, and not the maintenance of political relationships founded upon ancient 
colonialism. In such a struggle, the United States and other nations may properly be called 
upon to play their fullest part. 
 
If, however, this is not to be the nature of the war; if the French persist in their refusal to 
grant the legitimate independence and freedom desired by the peoples of the Associated 
States; and if those peoples and the other peoples of Asia remain aloof from the conflict, as 
they have in the past, then it is my hope that Secretary Dulles, before pledging our 
assistance at Geneva, will recognize the futility of channeling American men and machines 
ŝŶƚŽƚŚĂƚŚŽƉĞůĞƐƐŝŶƚĞƌŶĞĐŝŶĞƐƚƌƵŐŐůĞ ? ?8 
 
<ĞŶŶĞĚǇ ?ƐƐƉĞĞĐŚůĞĚƚŽĂůĞŶŐƚŚǇĂŶĚůŝǀĞůǇĚĞďĂƚĞŝŶƚŚĞ^ĞŶĂƚĞĂŶĚŚĞĚƌĞǁƉƌĂŝƐĞĨƌŽŵ
some members.  Senate Majority Leader, William Knowland (Republican) commented that 
there was  “ŵƵĐŚ ?ĂŶĚƉƌŽďĂďůǇƚŚĞƉƌĞĚŽŵŝŶĂŶĐĞŽĨǁŚĂƚƚŚĞ^ĞŶĂƚŽƌĨƌŽŵDĂƐƐĂĐŚƵƐĞƚƚƐ
ŚĂƐƐĂŝĚǁŝƚŚǁŚŝĐŚ/ǁŽƵůĚĨƵůůǇĂŐƌĞĞ ? ?9  Nevertheless, it made small impact upon actual 
events.  Just as the military effort of the French reached its nadir at Dien Bien Phu the 
Geneva Conference, called to resolve the issues raised by the outcomes of the Korean War, 
turned its attentions to the situation in Indochina and gave approval for the partition of 
what was recognised as the country of Vietnam into two republics separated roughly along 
the 17th parallel.  US participation in the conference was limited somewhat by the presence 
of representatives of the PRC, at that time not recognised by the USA; nevertheless, the US 
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delegate Walter ĞĚĚĞů^ŵŝƚŚĚŝĚĂĨĨŝƌŵŚŝƐŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ƐĐŽŵŵŝƚŵĞŶƚƚŽĨƌĞĞĞůĞĐƚŝŽŶƐĨŽƌ
resolving the dichotomy.10 
 
Fighting in Vietnam supposedly came to an end, but the reality on the ground had more the 
air of an armed truce.  In the South Ngo Dinh Diem was made prime minister in July 1954 
(and President in October the same year) while, in the North, Ho Chi Minh prevailed upon 
the terms of the Geneva Accords11 and held out for the elections promised for July 1956, 
knowing full well that he would succeed in them.12  Simultaneously groups of Ho 
sympathisers in the South embarked on disruptive activities that drew on the security 
resources of Diem and led to increasingly oppressive measures.  There was, by the 
contrivance of unfolding events, something of a conclusion to the French role as a colonising 
power in the region but, if he had been sincere in his numerous statements on the matter, 
what came in its place must have dismayed Kennedy.  As Alfred Grosser has written: 
 
 “dŚĞŝŶĚĞƉĞŶĚĞŶĐĞŽĨsŝĞƚŶĂŵ ?ƐŽfrequently promised by France, was now implemented 
step by step, at least in the army and in economic organization.  On January 1, 1955, the 
country was given sovereignty in customs and monetary matters.  But actually the Vietnam 
government was controlled much more directly by the United States than ever it had been 
by France.  And it was a government which was becoming increasingly unpopular as all 
observers agreed.  To respect the independence of South Vietnam in order to unify all 
nationalist elements against Communist North Vietnam was the course the American 
government had incessantly recommended to the French for more than seven years, and it 
was precisely what it failed to do itself, the moment American officers and political advisors 
replaced the French.  The opinion  W widespread in France in any event  W that American anti-
colonialism was merely a pretext for substituting an American for a European presence in 
ƚŚĞĨŽƌŵĞƌĐŽůŽŶŝĂůƚĞƌƌŝƚŽƌŝĞƐǁĂƐƚŚƵƐĐŽŶĨŝƌŵĞĚ ? ?13 
 
Should Kennedy or anyone else have been surprised at this outcome?  It had already been 
seen that the United States, under Eisenhower, was willing to intervene in Iran and 
Guatemala in order to preserve what it viewed as its vital interests.  Operations in 
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Indochina, and Vietnam in particular, were quite in keeping with current US foreign affairs 
management practices. 
 
Kennedy Takes a More Direct Interest in Vietnam 
As events moved along the government of the South was more and more seen as being 
removed from the democratic and Western ideals that the United States purported to be 
ƐƵƉƉŽƌƚŝŶŐ ?ďƵƚ<ĞŶŶĞĚǇ ?ƐŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚŝŶƚŚĞƌĞŐŝŽŶĚŝĚŶŽƚĚŝŵŝŶŝƐŚĂŶĚŝŶůĂƚĞ ? ? ? ?ŚĞŚĞůƉĞĚ
in founding a lobby group known as the American Friends of Vietnam (AFV).  This rather 
obscure organisation comprised chosen individuals who had come to believe in the abilities 
of Diem and supported him as the one person who might save the situation in Vietnam.14 
 
On 1st June 1956 the AFV sponsored a conference to discuss the situation of Vietnam and 
Kennedy was assigned keynote speaker.  He opened his address with some comments on 
why the subject of Vietnam had not featured greatly in newspaper headlines or broadcast 
newsreels.  One factor, he suggested, was: 
 
 “ ?ƚŚĞĂmazing success of President Diem in meeting firmly and with determination the 
ŵĂũŽƌƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůĂŶĚĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐĐƌŝƐĞƐǁŚŝĐŚŚĂĚŚĞƌĞƚŽĨŽƌĞĐŽŶƚŝŶƵĂůůǇƉůĂŐƵĞĚsŝĞƚŶĂŵ ? ?15 
 
 
He also described the USA as a: 
 
 “ ?ǀŽůƵŶƚĞĞƌĨŝƌĞĨŝŐŚƚŝŶŐĚĞƉĂƌƚŵĞŶƚĨŽƌƚŚĞǁŽƌůĚ ?ƚŚĂƚ Pǁhenever and wherever fire 
breaks out ? in Indo-China, in the Middle East, in Guatemala, in Cyprus, in the Formosan 
Straits ? our firemen rush in, wheeling up all their heavy equipment, and resorting to every 
known method of containing and extinguishing the blaze. The crowd gathers ? the usually 
successful efforts of our able volunteers are heartily applauded ? and then the firemen rush 
off to the next conflagration, leaving the grateful but still stunned inhabitants to clean up 
the rubble, pick up the pieces and rebuild their homes with whatever resources are 
ĂǀĂŝůĂďůĞ ? ?16 
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Kennedy framed the situation in Vietnam within the context of the threat of Communist 
ĞǆƉĂŶƐŝŽŶŝŶƚŚĞƌĞŐŝŽŶĂŶĚďĞǇŽŶĚĂŶĚŝĚĞŶƚŝĨŝĞĚ “ŵĞƌŝĐĂ ?ƐƐƚĂŬĞŝŶsŝĞƚŶĂŵ ?ŝŶƚĞƌŵƐŽĨ
the Domino Theory.  Later in the speech, in a fashion that had become characteristic of his 
formal pronouncements on the subject, he placed more emphasis on the importance of 
ĚĞŵŽĐƌĂĐǇ ?ŶĂƚŝŽŶďƵŝůĚŝŶŐĂŶĚĨƌĞĞĚŽŵĨƌŽŵĚŽŵŝŶĂƚŝŽŶǁŝƚŚƚŚĞsŝĞƚŶĂŵĞƐĞĂƌŵǇ “ŶŽǁ
fighting for its own homeland and not its colonial mastĞƌƐ ? P
 
 “ƵƚƚŚĞƌĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďŝůŝƚǇŽĨƚŚĞhŶŝƚĞĚ^ƚĂƚĞƐĨŽƌsŝĞƚŶĂŵĚŽĞƐŶŽƚĐŽŶĐůƵĚĞ ?ŽďǀŝŽƵƐůǇ ?ǁŝƚŚĂ
review of what has been accomplished thus far with our help. Much more needs to be done; 
much more, in fact, than we have been doing up to now. Military alliances in Southeast Asia 
are necessary but not enough. Atomic superiority and the development of new ultimate 
weapons are not enough. Informational and propaganda activities, warning of the evils of 
Communism and the blessings of the American way of life, are not enough in a country 
where concepts of free enterprise and capitalism are meaningless, where poverty and 
hunger are not enemies across the 17th parallel but enemies within their midst. As 
Ambassador Chuong [Ambassador of South Vietnam to the United State] has recently said: 
"People cannot be expected to fight for the Free World unless they have their own freedom 
to defend, their freedom from foreign domination as well as freedom from misery, 
ŽƉƉƌĞƐƐŝŽŶ ?ĐŽƌƌƵƉƚŝŽŶ ? ? ?17 
 
The speech was fairly straight forward in its delivery and message and demonstrated a 
consistency with the approach that Kennedy had developed since visiting Vietnam in 1951  W 
that the country should be supported by the United State as a barrier to further Communist 
expansion in the region and, as a result, beyond.  That the role of the United States must be 
to support those elements that were seen to be promoting the values that the US held to 
ĂŶĚǁŚŝĐŚ ?ŝŶ<ĞŶŶĞĚǇ ?ƐǀŝĞǁ ?ƉƌŽǀŝĚĞĚƚŚĞďĞƐƚĚĞĨĞŶĐĂŐĂŝŶƐƚŽŵŵƵŶŝƐƚĞǆƉĂŶƐŝŽŶ ?
Further, that the United States should not become militarily involved in the region for: 
 
 “/ƚŝƐŶŽǁǁĞůůŬŶŽǁŶƚŚĂƚǁĞǁĞƌĞĂƚŽŶĞƚŝŵĞŽŶƚŚĞďƌŝŶŬŽĨǁĂƌŝŶ/ŶĚŽ-china - a war 
which could well have been more costly, more exhausting and less conclusive than any war 
ǁĞŚĂǀĞĞǀĞƌŬŶŽǁŶ ? ?18 
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The timing and circumstances of the speech are instructive for gaining an understanding of 
its contents.  It was made to a lobby group that, in its fundamental objectives, was formed 
in response to the threat of spreading Communism; at the same time Kennedy was 
attempting to raise his profile in national politics.19   There is no great criticism of what the 
Eisenhower administration had done in regard to Vietnam but rather a manifesto statement 
of how the United States should conduct foreign affairs in nations newly released from 
colonial domination, such as Vietnam.  Kennedy makes clear that military intervention is a 
poor option that will not solve the underlying problems of poverty, social deprivation and 
the lack of the voice of the people in choosing and directing their government.  The 
damaging effects of colonial oversight are mentioned but, in the wake of the breaking of the 
French imperial hold, the speech looks more to the future and how the United States must 
act.  It implies that in its actions the US must be seen to be supportive of peoples seeking 
freedom and self-determination and that aid and assistance must be directed towards these 
purposes.  There is praise for Diem as somebody who can take these ideals forward.  Late on 
in the speech, in words that seem contradictory to much of the earlier content, Kennedy is 
emphatic that the elections proposed as part of the Geneva Accords (which were 
theoretically due to take place just a month later) must not go ahead, being  “ ?ŽďǀŝŽƵƐůǇ
ƐƚĂĐŬĞĚĂŶĚƐƵďǀĞƌƚĞĚŝŶĂĚǀĂŶĐĞ ? ?20 
 
It is evident therefore, that the speech holds close to the lines of political expediency by 
which Kennedy would have had to conform if he was to be successful in sustaining a 
challenge for higher office.  He does not desert his basic principles regarding how the United 
States should conduct foreign affairs in regard to Vietnam and similar new nations, and he is 
consistent in his assertions regarding avoidance of military intervention.  Overall however, 
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although his words are delivered with passion, the content is nuanced, inoffensive to all, 
anodyne almost. 
 
Kennedy Considers Algeria and Poland as Nations Seeking Freedom from Imperialist 
Oversight 
 
His tone changed the following year, after the need for politicking had subsided, when he 
ƐƉŽŬĞĨŽƌĐĞĨƵůůǇĂďŽƵƚ&ƌĂŶĐĞ ?ƐďĂƚƚůĞƚŽƌĞƚĂŝŶŝƚƐŚŽůĚŽŶůŐĞƌŝĂ ?21  It is noteworthy that 
this speech, made in the Senate on 2nd July 1957, was titled  “Imperialism  W the Enemy of 
Freedom ?.  It began with a challenging statement: 
 
 “Dƌ ?WƌĞƐŝĚĞŶƚ ?ƚŚĞŵŽƐƚƉŽǁĞƌĨƵůƐŝŶŐůĞĨŽƌĐĞŝŶƚŚĞǁŽƌůĚƚŽĚĂǇŝƐŶĞŝƚŚĞƌĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƐŵŶŽƌ
capitalism, neither the H-bomb nor the guided missile, it is man's eternal desire to be free 
and independent. The great enemy of that tremendous force of freedom is called, for want 
of a more precise term, imperialism - and today that means Soviet imperialism and, whether 
we like it or not, and though they are not to be equated, Western imperialism. 
 
Thus the single most important test of American foreign policy today is how we meet the 
challenge of imperialism, what we do to further man's desire to be free. On this test more 
than any other, this Nation shall be critically judged by the uncommitted millions in Asia and 
Africa, and anxiously watched by the still hopeful lovers of freedom behind the Iron Curtain. 
If we fail to meet the challenge of either Soviet or Western imperialism, then no amount of 
foreign aid, no aggrandizement of armaments, no new pacts or doctrines or high-level 
ĐŽŶĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƐĐĂŶƉƌĞǀĞŶƚĨƵƌƚŚĞƌƐĞƚďĂĐŬƐƚŽŽƵƌĐŽƵƌƐĞĂŶĚƚŽŽƵƌƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇ ? ?22 
 
 “ ?ĂŶĚƚŚŽƵŐŚƚŚĞǇĂƌĞŶŽƚƚŽďĞĞƋƵĂƚĞĚ ? ?zĞƚ<ĞŶŶĞĚǇĐůĞĂƌůǇconflates Soviet and 
Western imperialism, distinguishing between the two only by name in his analysis of the 
world situation at the time.  It is this theme, that imperialism was overarching, that it was 
the misconception which must be confined to history, which came to occupy the Senator 
and later the President as he grappled to conceive a foreign affairs strategy that would allow 
the United States to conduct business as the leader of the Free World without it too 
becoming an overbearing imperial power.  It is a reflection of the extent to which 
considerations of Cold War politics and manoeuvrings have come to dominate historical 
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interpretations of the time that Kennedy is not much remembered for his extensive 
endeavours in bringing this issue to the fore.  It can be argued that this speech, in terms of 
setting out the considerations, ideas and thinking of Kennedy in foreign affairs 
ŵĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚ ?ŝƐĂŶŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚƐŝŐŶĂůŽĨŚŝƐŝŶƚĞŶƚŝŽŶƐ ?/ƚŵĂƌŬƐƚŚĂƚƉŽŝŶƚŝŶƚŚĞ^ĞŶĂƚŽƌ ?Ɛ
learning and understanding on matters of foreign affairs that gives him the confidence to 
articulate the policy lines that guided and conditioned his approach on all matters 
concerning the role of the United States in the world from that time onwards until his death 
in November 1963.  It can be interpreted as a statement based on the experience and 
understanding of the world that he had gained as a result of his extensive travels and 
encounters since first venturing abroad as a schoolboy and which now gave him the 
wherewithal to press his ideas upon those in government with the authority to create 
policy. 
 
In the first part of the statement Kennedy referred briefly to Poland, saying that he would 
be speaking exclusively on Polish affairs in a later address.23  Apart from the fact that 
Kennedy appears to have been serious in his intentions regarding Poland (and more broadly, 
Soviet dominated Eastern Europe) he took this approach in order to avoid the accusation 
that he was more concerned with attacking the allies of the United States than he was in 
dealing with its enemies.24  Kennedy was an astute politician and had cultivated ambitions 
to attain higher office; the politics of the time meant that he could not possibly risk an 
ĂĐĐƵƐĂƚŝŽŶŽĨďĞŝŶŐ “ƐŽĨƚ ?ŽŶŽŵŵƵŶŝƐŵǁŝƚŚŽƵƚƌƵŝŶĂƚŝŽŶƚŽŚŝƐŝŶƚĞŶƚŝŽŶƐ ?<ĞŶŶĞĚǇ ?Ɛ
speech on Poland advocated economic aid for the country as a means for enhancing the 
reputation of the United States as a benevolent supporter of freedom (as opposed to being 
neo-imperialist).   By doing so he was able to cover a number of factors: 
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x Firstly, it helped to cement the idea that there was no great difference between Soviet 
and Western imperialism; 
x Secondly, it conveyed the impression that Soviet (more precisely, Russian) dominated 
ŶĂƚŝŽŶƐǁĞƌĞŶŽƚďĞǇŽŶĚƚŚĞƌĞĂĐŚŽĨƚŚĞhŶŝƚĞĚ^ƚĂƚĞƐ ?ŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚƐ ? 
x Thirdly it signalled the possibility of a new approach for the US in the affairs of Eastern 
Europe, an area in which both the Truman and Eisenhower administrations had seemed 
incapable of venturing with any real effect;25 
x Fourthly, it gave Kennedy an opportunity to attack the Department of State (and, more 
pointedly, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles) for raising false hopes among the 
ƉĞŽƉůĞƐŽĨĂƐƚĞƌŶƵƌŽƉĞǁŝƚŚŚŝƐĨĂŶĨĂƌĞƐƚĂƚĞŵĞŶƚƐŽĨ “>ŝďĞƌĂƚŝŽŶ ? ?26 a policy that 
had shown itself as meaningless against events and the realpolitik of prevailing 
conditions in that part of the world. 
 
On 2nd :ƵůǇ ?ŚŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ƚŚĞĐĞŶƚƌĂůƚŚĞŵĞŽĨ “/ŵƉĞƌŝĂůŝƐŵ W ƚŚĞŶĞŵǇŽĨ&ƌĞĞĚŽŵ ?ǁĂƐƚŚĞ
question of Algeria and the fierce struggle that was taking place there as the Front de 
Libération Nationale (FLN) sought to end the imperial domination of France.  KeŶŶĞĚǇ ?Ɛ
arguments did not differ from those he had presented in regard to Indochina and Vietnam  W 
that the approach of the United States created the impression of being a supporter of 
colonialism, which alienated the indigenous population; that military solutions, while they 
had a place, could not alone resolve the problems of the area, and that US neglect of these 
fundamental aspects opened the door to Communism. 
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The speech invoked a hostile response from several quarters and all political shades.  For 
DeĂŶĐŚĞƐŽŶ ?^ĞĐƌĞƚĂƌǇŽĨ^ƚĂƚĞĚƵƌŝŶŐƚŚĞdƌƵŵĂŶĂĚŵŝŶŝƐƚƌĂƚŝŽŶ ?ŝƚǁĂƐƚŚĞ “ǁƌŽŶŐǁĂǇ
ƚŽƚƌĞĂƚŽƵƌŽůĚĞƐƚĂůůǇ ? ?27 To Eisenhower, endorsing critical remarks made by his Secretary 
ŽĨ^ƚĂƚĞ:ŽŚŶ&ŽƐƚĞƌƵůůĞƐ ?ĂƉƌŽĚƵĐƚŝǀĞĨŽƌĞŝŐŶƉŽůŝĐǇŵĞĂŶƚ “ ?ǇŽƵŽĨƚĞŶǁŽrked behind 
ƚŚĞƐĐĞŶĞƐ ?ďĞĐĂƵƐĞǇŽƵĚŽŶ ?ƚŐĞƚƵƉĂŶĚďĞŐŝŶƚŽƐŚŽƵƚĂďŽƵƚƐƵĐŚƚŚŝŶŐƐŽƌƚŚĞƌĞǁŝůůďĞ
ŶŽĞĨĨĞĐƚŝǀĞŶĞƐƐ ? ?28  Robert Lacoste, French Minister for Algeria, spoke directly, calling 
<ĞŶŶĞĚǇ “ ?ĂǇŽƵŶŐ ?ĂŵďŝƚŝŽƵƐ^ĞŶĂƚŽƌ ?ƐƉĞĂŬŝŶŐĨŽƌƚŚĞKůĚDĂŝĚs of the United 
^ƚĂƚĞƐ ? ?29 
 
What is more remarkable however, is that a speech made by a US Senator in Washington 
was heard and understood by the people of Algeria and its neighbouring states (and other 
nations in other parts of the world also seeking to throw off colonial masters).30  Mongi Slim 
was, at the time of the speech, Tunisian Ambassador to the United States; in May 1965 he 
agreed to file a record for the John F Kennedy Library Oral History Program.  Interviewer Dr 
Lorna Hahn asked about the impression the speech had made upon Slim and what its wider 
effects were: 
 
 “tĞǁĞƌĞ- I was personally - very much impressed by his speech. It was for us the first 
speech of the kind by an official, a senator, a high-ranking American personality with 
responsibilities even as senator, speaking out so frankly about the Algerian problem and 
opening new perspectives. We were very impressed and very much pleased by the speech. 
 
I remember that in discussing it with other Americans, I always emphasized the courage and 
boldness of a senator speaking out like that at that time, in 1957, about the Algerian 
problem and the war going on there. It. was a manifestation of bravery and unquestionable 
courage that impressed us considerably, and that I think began to create at that time a new 
current of feeling not only in Tunisia but I believe even in other countries, among many 
Africans that I knew - Algerians, Moroccans, and others - a new current of feeling toward 
ƚŚĞhŶŝƚĞĚ^ƚĂƚĞƐŝŶƚŚĞŵĂƚƚĞƌŽĨĐŽůŽŶŝĂůƉƌŽďůĞŵƐ ? ?31 
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It is notable that Slim was succeeded in the office of Ambassador by Habib Bourguiba Jr., the 
son of the President of Tunisia, Habib Bourguiba.  Bourguiba senior, in a short written 
statement following the death of John Kennedy, made particular reference to the ways in 
which Kennedy took an interest in developing nations: 
 
 “He is known in the world for the help he gave ? help not always necessarily spectacular but 
always effective ? to the colonized peoples, the peoples of the Third World, the peoples of 
Africa and Asia, in their struggle for independence and for dignity. Finally, he is known in the 
world for the way he helped these newly independent and underdeveloped peoples to bring 
about the conditions of a decent and dignified life, of real freedom and true 
independence ? ?32 
 
 
What makes this statement noteworthy, apart from the fact that there was such heightened 
ĂǁĂƌĞŶĞƐƐŽĨ<ĞŶŶĞĚǇ ?ƐƐƚĂŶĐĞŝŶƌĞŵŽƚĞĐŽƌŶĞƌƐŽĨƚŚĞǁŽƌůĚ ?ŝƐƚŚĂƚŝƚƌĞŝŶĨŽƌĐĞƐƚŚĞ
impression that matters of decolonisation were important to Kennedy in his ideas about 
how the United States should position itself in the world at a time when so many new states 
were being created.  Although the words are couched in phraseology appropriate to the 
occasion, the statement recognises the high status thaƚƐƵĐŚƚŚŝŶŬŝŶŐŚĞůĚŝŶ<ĞŶŶĞĚǇ ?Ɛ
political outlook. 
 
This approach was further clarified in October 1957 when Kennedy wrote an article for 
Foreign Affairs, a respected journal. Titled A Democrat Looks at Foreign Policy, Kennedy 
began the article by identifying two leading failings in what was then current foreign policy: 
 
 “ ?ĨŝƌƐƚ ?ĂĨĂŝůƵƌĞƚŽĂƉƉƌĞĐŝĂƚĞŚŽǁƚŚĞĨŽƌĐĞƐŽĨŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůŝƐŵĂƌĞƌĞǁƌŝƚŝŶŐƚŚĞŐĞŽƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů
map of the world, especially in North Africa, south eastern Europe and the Middle East; and 
second, a lack of decision and conviction in our leadership, which has recoiled from clearly 
informing both the people and Congress, which seeks too often to substitute slogans for 
solutions, which at times has even taken pride in the timidity of its iĚĞĂƐ ? ?33 
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He concluded the article with words that may be viewed as something of a manifesto 
statement: 
 
 “dŚĞĂŐĞŶĚĂŽĨƚĂƐŬƐŝƐůĂƌŐĞ ?KƵƌĐŚŝĞĨĐŽŶĐĞƌŶƐŚŽƵůĚďĞŵĂũŽƌŝƚĞŵƐ ?tĞŵƵƐƚƐĞĞƚŚĂƚ
our actions stimulate the healthy development of the new states even if they are neutral; 
that we do not encourage the prolongation of Western colonialism where it is stagnant; that 
the position we take against Soviet imperialism in Eastern Europe is not weakened by 
tĞƐƚĞƌŶ ?ŝŵƉĞƌŝĂůŝƐŵ ?ŝŶĨƌŝĐĂŽƌƐŝĂ ? ?34
 
 
This was as clear a declaration as could be made of the principles that would condition the 
thinking of Kennedy as he strove to secure influence in American politics.  It has already 
been mentioned that he harboured ambitions for high office35 and, as his Senate career 
progressed, he sought to manoeuvre himself into position for securing the Democratic Party 
nomination for the Presidential race in 1960.  If he was to win through in his bidding then he 
would have to move cautiously, taking care not to alienate or offend those parts of the Party 
that would not necessarily view him as the most suitable candidate while, at the same time, 
holding onto those supporters whom he could already rely upon.  To better his chances of 
success Kennedy exercised discretion in his actions, perhaps most notably by voting against 
the Civil Rights Act put forward by the Eisenhower administration in 1957.  There are 
ĐŽŵƉůŝĐĂƚĞĚĂƌŐƵŵĞŶƚƐƚŽďĞŵĂĚĞĂďŽƵƚ<ĞŶŶĞĚǇ ?ƐĂĐƚŝŽŶƐŝŶƌĞƐƉĞĐƚŽĨŝǀŝůZŝŐŚƚƐ ?ďŽƚŚ
in 1957 and later when President, and there is little value for the purposes of this text in 
examining his record in detail; suffice to conclude that the several explanations that may be 
given for his approach provide ample material for different interpretations of what he 
represented as a politician.  What is clear, nevertheless, is that, when occupying the White 
House, Kennedy was frequently criticised for not taking a more active stance in establishing 
his credentials as a promoter of civil rights  W particularly in regard to the enactment of 
legislation.36 
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Kennedy Seeks Higher Office 
 
^ŽŝƚƚƌĂŶƐƉŝƌĞĚƚŚĂƚ ?ĨƌŽŵĂďŽƵƚ ? ? ? ?ŽŶǁĂƌĚƐ ?ŵƵĐŚŽĨ<ĞŶŶĞĚǇ ?ƐƚŝŵĞĂŶĚĂƚƚĞŶƚŝŽŶǁĂƐ
given to seeking the Democratic nomination for the Presidential election of 1960.37  These 
activities kept him occupied outside of the Senate38 and Lyndon Johnson, who also put his 
name forward for the race to the White House, was able to criticise him for his absences.39 
 
Some ten years into his life as a public figure, Kennedy had finally begun to secure a clarified 
formulation of the fundamental imperatives that would condition his thinking on the United 
^ƚĂƚĞƐ ?ƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉƐǁŝƚŚƚŚĞĨŽƌŵĞƌĐŽůŽŶŝĂůƉŽǁĞƌƐĂŶĚƚŚĞŶĞǁŶĂƚŝŽŶƐƚŚĂƚǁĞƌĞ
emerging as a result of their fading empires.  In so doing he was attempting to resolve (in his 
own mind) the complications and contradictions of the position of the United States in 
regard to colonial issues.  As he did so, he came face to face with the ferocity of opposition 
to his ideas  W a position he repeatedly encountered during his presidency.  Being a second 
term Senator with more than a decade of federal government experience, and having run a 
close race for nomination as the Democratic candidate for Vice President, he was well 
positioned both to speak out and present himself as a credible alternative for nomination 






FOREIGN AFFAIRS DECISION-MAKING IN THE WHITE HOUSE 
 
<ĞŶŶĞĚǇ ?ƐĞŶƚƌĂŶĐĞŝŶƚŽƚŚĞtŚŝƚĞ,ŽƵƐĞǁĂƐƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶƚĨŽƌƚŚĞĨĂĐƚƚŚĂƚĨĂƐƚŵŽǀŝŶŐ
events tested the mettle of him and those around him from the very first days.  Cuba, Laos, 
The Congo, Vietnam and Berlin all presented problems that, one way or another, called for 
responses from the new President.  Lesser known, yet still important to Kennedy,1 were 




It was in regard to Cuba that there was the most pressing force for the President to act and 
his decision making in response is widely accepted to have been flawed. 
 
Kennedy assented to The Bay of Pigs operation and made a decision that, when examined in 
light of the bulk of his pronouncements prior to becoming President and the tenor of his 
foreign affairs decisions after the inauguration, seems out of keeping. 
 
He had been presented with a scheme that, in essence, was a sponsored project aimed at 
toppling the dictatorship of President Fidel Castro in Cuba by use of exile troops, trained and 
equipped by agencies of the United States.  The Bay of Pigs came to be acknowledged by 
ďŽƚŚ<ĞŶŶĞĚǇ ?ƐƐƵƉƉŽƌƚĞƌƐĂŶĚĚĞƚƌĂĐƚŽƌƐĂƐĂďůƵŶĚĞƌŽĨŵĂŐŶŝƚƵĚĞ ?ĐĐŽƌĚŝŶŐƚŽƐŽŵĞ
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accounts the President regretted the decision almost from the outset and uttered remorse 
at his failure to heed his own misgivings. 
 
 “ ?ĂůůŵǇůŝĨĞ/ ?ǀĞŬŶŽǁŶďĞƚƚĞƌƚŚĂŶƚŽĚĞƉĞŶĚŽŶƚŚĞĞǆƉĞƌƚƐ ?,ŽǁĐŽƵůĚ/ŚĂǀĞďĞĞŶƐŽ
ƐƚƵƉŝĚ ?ƚŽůĞƚƚŚĞŵŐŽĂŚĞĂĚ ? ?2 
 
 
Ambrose argues that Kennedy had no one to blame but himself for making a poor decision, 
despite the fact that those close to him tried to deflect responsibility to others.  Irving Janis, 
ƐƵďƐĞƋƵĞŶƚůǇ ?ǁƌŽƚĞǁŝĚĞůǇŽŶƚŚĞĐŽŶĐĞƉƚŽĨ “ŐƌŽƵƉƚŚŝŶŬ ? ?ĂƚŚĞŽƌǇŽf psychology that 
sought to demonstrate that group decisions leading to flawed outcomes can be the product 
ŽĨƵŶďĂůĂŶĐĞĚĐŽůůĞĐƚŝǀĞƚŚŝŶŬŝŶŐĂŶĚĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐ ?:ĂŶŝƐ ?ƐŝĚĞĂƐƌĞgarding The Bay of Pigs 
incident suggest that Kennedy fell victim to groupthink as did those who were there to 
advise and guide him.3 
 
/ĨƚŚĞƌĞŝƐƚŽďĞƐƵďƐƚĂŶĐĞƚŽƚŚĞĂƌŐƵŵĞŶƚƚŚĂƚ<ĞŶŶĞĚǇ ?ƐƚŚŝŶking on foreign affairs was 
centred upon moving away from the types of confrontational, interventionist methods that 
had been employed by his predecessors in the White House, then an explanation for The 
Bay of Pigs is necessary. 
 
:ĂŶŝƐ ?ƐĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐůŽŽŬƐďĂĐŬĂƚƚŚĞĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶƐƚŚĂƚǁĞƌĞŵĂĚĞĂŶĚŝĚĞŶƚŝĨŝĞƐĨůĂǁƐŝŶƚŚĞ
structural approach that led to them.  Ambrose too looks at the decisions and their 
outcomes as do James Blight and Janet Lang (see p27 above).  But the key for understanding 
<ĞŶŶĞĚǇ ?ƐƚŚŝŶŬŝŶŐůŝĞƐ not in the decisions that he made; rather, it is to be found in the 
situation he faced going into the decision making process.  The CIA and the Military, who 
conceived and evaluated the plans for the Bay of Pigs, had briefed Kennedy, but they had 
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thoughts of their own regarding the plans and the chances of success.  Essentially there 
were only three possible outcomes from the invasion plan: 
x the exile force would overwhelm the Castro government and a new regime would be 
established in Havana; 
x the exile force would gain the beachhead and would gather support from disaffected 
members of the population such that Castro would be forced out over time; 
x the exile force would be defeated and the plan would fail. 
 
Realistically only the second and third of these outcomes was possible (Castro had an army 
of approximately 200,000 well equipped and trained men to combat the invasion force of 
about 1,400).  One must assume, therefore, that the CIA and the Military believed that the 
proposal would succeed on the basis of the second possible outcome  W a popular uprising.4  
Given that approval was put forward on this basis, the planners must also have considered 
what contingency arrangements would be required should the third possible outcome have 
started to materialise.  Here the choices were limited to two possible options: 
 
x To accept failure and withdraw support; 
x To provide back up support by use of US military forces. 
 
Evidently, the first of these would have been unacceptable to the planners, but Kennedy 
had ruled out the second option.  Because the invasion ended in failure and defeat the CIA 
and the Military must have believed that the President would change his mind and 
authorise US military intervention (as he was urged to do), but he chose instead to accept 
the failure. 
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Why then did the President give approval for a scheme that seemed to run counter to his 
thinking and which failed in just the way that he might have anticipated? 
 
In simple terms, it seems that he made a mistake, which is how he described the episode 
himself.5  Assurances from the CIA and military advisers had encouraged him to give 
agreement for the engagement; he had also sought the advice of his cabinet members 
beforehand.  But more than this, it seems that he viewed the scheme as an act of liberation, 
assisting those who would seek to overthrow dictatorship and replace it with freedom of 
choice.  Sometime after the unfortunate episode, in December 1962, Kennedy was able to 
welcome back veterans from the campaign who had been released by Castro following 
arrangements for settling the Cuban Missile Crisis.  Kennedy spoke of his feelings towards 
those who had taken part, his ambitions for the future of Cuba and the philosophical 
underpinning of his decision to approve the action: 
 
 “ ?your small brigade is a tangible reaffirmation that the human desire for freedom and 
independence is essentially unconquerable. Your conduct and valor are proof that although 
Castro and his fellow dictators may rule nations, they do not rule people; that they may 
imprison bodies, but they do not imprison spirits; that they may destroy the exercise of 
liberty, but they cannot eliminate the determination to be free. And by helping to free you, 
the United States has been given the opportunity to demonstrate once again that all men 
who fight for freedom are our brothers, and shall be until your country and others are 
free. ?6 
 
As can be seen from this quotation, TŚĞĂǇŽĨWŝŐƐŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĨŝƚƚĞĚǁŝƚŚ<ĞŶŶĞĚǇ ?ƐǀŝĞǁƐ
about self determination.  Within this line of thinking, his decision not to support the 
liberating force with US military power was consistent and matched his developed ideas 
about the importance of the US avoiding the pitfall of becoming a neo-imperialist power.   
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Had the venture succeeded then he might have satisfied himself that the United States had 
acted in a manner that gave illustration to his new approach to foreign affairs  W as a 
supporter and friend of free people.  There was, however, a widespread belief that the 
scheme was doomed to failure before it had begun7 and that it had always been the 
intention of the CIA planners that US support would have been forthcoming, knowing that 
the task force was insufficient to see the matter through on its own.8  Kennedy certainly felt 
that he had been misled (or badly advised)9 and set about taking future decisions that were 
closer to his own beliefs and instincts, even in the face of objections from those that had 
been appointed to counsel him. 
 
Writers such as Ambrose and Janis help to explain how the decisions regarding The Bay of 
Pigs incident were flawed in the making, but they do not entirely contextualise the situation 
that Kennedy faced and the thinking that took him into the process.  He was presented with 
two basic choices regarding the invasion plan  W to approve or not to approve.  By approving  
he could align his policy actions to his thinking regarding providing support for indigenous 
liberating forces.  Had he not given the go ahead then the consequences were, ironically, 
more uncertain.  He would have had to explain his decision to the thousands of Cubans who 
lived in Florida, Louisiana and other southern states, all of whom were clamouring for some 
sort of action to be taken against Castro.  Additionally, he would have faced the prospect of 
the task force members returning to the United States, trained, armed and bitterly 
disappointed after having been brought to a pitch of expectation; they would have 
dispersed among the refugee community and no doubt spread their disaffection far and 
wide.10 
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Neutralising Laos 
At much the same time as Kennedy was holding the military back from intervention in Cuba, 
he was approving plans for putting troops on high alert as a response to the critical situation 
that was evolving in Laos.  In keeping with the general characteristics of the problems that 
beset South East Asia at this time, Laos was in a state of flux and uncertainty in early 1961.  
According to Eisenhower, if the Communists were to take over Laos, then all parts of 
Indochina would soon succumb.11  Deeply concerning for the United States was the fact that 
the Soviet Union was actively engaged in supporting, by airlift of supplies and equipment, 
the pro Communist Pathet Lao in its struggle to exploit the political chaos in Vientiane.12  
This instability was partly the result of the lack of a coherent strategy within the US military, 
State Department, CIA and Foreign Service.  On the day before his inauguration, Kennedy 
was briefed by Eisenhower and his Secretary of State Christian Herter13 and urged to follow 
through on their recommendation for a large build up of US military presence in the 
country, but Kennedy demurred on military intervention, having often questioned its 
effectiveness against guerrilla forces. 
 
He relied more upon his own knowledge of Indochina, developed as a result of many years 
of interest and involvement.  As The Bay of Pigs fiasco unfolded, so the Pathet Lao made 
more gains and Vientiane was threatened.  Kennedy, in the course of press briefings early in 
his Presidency, had expressed his wish for an independent Laos but as Communist forces 
gained ever more ground, the prospects for a solution that would neutralise the country 
diminished.  Kennedy was briefed on the situation and a plan presented by his military 
advisers envisaged that an indigenous army, assisted and equipped by the USA, could drive 
back the Pathet Lao, secure the country and prepare the ground for neutrality.  Unknown to 
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Kennedy at the time he gave approval for this plan was the fact that the figures used for 
assessing the strength of the Pathet Lao and the North Vietnamese forces that would aid it, 
were badly underestimated.14  In approving the plan Kennedy allowed that no US troops 
were to be deployed in the process. 
 
As the plan was put into action, the Pathet Lao made further gains, consolidating their 
position on the strategic Plain of Jars and overrunning the forces of the indigenous army 
that the plan had relied upon for turning back the Communists.  Almost without exception,15 
State Department and Defense Department officials advising the President pressed for a 
military solution to save the country from falling to the Communists; Kennedy, by contrast, 
set upon negotiations for a coalition government that would include elements of the Pathet 
Lao.   Knowing that the Communists had no incentive to negotiate, Kennedy ordered the 
deployment of naval forces to the region and placed other troops in the vicinity on alert; 
some special forces were transferred to Laos itself and nearby in Thailand. 
 
It seemed that the plan was failing when, in the final weeks of March, further Pathet Lao 
offences met with success and the remnants of the US backed army were in retreat.  By 21st 
March, as more and more US forces were committed to the region, it seemed inevitable 
that US military force would be engaged to resolve matters.  On the 23rd March, with three 
aircraft carriers steaming towards the South China Sea and other troops arriving in Thailand, 
Kennedy informed a press conference that: 
 
 “/ĨŝŶƚŚĞƉĂƐƚƚŚĞƌĞŚĂƐďĞĞŶĂŶǇƉŽƐƐŝďůĞŐƌŽƵŶĚĨŽƌŵŝƐƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐŽƵƌĚĞƐŝƌĞĨŽƌĂ
ƚƌƵůǇŶĞƵƌĂů>ĂŽƐ ?ƚŚĞƌĞƐŚŽƵůĚďĞŶŽŶĞŶŽǁ ? ?16 
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It was brinkmanship of this nature that fuelled the idea of Kennedy as a combative Cold 
Warrior, and it is true to state that as the crisis continued the prospects of the threatening 
presence of US forces being turned to combat heightened.  But by the end of April Kennedy 
had built his position for a negotiated settlement and at Geneva a year later the final 
touches were put to the Declaration on the Neutrality of Laos, which placed the country into 
the hands of a coalition comprising representatives of the Pathet Lao, pro US and neutral 
factions.  It was not a strong settlement and, with unfolding events in neighbouring 
Vietnam, it became more academic as the war there expanded in later years.  Nevertheless, 
Kennedy had employed a tactic aimed at securing the solution he wanted  W a negotiated 
settlement, without the combat engagement urged upon him by advisers and the military.  
In the course of the final few days before pressing his decision Kennedy had to face down 
the demands of many who were willing to risk conflict with China and nuclear war to meet 
the situation head-on. His persistence, almost as a lone voice, against the actual use of the 
tremendous military power that had been brought to the area was as much an act of 
defiance as dissent. 
 
Though often disregarded as part of the tragic history of Indochina, the Laos crisis in March / 
April 1961 was a major step on the path that led to the Vietnam escalation a few years later.  
It also marked another statement of dissent that extended the distance between Kennedy 
and the military chiefs upon whom he relied for advice and support.  This breach expanded 
further in the course of his Presidency as Kennedy took a counter line when other crises 
came to bear. 
 
Holding Out on Vietnam 
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At the same time as The Bay of Pigs and Laos episodes were unfolding, Kennedy was 
presented with evidence of the precarious position of the government of South Vietnam.  
Since becoming President in October 1954 Ngo Dinh Diem appeared not to have advanced 
the prospects for a peaceful, united, democratic buttress against Communist expansion that 
ŚĂĚďĞĞŶƚŚĞƉƵƌƉŽƐĞĂŶĚŝŶƚĞŶƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞŝƐĞŶŚŽǁĞƌĂĚŵŝŶŝƐƚƌĂƚŝŽŶ ?dŚĞhŶŝƚĞĚ^ƚĂƚĞƐ ?
ŚŽƉĞƐĨŽƌsŝĞƚŶĂŵƐŝŶĐĞƉĂƌƚŝƚŝŽŶŝŶ ? ? ? ?ŚĂĚďĞĞŶďƵŝůƚƵƉŽŶŝĞŵ ?ƐůĞĂĚĞƌƐŚŝƉĂŶĚŚĞŚĂĚ
been supported by US economic and military aid, but by 1961 there was little evidence of 
real progress.  Diem, together with his influential brother Ngo Dinh Nhu, had failed to drive 
back the insurgent guerrilla troops from North Vietnam and seemed incapable of stifling the 
influence of their sympathisers, the Viet Cong,17 who enjoyed considerable success in 
convincing the population outside of Saigon that the government was both corrupt18 and 
dominated by foreigners.  Enjoying a privileged existence in the presidential palace, Diem 
could use the situation to press the United States for ever more resources and support.19  
^ŝŵƵůƚĂŶĞŽƵƐůǇ ?ƚŚĞŽƉƉƌĞƐƐŝǀĞĂŶĚĚŝǀŝƐŝǀĞŶĂƚƵƌĞŽĨŝĞŵ ?ƐŐŽǀĞƌŶĂŶĐĞǁĂƐŝƐŽůĂƚŝŶŐůĂƌŐĞ
parts of South Vietnamese society, the support of which would be essential for a united 
ĨƌŽŶƚĂŐĂŝŶƐƚƚŚĞƚŚƌĞĂƚƐƉŽƐĞĚďǇƚŚĞEŽƌƚŚĂŶĚƚŚĞsŝĞƚŽŶŐ ?ŝĞŵ ?ƐďƌŽƚŚĞƌEŚƵ ?
especially, had built a reputation as ruthless and uncompromising, running an enforcement 
based police force and crushing any opposition through fear and tyranny. 
 
If Kennedy had been genuine in his repeated calls for free, democratic and pluralist societies 
in the developing nations, then he must have been at least disappointed by the outcomes of 
his support for Diem over the previous few years.  As a state on the front line of resistance 
against Communist expansion he could not ignore South Vietnam and nor would his advisers 
let him  W the military, the State Department, the Foreign Service and all other parties of 
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government made repeated assertions regarding its vital importance as a strategic inter-
face in the fight that was the Cold War.  It was against this background that President 
<ĞŶŶĞĚǇ ?ƐĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶŵĂŬŝŶŐŝŶƌĞŐĂƌĚƚŽŵĂƚƚĞƌƐƉĞƌƚĂŝŶŝŶŐƚŽ^ŽƵƚŚsŝĞƚŶĂŵŵƵƐƚďĞ
assessed.   Certain characteristics stand out: 
 
x The nature, size and role of the US military presence in Vietnam changed considerably 
during the time of his Presidency.  As he took office in January 1961 there were 
approximately 700 accredited US military advisers in the country and, by the time of 
his death in November 1963 this number had risen to over 16,000.20 
x From late 1961 units of special forces using helicopters and other aircraft had been 
drafted.  These operated in close support with the Army of the Republic of Vietnam 
(ARVN) and were subject to attack from hostile forces. 
x The numbers of US personnel killed, wounded and missing in South Vietnam rose 
throughout the years of the Kennedy Presidency.21 
x Diem was overthrown and murdered, along with his brother Nhu, after a military coup 
Ě ?ĠƚĂƚ in early November 1963.2223   
x Despite heavy pressure from military and civilian advisers alike, Kennedy never 
introduced US forces for conventional combat in South Vietnam. 
 
It should be remembered that Kennedy was formulating his policy on Vietnam (and South 
East Asia in general) whilst resisting the ideas and proposals that were presented to him by 
his advisers  W particularly his military advisers.  In 2011 an official history of the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff and the Vietnam War was published by the Office of the Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff.  Author Dr Jack Schulimson has written: 
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 “ ?ƚhe failed invasion of Cuba during the Bay of Pigs episode very early in his administration 
caused President Kennedy to lose his faith in the advice of the Joint Chiefs. Indeed the 
President appointed General Maxwell Taylor to act as his intermediary with the Joint Chiefs 
until General Taylor assumed the position of Chairman himself in October 1962. Throughout 
the PresiĚĞŶƚ ?ƐƚĞŶƵƌĞŝŶŽĨĨŝĐĞ ?ƚŚĞ<ĞŶŶĞĚǇĂĚŵŝŶŝƐƚƌĂƚŝŽŶ ?ƐƉŽůŝĐǇŝŶ^ŽƵƚŚĞĂƐƚƐŝĂǁĂƐ
marked by clashes between factions in the Defense Department including the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, the State Department, and the White House ? ?24 
 
It is the circumstances of the time, as articulated by Dr SchulimsoŶ ?ƚŚĂƚŚĞůƉƉƵƚ<ĞŶŶĞĚǇ ?Ɛ
thinking on Vietnam into the context of his broader ideas about ensuring that the United 
States should not become a neo-imperialist power  W the concept that is of most interest to 
this study.  There are several explanations that may be put forward as reasons why Kennedy 
did not engage combat troops in Vietnam: 
 
x Because he did not believe that a militarily solution was feasible. 
x Because he was concerned that a military initiative on the part of the United States 
might trigger a reaction from the PRC or the Soviet Union that would lead to a wider 
war and the use of nuclear weapons. 
x Because such action would provide the Soviet Union with a moral justification to take 
counter measures elsewhere, such as in Berlin. 
x Because Kennedy habitually did not use US troops in a combat role to resolve issues, 
as evidenced by his actions in Cuba, Laos, Berlin and elsewhere. 
x Because Kennedy retained a belief that the USA must resist the types of actions that 
would cast it as a modern day imperialist nation, a position that would damage its 
efforts in waging the Cold War. 
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To reinforce the relevance of this last point it is necessary to examine how Vietnam featured 
during the Kennedy Presidency and how he reacted on each occasion. 
 
Kennedy and Vietnam in the White House 
General Edward Lansdale, who first reported to the new President on conditions in South 
Vietnam (see endnote 17 above), was a stand out character in the history of the United 
^ƚĂƚĞƐ ?ŝŶǀŽůǀĞŵĞŶƚŝŶ/ŶĚŽĐŚŝŶĂ ?,ĞŚĂĚĞĂƌŶĞĚĂ reputation as a pragmatic and effective 
envoy in the early 1950s in the Philippines, at which time he had manoeuvred to crush the 
Communist inspired Hukbalahap (Huk) Rebellion and ensure the ascendancy of Ramon 
Magsaysay to the presidency,25 an episode of recent US history that demonstrated how 
nations could be freed from colonial oversight and avoid becoming Communist dominated. 
 
In many ways Lansdale epitomised the type of individual to whom Kennedy could relate.   
He was active and involved, he used unconventional methods and, given his background in 
the business of advertising, he knew how to convey appearances to cement ideas and 
policies.  His part in the elevation of Magsaysay and the defeat of the Huk gave him 
sufficient of a reputation for John Foster Dulles, Secretary of State, to send him to Vietnam 
in 1954 as the man to resolve matters there26 and he struck up a close relationship with 
ŝĞŵ ?/ŶĂƉƉĞĂƌĂŶĐĞĂƚůĞĂƐƚ ?>ĂŶƐĚĂůĞ ?ƐƐƵĐĐĞƐƐŝŶƚŚĞWŚŝůŝƉƉŝŶĞƐƌĞĨůĞĐƚĞĚŵĂŶǇŽĨ
<ĞŶŶĞĚǇ ?ƐƐƚĂƚĞĚďĞůŝĞĨƐŽŶ how the United States should engage with nations emerging 
from foreign oversight and open to the persuasions of Communist propaganda; namely, that 
the US should not be overbearing, should look to assist and support democratic 
governments and should, above all, avoid the danger of being seen as a neo-colonial power.  
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When they first met in the White House, on 28th January 1961, Kennedy is reported to have 
told the General that he would like him to be the next ambassador to Vietnam.27 
 
Lansdale, however, was viewed in different ways by those who advised Kennedy and efforts 
were made to ensure that this did not happen.28  dŚŝƐĨĂĐƚŽƌĂƐŝĚĞ ?>ĂŶƐĚĂůĞ ?Ɛ
recommendation that the US ambassador in Saigon should be replaced was accepted and 
there is no doubt that his presence in the national security apparatus was influential at 
different levels; he certainly had a close relationship with General L. C. McGarr, commander 
of the Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) in Vietnam.29  As US involvement in 
Vietnam began to wind down after Richard Nixon became President, and with the release of 
the Pentagon Papers in 1971,30 questions were raised about his methods and influence and 
his reputation today may be interpreted in different ways.31  In 1961, however, and despite 
the lack of progress, the revisions were yet to come and there was a retained belief that, 
with the right people, the right approach and the right attitude, Vietnam could be retained 
within the sphere of US influence, could operate on a democratic and open basis, and could 
act as a standard for other nations to follow whilst positioning itself as impregnable to the 
blandishments of Communist inspired infiltrators. 
 
Lansdale had been sent to South Vietnam for the purposes of evaluating the developing 
situation by ŝƐĞŶŚŽǁĞƌ ?ƐĞĨĞŶƐĞ^ĞĐƌĞƚĂƌǇdŚŽŵĂƐ'ĂƚĞƐ ?,ŝƐǀŝƐŝƚƚŽŽŬƉůĂĐĞďĞƚǁĞĞŶ ?nd 
and 14th January 1961 and he reported directly to the new President at a meeting held in 
the White House on 28th January.32  /ŶĞƐƐĞŶĐĞ ?>ĂŶƐĚĂůĞ ?ƐĨŝŶĚŝŶŐƐďƵŝůƚƵƉŽŶƚŚĞ “Basic 
Counterinsurgency Plan for VietNam ?,33 a document that had been initiated in early 1960 by 
the Pacific Command branch of the military.  The paper urged action for all forms of aid to 
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the South Vietnamese government: military, economic and political, as well as a programme 
for psychological war ( “psyops ?) to stifle the growing influence of the North and its 
ĐŽŶĨĞĚĞƌĂƚĞƐŝŶƵŶĚĞƌŵŝŶŝŶŐŝĞŵ ?ƐĂĚŵŝŶŝƐƚƌĂƚŝŽŶ ?34 but it also warned of an imminent 
collapse of the government if actions were not taken immediately.35 
 
/ƚŝƐŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚŝŶŐƚŽŶŽƚĞ<ĞŶŶĞĚǇ ?Ɛƌeactions to Lansdale and the report that he presented.  
Lansdale came across to the new President as somebody who represented the values he 
ǁĂƐƐĞĞŬŝŶŐƚŽƉƌŽŵŽƚĞŝŶƚŚĞĨŽƌŵƵůĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞhŶŝƚĞĚ^ƚĂƚĞƐ ?ƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐǁŝƚŚŶĞǁĂŶĚ
developing countries, especially those released from the shackles of imperial oversight.  
>ĂŶƐĚĂůĞ ?ƐƐƵĐĐĞƐƐĞƐŝŶƚŚĞWŚŝůŝƉƉŝŶĞƐǁĞƌĞƐƚŝůůƋƵŝƚĞĨƌĞƐŚŝŶƚŚĞŵŝŶĚĂŶĚŝƚǁĂƐƚŚŝƐ
episode, which had sealed his reputation, upon which he traded when dealing with 
Vietnam.  Kennedy showed some naivety in suggesting him for Ambassador to Saigon; while 
ŚĞŵĂǇŚĂǀĞďĞĞŶĂďůĞƚŽĂĚǀĂŶĐĞŵĂƚƚĞƌƐĂƐĂĨƌŝĞŶĚĂŶĚĐŽŶĨŝĚĂŶƚŽĨŝĞŵ ?>ĂŶƐĚĂůĞ ?Ɛ
character was much too volatile for a diplomatic posting.36   Notwithstanding this error of 
judgement, Kennedy accepted most of what Lansdale put forward and sought to retain US 
influence in Vietnam through the use of programmes of support that covered aspects of 
economic, social and political reform, as well as military aid.  It was unfortunate for the 
President that there was such a level of intrigue in Vietnam (and also among his own 
ĂĚǀŝƐŽƌƐ ?ŽŶǁŚĂƚƐŚŽƵůĚďĞƚŚĞďĞƐƚƉĂƚŚƚŽĨŽůůŽǁ ?ƚŚĂƚĞǀĞŶ>ĂŶƐĚĂůĞ ?ƐƌĞƉŽƌƚǁĂƐ
conflicted.37 
 
In pursuit of further clarification Kennedy despatched Vice President Johnson to Vietnam in 
May 1961 as a means for both assuring the Diem regime of further US support and to obtain 
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a more direct statement on the value of continuing with the aid program as it had been 
operating for some years.  But the machinations continued. 
 
In February 1961, for example, the States Department, in a message signed by Secretary of 
State Dean Rusk, had instructed US Ambassador to Saigon Elbridge Durbrow to attach terms 
to the continueĚĂŝĚƉĂĐŬĂŐĞƚŚĂƚƐƵƉƉŽƌƚĞĚŝĞŵ ?Ɛ regime.  In essence, Durbrow was to 
advise the President of South Vietnam that aid would only be guaranteed for the current 
year (1961) and would be suspended unless the desired political, social and economic 
reforms were forthcoming.  Attaching strings to the aid programme aroused concerns 
within MAAG, not least because it was the main beneficiary of US support.38  Durbrow had, 
as almost a lone voice against the endeavours of the Foreign Service, the State Department, 
the military and others, such as Lansdale, come to the idea the Diem was playing fast and 
loose with US assistance, using it to prop up his shaky regime by patronising a narrow group 
of friends, associates and appointees to run government affairs.  In the eventuality, 
Durbrow lost all credibility when, in almost his last act as Ambassador, he had to listen to 
^ĞĐƌĞƚĂƌǇŽĨ^ƚĂƚĞĞĂŶZƵƐŬĂĚǀŝƐĞŝĞŵ ?Ɛ^ĞĐƌĞƚĂƌǇŽĨ^ƚĂƚĞ ?EŐƵǇĞŶŝŶŚdŚƵĂŶƚŚĂƚƚŚĞ
ƌĞƉůĂĐĞŵĞŶƚŵďĂƐƐĂĚŽƌ “ ?ǁŝůůďĞǀĞƌǇƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐ ? ? ?39 
 
<ĞŶŶĞĚǇ ?ƐĞĨĨŽƌƚƐŝŶŚĂŶĚůŝŶŐƚŚĞŝŶƚƌŝŐƵĞƐ ?ŝŶĨŝŐŚƚŝŶŐ ?ĐŽŶƚƌĂĚŝĐƚŝŽŶƐand countermanding 
that marked US actions in regard to Vietnam during his Presidency were, on the face of 
things, quite consistent.  He repeatedly asked for update reports  W from Johnson, from 
General Maxwell Taylor (together with special advisor Walter Rostow), from Senate majority 
leader Mike Mansfield40 and later from Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara.  Each of 
these reported back with mixed messages about how the Diem regime was under threat, 
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but that the prospects for defeating both the Viet Cong insurgency and, eventually, the 
sŝĞƚŵŝŶŚ ?ƌĞŵĂŝŶĞĚďƌŝŐŚƚĂƐůŽŶŐĂƐh^ĂŝĚĐŽŶƚŝŶƵĞĚ ?ĂĐŚ ?ƚŽ<ĞŶŶĞĚǇ ?ƐĐŚĂŐƌŝŶ ?
suggested a heightened US military presence and, in trying to be responsive and 
constructive, the President authorised some increases in training units and special forces. 
 
MAAG (and later the US Military Assistance Command for Vietnam (MACV), which replaced 
it in February 1962) was meanwhile redefining its role as the insurgency grew and the 
Government of North Vietnam (GNV) became more open in its support for overturning the 
Diem government.  US troops, ostensibly involved only in training or back field operations, 
became engaged in combat situations and numbers were wounded, killed or went missing.  
US news reporters in South Vietnam were filing reports back to their newspapers and 
broadcast outlets that presented a picture of the US presence that was at odds with official 
statements coming out of the White House.  It became clear that the situation in Vietnam 
from the beginning of the Kennedy Presidency until the time of his death was moving in a 
single direction:  the US military presence, in the form of advisers and special forces, was 
expanding, the government was becoming more isolated and the prospects for a conclusion 
that would fit with the objectives sought by both Eisenhower and Kennedy  W a stable peace 
under a government that was reflective of the choice of the people  W grew ever more 
remote.  More worrying still for Kennedy was the fact that none of these developments 
fitted with his own ideas about keeping the United States out of positions of dominance in 
Third World countries and, thereby, avoiding the trap of the US becoming a proto-colonial 
influence. 
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It was in the light of these realities that Kennedy refused to commit US ground troops41 and 
repeatedly insisted that the army of South Vietnam must do the fighting; the duty of the 
United States was to provide support and encouragement in ways that would deflect the 
baleful influence of the Communist powers. 
 
<ĞŶŶĞĚǇ ?Ɛ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶĨĨĂŝƌƐ Management Breaks New Ground 
The guiding principles that have been iterated above42 hardened through the first months of 
1963 as Kennedy weighed the events and issues of his time in the White House and looked 
to how he might secure a second term as President.  He had taken the view that only with a 
further four years could he hope to put into place some of the more radical ideas he had 
developed about how the United States could move forward in the Cold War.43  If he should 
succeed in 1964 then he would have no further political ambitions to fulfil and would not 
suffer political respite by advancing new policy initiatives.  His ideas were expressed most 
ĨŽƌĐŝďůǇŝŶƚŚĞƐƉĞĞĐŚ ? “^ƚƌĂƚĞŐǇŽĨWĞĂĐĞ ?ƚŚĂƚŚĞŵĂĚĞĨŽƌthe Commencement Address 
at American University on June 10th that year.44   
 
KĨƚĞŶĐĂůůĞĚƚŚĞ “WĞĂĐĞ^ƉĞĞĐŚ ? ?ƚŚŝƐƐƚĂƚĞŵĞŶƚŽĨƚŚĞWƌĞƐŝĚĞŶƚ ?ƐǀŝĞǁƐĂŶĚŝĚĞĂƐŽŶŚŽǁ
the United States should re-orientate its position in the Cold War, how it should look to a 
future of peaceful cooperation and coexistence, was in point of fact a declaration on behalf 
of free peoples.  It was an attempt to portray a future world in which levels of 
understanding between different creeds and beliefs would have to be reached if mankind 
was to survive as a species on earth; failure to do so would result in self-destruction for the 
human race.   The benefits to be obtained in the future, which were growing all the while 
with advancing scientific progress, would be realised by cooperation, not conflict and the 
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old world, in which the strong dominated the weak or disadvantaged was being replaced by 
a new age in which self-determination and advanced communications would give all the 




public utterances.  It acted as a signal both for his political philosophy and the platform on 
which he would stand for re-election to the Presidency.  The remaining five months of his 
life were geared to actions, both overt and behind closed doors, that were directed on the 
broad lines of this speech.  In Cuba, a small island in the Caribbean that had brought the 
world as close to nuclear annihilation as ever it had faced, Kennedy initiated tentative 
moves for a rapprochement that would discharge the tensions and allow for a future of co-
existence.45  From out of the crisis over Cuba that had gripped the world in October 1962, 
Kennedy had engaged in a remarkable correspondence with Soviet Premier Khrushchev in 
which the two leaders established the common grounds of their ambitions for the futures of 
their respective countries.46  Most prominently, this correspondence set out the efforts of 
both leaders to realise the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty that came into being in August 1963. 
 
Then, on 2nd September, Kennedy was interviewed by Walter Cronkite for CBS Television.  It 
was in the course of this broadcast that the President made clear his feelings about the 
deteriorating situation in Vietnam: 
 
 “ƌŽŶŬŝƚĞ P
Mr. President, the only hot war we've got running at the moment is of course the one in 
Viet-Nam, and we have our difficulties there, quite obviously. 
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The President. 
I don't think that unless a greater effort is made by the Government to win popular support 
that the war can be won out there. In the final analysis, it is their war. They are the ones 
who have to win it or lose it. We can help them, we can give them equipment, we can send 
our men out there as advisers, but they have to win it, the people of Viet-Nam, against the 
Communists. 
 
We are prepared to continue to assist them, but I don't think that the war can be won 
unless the people support the effort and, in my opinion, in the last 2 months, the 
government has gotten out of touch with the people. 
 
The repressions against the Buddhists, we felt, were very unwise. Now all we can do is to 
make it very clear that we don't think this is the way to win. It is my hope that this will 
become increasingly obvious to the government, that they will take steps to try to bring 
back popular support for this very essential struggle. 
 
Cronkite: 
Do you think this government still has time to regain the support of the people? 
 
The President. 
I do. With changes in policy and perhaps with personnel I think it can. If it doesn't make 
those changes, I would think that the chances of winning it would not be very good. 
 
Cronkite: 




If he does not change it, of course, that is his decision. He has been there 10 years and, as I 
say, he has carried this burden when he has been counted out on a number of occasions. 
 
Our best judgment is that he can't be successful on this basis. We hope that he comes to see 
that, but in the final analysis it is the people and the government itself who have to win or 
lose this struggle. All we can do is help, and we are making it very clear, but I don't agree 
with those who say we should withdraw. That would be a great mistake. I know people 
don't like Americans to be engaged in this kind of an effort. Forty-seven Americans have 
been killed in combat with the enemy, but this is a very important struggle even though it is 
far away. 
 
We took all this--made this effort to defend Europe. Now Europe is quite secure. We also 
have to participate--we may not like it--in the defense ŽĨƐŝĂ ? ?47 
 
 
It was just two months later that the Diem brothers were assassinated and their 
government overthrown and a few weeks thereafter that President Kennedy himself was 
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ĚĞĂĚ ?ǇƚŚŝƐƚŝŵĞ<ĞŶŶĞĚǇ ?ƐŐƵŝĚŝŶŐƚŚŽƵŐŚƚƐŽŶƚŚĞĨƵƚƵƌĞŚĂĚďĞĞŶŵĂĚĞĂďƵŶĚĂŶƚůǇ
clear and he had made repeated statements regarding the importance of ensuring that the 
United States did not become a neo-imperial power.  This observation warrants a more 
detailed examination of the implications of the ĐŽƵƉĚ ?ĠƚĂƚ that ousted the Diems and the 
approach that Kennedy took in handling the situation. 
 
The Military Take Over in Saigon 
This episode was pivotal in the history of South Vietnam, closing out the strategy of the 
United States up to this time of supporting Diem as a reforming force that would defeat the 
insurgency and the threat from the North by use of indigenous assets.  It marked the change 
towards active US military involvement as sponsored by President Johnson.  It also provides 
a small window on the thinking of John F. Kennedy in handling foreign policy issues where 
the interests of the United States are tied closely to the well-being of a non-westernised 
state still emerging from a colonial past.  Opinions on the actual event are divided and there 
is controversy regarding the part that Kennedy played in promoting or encouraging a coup 
Ě ?ĠƚĂƚ.  For Howard Jones there is little doubt: 
 
 “dŚĞ<ĞŶŶĞĚǇĂĚŵŝŶŝƐƚƌĂƚŝŽŶĐŽƵůĚŶŽƚĞƐĐĂƉĞƌĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďŝůŝƚǇĨŽƌƉƌŽŵŽƚŝŶŐĂĐŽƵƉĂƚŝƚƐ
most crucial moment when its leaders were poised to act and needed only a green light 
ĨƌŽŵtĂƐŚŝŶŐƚŽŶ ? ?48 
 
 




takeover, Kennedy came under pressure to support a military coup against Dieŵ ?Ɛ
government.  John Kenneth Galbraith, his ambassador to India, urged him to withdraw U.S. 
support from Diem.  Galbraith did not think Diem could effectively lead South Vietnam and 
ƚŚŽƵŐŚƚŝƚĂĐůŝĐŚĠƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƌĞǁĂƐŶŽĂůƚĞƌŶĂƚŝǀĞƚŽŝĞŵ ?,ĞũŽŬĞĚ ? “EŽthing succeeds like 
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ƐƵĐĐĞƐƐŽƌƐ ? ?tŚĞŶ,ĞŶƌǇĂďŽƚ>ŽĚŐĞ ?ƚŚĞh ?^ ?ĂŵďĂƐƐĂĚŽƌŝŶ^ĂŝŐŽŶ ?ǁĞŝŐŚĞĚŝŶǁŝƚŚ
ƐŝŵŝůĂƌĂĚǀŝĐĞ ?<ĞŶŶĞĚǇƌĞůƵĐƚĂŶƚůǇƐŝŐŶĞĚŽĨĨŽŶĂĐŽƵƉ ? ?49 
 
 
But Arthur Schlesinger saw things differently: 
 
 “/ƚŝƐŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚƚŽƐƚĂƚĞĐůĞĂƌůǇƚŚĂƚƚŚe coup of November 1, 1963, was entirely planned 
and carried out by the Vietnamese.  Neither the American Embassy nor the CIA were 
involved in instigation or execution. 
 
 ?/Ĩ>ŽĚŐĞĂŐƌĞĞĚ ?ƚŚĞWƌĞƐŝĚĞŶƚƐĂŝĚ ?ǁĞƐŚŽƵůĚŝŶƐƚƌƵĐƚŚŝŵƚŽĚŝƐĐŽƵƌĂŐĞĂĐŽƵƉ ? ?50 
 
US ambassador to Saigon at the time was Henry Cabot-Lodge.  In an interview he made as 
part of the John F Kennedy Library and Museum Oral History Program, he stated that he 
believed the assassinations were inexorable: 
 
 “/ŶtĂƐŚŝŶŐƚŽŶ ?ďĞĨŽƌĞŐŽŝŶŐŽƵƚƚŽsietnam, I had a talk with a very eminent Vietnamese 
ǁŚŽƐĂŝĚƚŽŵĞƚŚĂƚĂŶĚ/ ?ŵƋƵŽƚŝŶŐŶŽǁ “hŶůĞƐƐƚŚĞǇůĞĂǀĞƚŚĞĐŽƵŶƚƌǇ ?ƚŚĞƌĞŝƐŶŽƉŽǁĞƌ
on earth that can prevent the assassination of Madame Nhu [Madame Ngo Dinh Nhu], her 
husband Mr. Nhu [Ngo Dinh Nhu ? ?ĂŶĚŚŝƐďƌŽƚŚĞƌDƌ ?ŝĞŵ ? ?ƚŚĂƚƚŚĞŽƉƉƌĞƐƐŝǀĞĂĐƚƐŽĨ
the regime the arbitrary arrests, imprisonments and executions, and the general reign of 
terror that was going on would make assassination inevitable in any country. I remembered 
that and I found, not long after my arrival that it was true. Mr. Nhu and Mr. Diem were both 
assassinated, much to my regret, and Madame Nhu certainly would have been had she not 
ůĞĨƚƚŚĞĐŽƵŶƚƌǇ ? ?51 
 
 
Cabot Lodge commented further on how the President viewed the situation in Vietnam and 
how the murders could have been avoided: 
 
 “WƌĞƐŝĚĞŶƚ<ĞŶŶĞĚǇ ?ƐƉŽůŝĐǇǁĂƐŶŽƚ ?ĂƐŚĂƐďĞĞŶĐĂƌĞůĞƐƐůǇƐĂŝĚ ?ƚŽŽǀĞƌƚŚƌŽǁƚŚĞŝĞŵ
ƌĞŐŝŵĞ ?dŚĞsŝĞƚŶĂŵĞƐĞǁĞƌĞĚŽŝŶŐƚŚĂƚĨŽƌƚŚĞŵƐĞůǀĞƐĂŶĚĚŝĚŶ ?ƚŶĞĞĚĂŶǇŽƵƚƐŝĚĞŚĞůƉ ?
What he was trying to do, and what I was trying to do as his representative, was to get them 
to change their policies, change some of their personnel, and try to rehabilitate themselves 
so that they could function as a government as long as they remained in power. ? 
 
³« WƌĞƐŝĚĞŶƚ<ĞŶŶĞĚǇ ?ƐƉŽůŝĐǇ ?ĨĂƌĨƌŽŵďĞŝŶŐŽŶĞǁŚŝĐŚůĞĚƚŽƚŚĞůŝƋƵŝĚĂƚŝŽŶŽĨŝĞŵĂŶĚ
EŚƵ ?ǁŽƵůĚŚĂǀĞƐĂǀĞĚďŽƚŚŽĨƚŚĞŝƌůŝǀĞƐ ? “52 
 
 
>ŽĚŐĞĞǆƉůĂŝŶĞĚWƌĞƐŝĚĞŶƚ<ĞŶŶĞĚǇ ?ƐƉĂƌƚŝŶƚŚĞĚĞǀĞůŽƉŝŶŐĐŽƵƉĚ ?ĠƚĂƚ with the words:  
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 “ ?ŚŝƐŝŶƐƚƌƵĐƚŝŽŶƚŽŵĞ “ŶŽƚƚŽƚŚǁĂƌƚ ?ǁĂƐĂƐĂŐĂĐŝŽƵƐŝŶƐƚƌƵĐƚŝŽŶ ?ƐŚŽǁŝŶŐĂŶĂǁĂƌĞŶĞƐƐ
that the ideas that men live by in Vietnam are not the same as the ideas that they live by 
ŚĞƌĞ ? ?53 
 
 
&ŽƌŽƚŚĞƌƐ ?ŚŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ƚŚĞƚƌƵƚŚŽĨƚŚĞĚĞŵŝƐĞŽĨƚŚĞŝĞŵƌĞŐŝŵĞŝƐĨĂƌĨƌŽŵ>ŽĚŐĞ ?Ɛ
account.  Professor Geoffrey Shaw identifies a failure to understand the structures of 
Vietnamese society by US planners as fundamental to the reasons why Diem fell.  Shaw 
portrays Diem as an honest, upstanding and widely admired leader of the Vietnamese, 
praised even by those who led the coup against him and by Ho Chi Minh himself.   He was 
undermined by US interference (based upon ignorance) and his death signalled the longer 
term tragedy of Vietnam.  Shaw quotes President Johnson for a perspective on how matters 
ƚƌĂŶƐƉŝƌĞĚŝŶ^ŽƵƚŚsŝĞƚŶĂŵĨŽůůŽǁŝŶŐŝĞŵ ?ƐĨĂůů P 
 
 “sŝĐĞWƌĞƐŝĚĞŶƚ:ŽŚŶƐŽŶŚĂĚĂƌŐƵĞĚĂŐĂŝŶƐƚƚŚĞĐŽƵƉƉůŽƚƚŝŶŐ ?ďǇĂůůĂĐĐŽƵŶƚƐ ?ŚĞŐĞŶƵŝŶĞůǇ
liked Diem and thought him a good leader of his country.  He was livid over the murder of 
Diem and did little to hide his contempt for those who had a hand in it.  In 1966, when he 
was president, he confided in a telephone conversation with Senator Eugene McCarthy the 
ƚƌƵƚŚŽĨǁŚĂƚƚŚĞ<ĞŶŶĞĚǇĂĚŵŝŶŝƐƚƌĂƚŝŽŶŚĂĚĚŽŶĞƚŽWƌĞƐŝĚĞŶƚŝĞŵďĂĐŬŝŶ ? ? ? ? P “ ?tĞ ?
killed him.  We all got together and got a goddamn bunch of thugs and we went in and 
ĂƐƐĂƐƐŝŶĂƚĞĚŚŝŵ ?EŽǁ ?ǁĞ ?ǀĞƌĞĂůůǇŚĂĚŶŽƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůƐƚĂďŝůŝƚǇƐŝŶĐĞƚŚĞŶ ? ? ?54 
 
 
This episode demonstrates a number of important aspects for any study of John F. Kennedy, 
but it is particularly enlightening for a true understanding of his thinking in regard to nations 
emerging from out of a colonial past.  In the first place it shows that there is confusion, a 
division of opinions and assertions.  Secondly, it provides evidence for any interpretation of 
Kennedy that suits the writer  W he was ruthless and conniving, he was weak and ineffectual, 
he was error prone and naïve.  Clearly, encouraging a military take over in a country 
struggling to establish itself after colonial subjugation would stand Kennedy aloft as the Cold 
Warrior that many have portrayed him and would diminish to insignificance any notion that 
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he sought to promote democracy and free societies in the newly created nations.  What, 
therefore, is the best explanation for ďŽƚŚƚŚĞĞǀĞŶƚĂŶĚ<ĞŶŶĞĚǇ ?ƐƉĂƌƚŝŶŝƚ ?
 
Kennedy had devoted a considerable part of his time and efforts in supporting and 
promoting Diem in Saigon, not just during his Presidency, but in years beforehand as a 
Senator and prominent member of the AFV.  By August 1963, as demonstrated in his 
interview with Walter Cronkite,55 he was beginning to despair that Vietnam would ever 
become the type of state that he envisioned for countries emerging from a colonial past.  
Democracy had not taken root; there were few signs of a plurality of institutions, power had 
become concentrated and nepotism abounded.  Concomitantly there was political instability 
with a lack of cohesion in the forces of the state  W the military, the government and religious 
factions all pulling in different directions.  Furthermore the country had become 
economically dependent upon the United States. 
 
Amid this parlous situation, by August 1963 there were widespread rumours of a pending 
military take over.  Certainly, there were grounds for a military coup as the army was the 
most powerful single body and had many reasons for being dissatisfied with Diem, but this 
did not make a revolution inevitable.   Those who put forward the idea that Kennedy 
supported, promoted or even sponsored a coup by the military are missing the point that 
Lodge makes  W that the plotting was taking place in Saigon, not Washington. 
 
Had Kennedy wished to show force to resist the rebel generals in their ambitions then he 
was confounded.  There were only sixteen thousand US military personnel in Vietnam at the 
time, compared to the ARVN which was 200,000 strong.  Apart from being an insufficient 
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number, care had been taken to restrict the role of the US military to assigned and 
mandated responsibilities for advising and supporting the ARVN.  There was no way the US 
forces could be re-deployed to undertake, for example, presidential protection duties, 
without reducing the capability for which they were in place or provoking a split with the 
ARVN that would be injurious to any future cooperation. 
 
Had Kennedy chosen to send a strong message to the rebel generals that he did not support 
them in undermining Diem, then what would have been the consequences?  Either the 
generals would have gone ahead anyway, which would have compromised the President in 
his future decision making and undermined the position in Vietnam that the Kennedy 
administration had sought to build through almost three years, or they would have desisted.  
In the latter case there would have been soured relations between Washington and the 
fighting forces upon which it relied to hold its position and policy; further, according to 
Lodge, it would only have delayed the inevitable anyway. 
 
<ĞŶŶĞĚǇ ?ƐĂĐƚŝŽŶƐ ? ?ŽƌŝŶĂĐƚŝŽŶƐ ?ŚŽǁĞǀĞƌƚŚĞǇŵĂǇďĞŝŶƚĞƌƉƌ ƚĞĚ ?ĂĐƚƵĂůůǇŐŝǀĞŝůůƵƐƚƌĂƚŝŽŶ
to the consistent line that he had shown he wished to take in regard to the affairs of 
countries emerging from an imperialist dominated past.  He did not wish to interfere in or 
direct their affairs; he wanted for them to make their own way in the world, make their own 
decisions based upon their own circumstances.  It was his hope (and more so his belief) that 
left to their own devices, the new nations would choose democracy and pluralism because 
these presented the best options for prosperity and progress.  His failing lay in his inability 
fully to appreciate the extent to which individuals in a new or emerging state sought power, 
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wealth and influence for themselves - over and above whatever general ambitions they may 
have had for their country and its people. 
 
Even had Kennedy wished to promote, support or sponsor a coup, one must wonder: what 
would he have done?  If he had made secret contact with the rebel generals in Saigon (and 
no writer suggests that he did), what could he have promised them?  He could make the 
offer that nothing would change: that the aid would continue, that the programme for 
importing consumer goods would carry on, that diplomatic relations would be retained and 
military cooperation would not be affected.  None of this would have amounted to a great 
deal however, because the rebel generals knew that their position was impregnable  W so 
long as they ensured that was no lingering presence of the Diem regime after they acted.  
They knew that US policy for containment of Communist expansion would not permit the 
wholesale withdrawal of US support and military aid; they knew that Washington could not 
cut off diplomatic links without compromising the US position on support for other parts of 
the world threatened by Communist take over.  Would it not be the case, for example, that 
the Soviets would interpret such actions as a willingness on the part of the US to abandon 
its allies (and its strategic positions) and encourage it to increase pressures in Berlin and 
elsewhere? 
 
The rebel generals in Saigon, as well as everyone else around the world who had even a 
vague understanding of how US foreign policy operated in late 1963, could have seen all 
these difficulties quite easily. Writers who come forth with the idea that Kennedy 
 “ĞŶĐŽƵƌĂŐĞĚ ?Žƌ “ŐĂǀĞƚŚĞŐƌĞĞŶůŝŐŚƚ ?ƚŽƚŚĞĐŽƵƉĚŽŶŽƚĚŽŚŝƐƚŽƌǇŐƌĞĂƚƐĞƌǀŝĐĞ ?56 this 
misses the point that Kennedy was trying to change the agenda of the Cold War and that 
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this particular event shows that he was still the prisoner of the nostrums that had governed 
US foreign policy since the Iron Curtain came down in 1945/6. 
 
tŚĂƚ ?ƚŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞ ?ŵƵƐƚďĞŵĂĚĞŽĨ:ŽŚŶƐŽŶ ?Ɛ outburst to McCarthy, as cited by Shaw?57  It 
should be stated, without equivocation, that it is not a declaration of any great value in 
ĂƐĐĞƌƚĂŝŶŝŶŐƚŚĞƚƌƵĞŶĂƚƵƌĞŽĨ<ĞŶŶĞĚǇ ?ƐĚĞĂůŝŶŐƐŝŶƚŚĞŵĂƚƚĞƌ ?dŚĞĐŽŶǀĞƌƐĂƚŝŽŶ ?ĂƐ
quoted, was part of a recorded telephone call, it was made in 1966 and it was factually 




hiŵ ? ? 
 
There was not the collusion that these words assert; this is simply not true.58  Secondly, 
Johnson was judicious in selecting which of his telephone conversations he wanted 
recorded and, as a selective record, they are not an altogether reliable source; it is 
ƚŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞ ?ĞǀŝĚĞŶƚŝĂůůǇƵŶƐŽƵŶĚƚŽĚĞƉĞŶĚŽŶƚŚŝƐƐƚĂƚĞŵĞŶƚ ?&ŝŶĂůůǇ ?ďǇ ? ? ? ?:ŽŚŶƐŽŶ ?Ɛ
ŽǁŶƉŽůŝĐǇĂĐƚŝŽŶƐŝŶƌĞŐĂƌĚƚŽsŝĞƚŶĂŵǁĞƌĞďĞŐŝŶŶŝŶŐƚŽƵŶƌĂǀĞů ?<ĞŶŶĞĚǇ ?ƐŝĚĞĂƐĂďŽƵƚ
non-interference, self-determination and avoidance of military entanglement had been 
quickly abandoned.  Both naturally and politically Johnson had put himself into a defensive 
position on Vietnam and this statement is more reflective of that reality than it is of any 
counter-ĂƐƐĞƐƐŵĞŶƚŽĨ<ĞŶŶĞĚǇ ?ƐƚŚŝŶŬŝŶŐŽƌĂĐƚŝŽŶƐ ? 
 
It is evident that Johnson and Kennedy viewed the situation in Vietnam quite differently.  
For Johnson (and the Military), Vietnam was a Cold War flashpoint which must be faced 
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down; for Kennedy, it was predominantly a nationalist conflict that could only be resolved 
ďǇƚŚĞƉĞŽƉůĞƚŚĞŵƐĞůǀĞƐ ?dŚŝƐǁĂƐĐůĞĂƌůǇĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƚĞĚďǇZŽŐĞƌ,ŝůƐŵĂŶ ?<ĞŶŶĞĚǇ ?ƐĐŚŝĞĨ





WRITERS ON KENNEDY, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, DECOLONISATION AND 
IMPERIALISM 
 
As has been shown, John Kennedy took an interest in colonial affairs from an early age; he 
developed this interest as a result of his own experiences - as a student, as a serviceman, as 
a journalist and as a politician.  Each of these parts of his life contributed to the 
development of his ideas and beliefs and the new imperatives that charged the dynamics of 
the imperialist powers occupied more than a little of his concerns and wishes regarding the 
future role of the United States as an active world power.  What is surprising to note is that 
ƚŚŝƐĂƐƉĞĐƚŽĨ<ĞŶŶĞǇ ?ƐƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůƚŚŝŶŬŝŶŐŚĂƐďĞĞŶƌĞůĂƚŝǀĞůǇŶĞŐůĞĐƚĞĚ ?DĂŝŶƐƚƌĞĂŵǁƌŝƚŝŶŐ
on Kennedy and imperialism is generally confined to articles, references and chapters and, 
although there are some specialist books that deal with aspects of his approach to different 
parts of the world there does not appear to be a comprehensive examination of the extent 
ƚŽǁŚŝĐŚ<ĞŶŶĞĚǇ ?ƐŝĚĞĂƐŽŶƚŚĞƌŽůĞŽĨƚŚĞhŶŝƚĞĚ^ƚĂƚĞƐĂƐĂǁŽƌůĚƉŽǁĞƌǁĞƌĞƚĞŵƉĞƌĞĚ
by his enduring interest in the repercussions arising from the breaking hold of the empire 
nations as colonised peoples sought to gain independence. 
 
Richard H. Mahoney in his book J.F.K.: Ordeal in Africa 1 goes some way in demonstrating 
ŚŽǁŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚĂŶĂƐƉĞĐƚŽĨ<ĞŶŶĞĚǇ ?ƐĨŽƌĞŝŐŶĂĨĨĂŝƌƐŵĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚƚŚŝŶŬŝŶŐƚŚĞdŚŝƌĚtŽƌůĚ
became after he was elected President.   In a review of Ordeal in Africa for The Christian 
Science Monitor, Howard C. Thomas writes: 
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 “Kennedy's policies in Africa make for interesting study, as they reveal a gradual shift in the 
President's mind as to the role the United States should play in the third world, particularly 
ƌĞŐĂƌĚŝŶŐƚŚĞŶĞǁůǇŝŶĚĞƉĞŶĚĞŶƚŶĂƚŝŽŶƐŽĨĨƌŝĐĂ ? ?2 
 
Whether this is the opinion of Thomas after reading the book or the opinion of the author 
himself is not made clear, but it is a remarkable statement given the extent to which 
Kennedy had made clear his position on US engagement with the Third World since 1951 
and demonstrates the degree to which the enduring interest that Kennedy took in US 
relations with developing nations has not been examined in any great detail. 
 
Other works, such as Bruce Riedel, :&< ?ƐForgotten Crisis: Tibet, The CIA, and the Sino-Indian 
War3 and Philip Muehlenbeck, ĞƚƚŝŶŐŽŶƚŚĞĨƌŝĐĂŶƐ ?:ŽŚŶ& ?<ĞŶŶĞĚǇ ?ƐŽƵƌƚŝŶŐŽĨĨƌŝĐĂŶ
Nationalist Leaders4 ĚĞĂůǁŝƚŚĂƐƉĞĐƚƐŽĨ<ĞŶŶĞĚǇ ?ƐĨŽƌĞŝŐŶƉŽůŝĐǇŵĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚŝŶƚŚĞtŚŝƚĞ
House, but treat them as somehow detached from the real business of international affairs 
that was US relations with the Soviet Union and its dealings in the Cold War.  There is 
ĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĂďůĞƌŽŽŵĨŽƌƚĂŬŝŶŐĂĐĐŽƵŶƚŽĨƚŚĞĨĂĐƚƚŚĂƚŵƵĐŚŽĨ<ĞŶŶĞĚǇ ?ƐƚŚŝŶŬŝŶŐŝŶ
managing the international interests of the USA was geared to his understanding of the 
changing world as a result of the decolonisation processes that were taking place, but 
authoritative texts on this are difficult to find. 
 
Indeed, one does not have to go far to determine just how much of an omission this is, given 
the extraordinary quantity of written works on the life and times of John F. Kennedy.  Jill 
Abramson, writing in The New York Times of 22nd October, 2013 has stated: 
 
 “ŶĞƐƚŝŵĂƚĞĚ ? ? ? ? ? ?ďŽŽŬƐŚĂǀĞďĞĞŶƉƵďůŝƐŚĞĚƐŝŶĐĞŚŝƐ ?<ĞŶŶĞĚǇ ?Ɛ ?ĚĞĂƚŚ ?and this 
anniversary year has loosed another vast outpouring.  Yet to explore the enormous 
ůŝƚĞƌĂƚƵƌĞŝƐƚŽďĞƐƚƌƵĐŬŶŽƚďǇǁŚĂƚ ?ƐƚŚĞƌĞďƵƚďǇǁŚĂƚ ?ƐŵŝƐƐŝŶŐ ? ?
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DƐďƌĂŵƐŽŶ ?ƐĂƌƚŝĐůĞŝƐƚŝƚůĞĚKennedy  W The Elusive President, a piece that reviews the 
wide ranging and diverse opinions about Kennedy that so many writers have put forward so 
it is perhaps not surprising that she should make such a comment.  Notwithstanding, Ms 
ďƌĂŵƐŽŶ ?ƐƌĞŵĂƌŬƐĂƌĞǁĞůůĨŽƵŶĚĞĚ- it is quite usual to find confusion, and even 
contradiction, regarding the nature, personality, beliefs and philosophy of John F. Kennedy. 
 
On 15th July 2007 Ted Widmer published an article in the Boston Globe newspaper under 
the headline: A voice of dissent.5  It may be overstating the case to call the piece an article 
for, apart from a short introduction, it was entirely made up of extracts from a speech made 
by Senator Kennedy fifty years previously (on 2nd July 1957).6  <ĞŶŶĞĚǇ ?ƐƐƉĞĞĐŚ ?ǁŚŝĐŚǁĂƐ
titled  “Imperialism  W The Enemy of Freedom ?,7 was, ĂĐĐŽƌĚŝŶŐƚŽtŝĚŵĞƌ ?ƐŝŶƚƌŽĚƵĐƚŝŽŶ P 
 
 “ ?met by strong criticism from both parties. The response from abroad was far more 
positive, however, and Kennedy's speech eventually brought him new standing as a bold 
foreign-ƉŽůŝĐǇƚŚŝŶŬĞƌ ? ?8 
 
 
During November 2013, while much attention was focussed upon the fiftieth anniversary of 
the death of John F. Kennedy, the on-line newsletter The Dissident Voice, published an 
excoriating account of how Kennedy conducted foreign affairs during his short presidency.9  
Titled  “:&< ?ƐŽƌƉŽƌĂƚŝƐƚĂŶĚ/ŵƉĞƌŝĂůŝƐƚWƌĞƐŝĚĞŶĐǇ ?, and written by activist blogger Burkely 
Hermann, the piece tears into what Hermann projects as conventional wisdom regarding 
the 35th President and presents a chronology of action and interventions by the Kennedy 
administration that served only the purposes of developing and reinforcing US corporate 
and political power throughout the world.   Whether analysing South East Asia, the Middle 
East, West Africa or Tibet, Hermann identifies Kennedy ?ƐĨŽƌĞŝŐŶĂĨĨĂŝƌƐŵĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚĂƐ
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always geared towards building and maintaining the empire that the position of the USA in 
the world at that time had come to represent.  He provides various details regarding troop 
deployments, under-cover actions and threats of annihilation to demonstrate how far-
reaching was Kennedy ?ƐĐŽŵŵŝƚŵĞŶƚƚŽƚŚŝƐŽďũĞĐƚŝǀĞĂŶĚŝƐĐŽŶĚĞŵŶĂƚŽƌǇŝŶĚĞƐĐƌŝďŝŶŐ
 “Kennedy ?ƐŚĂƌĚƐƚĂŶĐĞĂƐĂŽůĚtĂƌƌŝŽƌ ? ?10 
 
Both Widmer and Hermann are journalists, so it may be appropriate to consider their words 
within the context of the demands of that profession, rather than as chronicles of the 
historical record.   But revisionist opinion regarding the thinking behind the actions of John 
Kennedy has been popular for many years among historians and is often presented in stark 
contrast to the sympathetic, and sometimes unquestioning, assessments of his life and 
conduct that followed his untimely death.  It is an unfortunate aspect of the present day 
perspective on both the man that was John Kennedy and the White House over which he 
presided that these various interpretations, and the vast weight of documentary and eye 
witness evidence that is available, serve to obscure rather than enlighten the subject at 
hand.  Consequently, as the above references demonstrate, it is evident that the interested 
observer may take a view on Kennedy  W any view  W for, given the depth and range of 
ĂǀĂŝůĂďůĞƉƵďůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶƐ ?ƚŚĞ “ĨĂĐƚƐ ?ĂƌĞƚŚĞƌĞƚŽƐƵƉƉŽƌƚǁŚĂƚĞǀĞƌĐĂƐĞŽŶĞŵĂǇǁŝƐŚƚŽ
ŵĂŬĞ ?,ĞƌŵĂŶŶ ?ƐǀŝĞǁƐĂƌĞĞŵƉŚĂƚŝĐ ?ŚĞŝƐƵŶĐompromising in his conclusions, definitive as 
well as interpretative.  Widmer, whether by design or incidentally, makes the case for 
another Kennedy, using his own words (and the reactions they engendered) rather than 
interpreting them for a purpose. 
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It sĞĞŵƐ ?ƚŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞ ?ƚŚĂƚŝŶƚĞƌŵƐŽĨ<ĞŶŶĞĚǇ ?ƐŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚŝŶĨŽƌĞŝŐŶĂĨĨĂŝƌƐ, much has been 
written but little has been concluded.  Early biographical and critical treatments of Kennedy 
are replete with references regarding the attention he gave to colonial matters in his 
speeches, but it is difficult to locate any definitive statement on what the changing force of 
imperialism meant to him as a political imperative.  Later works, after about the year 2000, 
are more pointed in suggesting how important a topic it was to Kennedy and one reason for 
this is that the magnitude of the available documentary record regarding his life and 
Presidency increased considerably during the 1990s.11  But again, despite receiving greater 
attention and, often, deeper analysis, there does not appear to be any substantive work 
ƚŚĂƚƉŝĐŬƐƵƉŽŶ<ĞŶŶĞĚǇ ?ƐŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚŝŶĚĞĐŽůŽŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶĂŶĚƚŚĞŶĞǁŶĂƚŝŽŶƐĂŶĚĂƐƐĞƌƚƐŝƚƐ
importance as a guiding philosophy for his decision making. 
 
Some works mention colonialism, or imperialism, as passing references for providing 
context in broader historical treatments, but there is little in the way of a specific analysis of 
Kennedy and colonialism or the extent to which it had a bearing or influence on his thinking.  
Following his sojourn to the Middle and Far East in October 1951 Kennedy made repeated 
statements, speeches and broadcasts in which he emphasised the importance of the United 
States establishing friendly relations with developing nations.  On 13th April 1956, an 
important year for Kennedy in terms of his developing political ambitions, the Senator 
ĚĞůŝǀĞƌĞĚĂƐƉĞĞĐŚŝŶ>ŽƐŶŐĞůĞƐƚŝƚůĞĚ “Colonialism and American Foreign Policy ?.12   
Although a critique of the Eisenhower administration, this statement provides an explicit 
explanation of the point of view of Kennedy and his ideas about the position of the United 
States in the world at that time: 
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 “dŚŝƐƉŽůŝĐǇ W if it can be called a policy  W of trying to look both ways at once, of trying to 
bury our heads in the sand when a colonial issue arises, of trying to please everybody and 
displease nobody  W ƚŚŝƐŝƐƚŚĞƉŽůŝĐǇŽƵƌĞƉĂƌƚŵĞŶƚŽĨ^ƚĂƚĞůŝŬĞƐƚŽĐĂůů “ŶĞƵƚƌĂůŝƚǇ ?ŽŶ
colonial issues.  And when asked about it at a recent news conference, Secretary Dulles had 
ƚŚŝƐƚŽƐĂǇ P “tĞĞǆƉĞĐƚƚŽĐŽŶƚŝŶƵĞƚŽƚĂŬĞĂƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶŽĨŶĞƵƚƌĂůŝƚǇďĞĐĂƵƐĞƚŚĂƚŝƐŽƵƌ
general policy with relation to these highly controversial matters which involve countries 
both of whom are friends ĂŶĚǁŚĞƌĞǁĞŽƵƌƐĞůǀĞƐĂƌĞŶŽƚĚŝƌĞĐƚůǇŝŶǀŽůǀĞĚ ? ?
 
I must respectfully disagree with the able Secretary.  We are directly involved, deeply 
involved.  They are not our possessions  W they do not involve our treaties  W they may not 
always even involve our military bases.  But we are directly involved  W our standing in the 
eyes of the free world, our leadership in the fight to keep that world free, our geographical 
and population advantage over the Communist orbit, our prestige, our security, our life and 
our way of life  W these are all directly involved.  How can we be wedded to this do-nothing 
ƉŽůŝĐǇĐĂůůĞĚ “ŶĞƵƚƌĂůŝƚǇ ? ?,ŽǁĐĂŶǁĞďĞĂĨƌĂŝĚƚŽƚŽƵĐŚƚŚĞƐĞ “ŚŝŐŚůǇĐŽŶƚƌŽǀĞƌƐŝĂů ?
disputes between two friends when their continuation and our reluctance only serve to 
strengthen the hand of the mutual enemy of colonial powers, colonial areas and the United 
^ƚĂƚĞƐ ? ?13 
 
Yet this speech does not merit so much as a mention in numerous and prominent historical 
ƌĞĐŽƌĚƐŽĨ<ĞŶŶĞĚǇ ?ƐƚŝŵĞĂƐĂ^ĞŶĂƚŽƌŽƌƉŽƚĞŶƚŝĂůWƌĞƐŝĚĞŶtial candidate.  This seems an 
odd omission. 
 
Where his words on colonialism are considered, it is often in the context of other issues, 
most particularly his speech in July 1957 regarding the French struggle in Algeria.  It is 
probably because the Senator ?ƐǁŽƌĚƐĐĂƵƐĞĚƐƵĐŚĂĨƵƌŽƌĞƚŚĂƚƐŽŵĂŶǇŽĨƚŚĞĂŶĂůǇƐĞƐŽĨ
his views on colonialism are focussed on this occasion.  Yet, despite the consistency of 
<ĞŶŶĞĚǇ ?ƐǁŽƌĚƐƐŝŶĐĞ ? ? ? ? ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞƉƌŝů ? ? ? ?ƐƉĞĞĐŚŝŶƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌ ? ?ƚŚĞƌĞŝƐĂƚĞŶĚency to 
align his outspokenness not with a guiding philosophy or a founding set of ideas, but as an 
adjunct to ulterior motives.  Robert Kumamoto, for example, identifies the Algerian speech 
as an encouragement for terrorism: 
 
 “<ĞŶŶĞĚǇƐĞĞŵĞĚƚŽũƵƐƚŝĨǇƚĞƌƌŽƌŝƐŵŝĨĐŽŵŵŝƚƚĞĚ in the name of legitimate political 
revolution.  He further suggested that the nationalist leaders of Algeria, terrorist methods 
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notwithstanding, had to be dealt with as potentially influential politicians of the future, just 
as Begin had commanded respect during the dark days of the Irgun.  Americans had then 
shown willingness to overlook Irgun atrocities because they were willing to separate the 
plight of world Jewry from the fanatical methods of the extremists.  Kennedy was now 
asking Americans to separate FLN terrorism from the cause of African nationalism and to 
overlook resultant atrocities as an inevitable outgrowth of the search for self-determination 
ĚƵƌŝŶŐĂĐƌŝƚŝĐĂůĞƌĂŽĨĚĞĐŽůŽŶŝǌĂƚŝŽŶ ? ?14 
 
It is this approach  W ƚĂŬŝŶŐ<ĞŶŶĞĚǇ ?ƐƐƚĂƚĞŵĞŶƚƐƉŝĞĐĞmeal and attaching them to separate 
connectional purposes, that provides the myriad of interpretations of his views that blurs 
ƚŚĞŝŵĂŐĞŽĨƚŚĞŵĂŶ ?dŚĞƌĞŝƐƐŽŵĞƚŚŝŶŐŽĨƚŚĞƐĂŵĞĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚŝŶdŚĞƌĞƐĂZŽŵĂŚŶ ?Ɛ
ĂƌƚŝĐůĞ ? “Colonialism and the Campaign Trail: On Kennedy's Algerian Speech and his Bid for 
the 1960 Democratic Nomination ? ?15  Romahn identifies purpose, not philosophy, in 
<ĞŶŶĞĚǇ ?ƐǁŽƌĚƐďǇƉůĂĐŝŶŐƚŚĞƐƉĞĞĐŚĨŝƌŵůǇŝŶƚŚĞĐŽŶƚĞǆƚŽĨĂůŽŶŐĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĞĚĐĂŵƉĂŝŐŶ
for securing the nomination of the Democratic Party for the Presidential race in 1960.  
Romahn suggests that Kennedy needed a strong foreign policy initiative to give him profile 
ĂŶĚƚŽĐŽƵŶƚĞƌƚŚĞǀŝĞǁƚŚĂƚŚĞǁĂƐŶŽƚƐƵĨĨŝĐŝĞŶƚůǇ “ůŝďĞƌĂů ?ĂƚĂƚŝŵĞǁŚĞŶ P 
 
 “ ?ƚŚĞĞŵŽĐƌĂƚƐǁĞƌĞƐƚĂƌƚŝŶŐƚŽĚĞĨine themselves more and more as the party that 
believed in the role of government as social liberator, responsible to the poor and 
ĚŝƐĂĚǀĂŶƚĂŐĞĚ ?ƌĞĂƐŽŶŝŶŐƚŚĂƚŚĞůƉŝŶŐƚŚĞŵŚĞůƉĞĚƐŽĐŝĞƚǇĂƐĂǁŚŽůĞ ? ?16 
 
 
Romahn outlines the contradictions in this conclusion  W the fact that the speech did much to 
ĚĂŵĂŐĞ<ĞŶŶĞĚǇ ?ƐƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐŝŶƚŚĞWĂƌƚǇǁŝƚŚďŽƚŚůŝďĞƌĂůĂŶĚĐŽŶƐĞƌǀĂƚŝǀĞĞůĞŵĞŶƚƐ ?ďǇ
suggesting that its real purpose was to secure the support of African-American voters 
without alienating Dixiecrat voters in the South: 
 
 “/ŶƚŚĞŚĞĂƌƚŽĨƚŚĞĐŝǀŝůƌŝŐŚƚƐĚĞďĂƚĞƚŚĞŶ ?<ĞŶŶĞĚǇĐŚŽƐĞƚŽŵĂŬĞŚĞĂĚůŝŶĞƐƐƉĞĂŬŝŶŐŽƵƚ
against colonialism in Algeria, practicing his own rule that when campaigning it is better to 
make a name in foreign policy than getting bogged down in domestic matters. He could not 
avoid voting on the civil rights bill in the Senate, but he could do everything in his power to 
mitigate the affect it would have on his political career. The Algeria speech was a well-
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chosen attempt to take a stand on the side of the African Americans in an issue that the 
ǁŚŝƚĞ^ŽƵƚŚĞƌŶǀŽƚĞƌƐǁĞƌĞƵŶůŝŬĞůǇƚŽƐƉůŝƚĨƌŽŵƚŚĞƉĂƌƚǇŽǀĞƌ ? ?17 
 
 
For Victor Lasky the speech was a simple act by Kennedy aimed at raising his profile:  
 
 ? ?ƐƵĚĚĞŶůǇ ?ŝŶƐĞĞŬŝŶŐĂŶŝƐƐƵĞ Win fact, any issue  Wwith which to call attention to himself, 
<ĞŶŶĞĚǇůĂƚĐŚĞĚŽŶƚŽƚŚĞEŽƌƚŚĨƌŝĐĂŶƌĞďĞůůŝŽŶ ? ?18 
 
Thomas Oliphant and Curtis Wilkie go some way in taking a broader view to identify 
<ĞŶŶĞĚǇ ?ƐƐƚĂŶĐĞĂƐĂŐƵŝĚŝŶŐƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇ ?ďƵƚƚŚĞǇƚŽŽĂƌĞŵŽƌĞĞŵƉŚĂƚŝĐŝŶƐtressing the 
ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůĞǆƉĞĚŝĞŶĐǇƚŚĂƚǁŽƵůĚĨĞĞĚƚŚĞ^ĞŶĂƚŽƌ ?ƐĂŵďŝƚŝŽŶƐ P 
 
 “ƵƚĂƐƉŝƌŝƚŽĨƌĂďŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůŝƐŵƐĞĞŵĞĚƚŽďĞĂƐƚƌŽŶŐĞƌĨŽƌĐĞďĞŚŝŶĚůŐĞƌŝĂŶƌĞďĞůƐ ?ĂŶĚ
ŝŶ<ĞŶŶĞĚǇ ?ƐŵŝŶĚƚŚĞŝƌĚĞƐŝƌĞĨŽƌŝŶĚĞƉĞŶĚĞŶĐĞĚŽǀĞƚĂŝůĞĚǁŝƚŚŚŝƐƐƚƌŽŶŐaversion to 
colonialism.  He had seen French colonialism, and disliked it, in Indochina.  So he chose 
Algeria to serve as the subject for his first major foreign policy speech, knowing that it would 
ďĞĐŽŶƚƌŽǀĞƌƐŝĂůĂŶĚĂŶŐĞƌŵĂŶǇŵĞŵďĞƌƐŽĨƚŚĞŶĂƚŝŽŶ ?ƐĨoreign policy establishment.  But 
he also knew that a bold and reasoned statement on behalf of freedom for people half a 
world away would win headlines and, importantly, respect from liberal intellectuals he had 




ĨŽƌĞŝŐŶƉŽůŝĐǇƐƉĞĞĐŚ ? ? ? ?20 
 
And, according to André Kaspi: 
 
 
"Kennedy [knew] that by giving Africa a high profile in his electoral campaign, he would 
draw in the black voters he needed. He also sought to demonstrate that Africa had become 
one of the theaters of operations of the Cold War."21 
 
 
Philip E. Muehlenbeck, in a manner similar to that taken by Kaspi, identifies a broader 
ƉƵƌƉŽƐĞŝŶ<ĞŶŶĞĚǇ ?ƐĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚƚŽĨƌŝĐĂŶĂĨĨĂŝƌƐĂŶĚƐĞĞƐŚŝƐƌĂƚŝŽŶĂůĞĐĂƌƌŝĞĚĨƵƌƚŚĞƌŽŶĐĞ
he reached the White House:  
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 “:ŽŚŶ& ?<ĞŶŶĞĚǇǁĂƐƚŚĞĨŝƌƐƚ ?ƉĞƌŚĂƉƐŽŶůǇ ? American president to make a pointed effort 
to court African nationalism. He did so partly on moral grounds, but strategic 
considerations were far more important. JFK believed Third World nationalism would 
become one of the most potent political forces in the second half of the 20th century.´22 
 
&ŽƌDŽŚŝĞĚĚŝŶĞ,ĂĚŚƌŝŝƚǁĂƐ<ĞŶŶĞĚǇ ?ƐƉĞƌƐŽŶĂůŝƚǇƚƌĂŝƚ ?ĂƐ  “ƉƌĂŐŵĂƚŝĐŝĚĞĂůŝƐƚ ? ?ƚŚĂƚůĞĚ
him to take a contrary view on the Algerian situation: 
 
 “ ?strongly believ[ing] that the best way to prevent the spread of communism was for 
America to lead the social revolutions that were taking place in the emerging nations of 
North Africa. ?23 
 
 
James McGregor Burns24 ĚŽĞƐŝĚĞŶƚŝĨǇĂďĂƐŝƐŽĨ “ƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇ ?ŝŶ<ĞŶŶĞĚǇ ?ĚĞƐĐƌŝďŝŶŐƚŚĞ
piece he wrote for Foreign Affairs in October 1957:25 
 
 “ ?ƚŚĞĂƌƚŝĐůĞǁĂƐĂƐǁĞĞƉŝŶŐƐƚĂƚĞŵĞŶƚŽĨƚŚĞƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇƚŚĂƚƵŶĚĞƌůĂǇ<ĞŶŶĞĚǇ ?Ɛ
approach to specific foreign-ƉŽůŝĐǇƉƌŽďůĞŵƐ ? ?26 
 
 
Yet he later writes, by way of description of Kennedy as a leader: 
 
 “,ĞĚŝĚŶŽƚƉĞƌƐŽŶŝĨǇĂŶǇŐƌĞĂƚŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůŝƐƐƵĞ ?,ĞǁĂƐŶŽƚƚŚĞĐŚĂŵƉŝŽŶŽĨĂŶǇŽŶĞŐƌŽƵƉ
ŽƌƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇ ? ?27 
 
 
Burns does present a different view by mentioning a speech made by the Senator to the 
Jefferson-Jackson Day Dinner, in Detroit, Michigan, on 23rd May 1959.  This identifies the 
 “ƚĞŶƉĞĂĐĞĨƵůƌĞǀŽůƵƚŝŽŶƐ ?ƚŚĂƚďĞĐĂŵĞĂƉůĂŶŬŽĨ<ĞŶŶĞĚǇ ?ƐĞůĞĐƚŝŽŶƉƌŽŐƌĂŵŵĞ
throughout 1959 and 1960,28 ĂĐŚĂƌĂĐƚĞƌŝƐƚŝĐŽĨƚŚĞƉƵƚĂƚŝǀĞWƌĞƐŝĚĞŶƚ ?ƐĚĞǀĞůŽƉĞĚŝĚeas on 
what the future held for the United States and its position in the world: 
 
 “,Ğ ?<ĞŶŶĞĚǇ ?ŚĂƐƌĞĐŽŐŶŝǌĞĚƚŚĞŶĞǁĐŚĂůůĞŶŐĞƐƚŽůŝďĞƌĂůŝƐŵ ?ĂŶĚŚĞŶĐĞŝƚƐĐŚĂŶŐŝŶŐ
ĐŽŶƚĞŶƚ ?ďǇĚǁĞůůŝŶŐŝŶŵĂŶǇƐƉĞĞĐŚĞƐŽŶƚŚĞ “ƚĞŶƉĞĂĐĞĨƵůƌĞǀŽůƵƚŝŽŶƐ ?ƚŚĂƚ “ĂƌĞƌŽĐŬŝŶg 
our nation and our world, reshaping our lives and remaking our destinies.  These are the 
revolutions in our cities, on the farm, in the birth rate, in life expectancy, in technology 
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(especially automation), in energy, in our standard of living, in weapons development, in the 
ƵŶĚĞƌĚĞǀĞůŽƉĞĚŶĂƚŝŽŶƐ ?ĂŶĚŝŶŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůŝƐŵ ? ?29 
 
It may have been that Burns selected this speech because it was well-known or popular at 
the time it was made, but it has been largely forgotten today.30  Though clearly a 
 “ĐĂŵƉĂŝŐŶŝŶŐƐƉĞĞĐŚ ? ?ŝƚŝƐŶĞǀĞƌƚŚĞůĞƐƐĂƉŽŝŶƚĞĚƐƚĂƚĞŵĞŶƚŽĨƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇ ?ĂŶ
encapsulation of the guiding principles by which Kennedy will, if elected, conduct his 
administration in the White House.  There is mention within it of the Cold War, but only to 
dismiss it: 
 
 “Republicans and Democrats agree in their strong opposition to the Communist challenge, 
all partisan charges to the contrary.  But we do not agree on meeting the challenge of these 
ƚĞŶƉĞĂĐĞĨƵůƌĞǀŽůƵƚŝŽŶƐ ? ?31 
 
By contrast the last of the ten revolutions  W nationalism, is presented in a fashion that 
suggests it holds the highest importance.  It prefaces the closing remarks of the speech and 
carries the emphasis of being the most forceful of the challenges that must be faced: 
 
 “dĞŶƚŚĂŶĚĨŝŶĂůůǇŝƐƚŚĞZĞǀŽůƵƚion of nationalism.  In Asia, Latin America and particularly in 
ĨƌŝĐĂ ?ŵĂŶ ?ƐĞƚĞƌŶĂůĚĞƐŝƌĞƚŽďĞĨƌĞĞŝƐƌŝƐŝŶŐƚŽƚŚĞĨŽƌĞ ?dŚĞĚĂǇŽĨƚŚĞĐŽůŽŶŝĂůŝƐŐŽŶĞ W
the Declaration of Independence has become a universal doctrine. 
 
 
The principles of self-determination are still being contested in some parts of the globe.  Too 
often it is a struggle between a white minority and a colored majority, with dangerous 
implications for our future.  Unfortunately, the present administration has assumed an 
attitude of neutrality in these contests.  But if we merely look at the record of the last 10 
years, from Indonesia to Tunisia, we cannot doubt that these peoples eventually will, and 
ought to be, free and equal.  The only question is one of timing  W and whether, once that 
freedom is achieved, they will regard the United States as friend or foe.   This nation, the 
home of the Declaration of Independence, should have led this nationalist revolution 
instead of helping to throttle it  W and I am hopeful that, if it is not too late, a new 
ĞŵŽĐƌĂƚŝĐĚŵŝŶŝƐƚƌĂƚŝŽŶĐĂŶƐƚŝůůĨƵĨŝůůƚŚĂƚƌŽůĞ ? ?32 
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dŚŝƐƐƉĞĞĐŚ ?ĂŶĚŽƚŚĞƌƐƚŚĂƚĐŝƚĞĚƚŚĞ “ƚĞŶƌĞǀŽůƵƚŝŽŶƐ ?ĚŽĞƐŶŽƚĨĞĂƚƵƌĞŝŶƚŚĞŵŽƌĞ
prominent biographical treatments of Kennedy such as those by Robert Dallek,33 Michael 
K ?ƌŝĞŶ34 or Herbert Parmet.35  Neither is it mentioned in well known examinations of the 
<ĞŶŶĞĚǇWƌĞƐŝĚĞŶĐǇ ?ƐƵĐŚĂƐƌƚŚƵƌD ?^ĐŚůĞƐŝŶŐĞƌ:ƌ ?Ɛ “dŚŽƵƐĂŶĚĂǇƐ ?<ĞŶŶĞĚǇŝŶƚŚĞ
tŚŝƚĞ,ŽƵƐĞ ? ?DŽƐƚƐƵƌƉƌŝƐŝŶŐůǇŝƚŝƐŶŽƚƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞĚŝŶ “:&<ŝŶƚŚĞ^Ğnate: Pathway to the 
WƌĞƐŝĚĞŶĐǇ ?36 ďǇ:ŽŚŶd ?^ŚĂǁ ? “WĂƚŚǁĂǇƚŽƚŚĞWƌĞƐŝĚĞŶĐǇ ?ĚŽĞƐŝŶĐůƵĚĞĂĐŚĂƉƚĞƌŚĞĂĚĞĚ P
 “dŚĞ,ŝŐŚZĞĂůŵŽĨ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶĨĨĂŝƌƐ ?ŝŶǁŚŝĐŚ^ŚĂǁŽƵƚůŝŶĞƐƚŚĞŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚĂƐƉĞĐƚƐŽĨ
<ĞŶŶĞĚǇ ?ƐĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞƐĂƐĂ^ĞŶĂƚŽƌǁŝƚŚĂƐƚƌŽŶŐŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚŝŶforeign affairs.  Included is a 
quotation from Harris Wofford, taken from an interview conducted by the author: 
 
 “&ŽƌĞŝŐŶƉŽůŝĐǇ ?ƚŚĞǁŽƌůĚ ?ǁĂƐƚŚĞŽŶĞƚŚŝŶŐŚĞǁĂƐǀĞƌǇ ?ǀĞƌǇŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚĞĚŝŶ ?/ƚǁĂƐǁŚĂƚ
ĞǆĐŝƚĞĚŚŝŵ ? ?37 
 
Burns gets closer to the issue, menƚŝŽŶŝŶŐĂƐƉĞĐƚƐŽĨ<ĞŶŶĞĚǇ ?ƐĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚƚŽŵĂƚƚĞƌƐŽĨ
colonialism, but he provides no special emphasis; there are numerous references to 
 “ĨƌĞĞĚŽŵ ? ?ŝŶĐůƵĚŝŶŐŵĂŶǇƋƵŽƚĂƚŝŽŶƐ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞƐĞŵĂǇďĞƌĞĂĚŝŶƚŚĞĐŽŶƚĞǆƚŽĨĐŽůŽŶŝĂůŝƐŵ ?
but there is no direct statement that binds these references to an underlying set of beliefs. 
^ŚĂǁĐŝƚĞƐ<ĞŶŶĞĚǇ ?ƐĐĂŵƉĂŝŐŶƉƵďůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ “dŚĞ^ƚƌĂƚĞŐǇŽĨWĞĂĐĞ ?38 to portray a politician 
taking a contrary position to the Eisenhower administration for the conduct of foreign 
affairs, but this is a standard approach  W Kennedy as a dissenter on foreign policy is 
ĚŝƐĐƵƐƐĞĚŝŶĚĞƚĂŝůďǇK ?ƌŝĞŶ ?39 
 
There is a hint of how Kennedy was operating to change the philosophical basis of United 
States foreign policy when Shaw explains the efforts of the Senator, together with Vermont 
Republican Senator, George Aiken, to reform the Battle Act40 which restricted trading with 
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Soviet doŵŝŶĂƚĞĚƐƚĂƚĞƐ ?^ŚĂǁŽƵƚůŝŶĞƐƚŚĞƚǁŽ^ĞŶĂƚŽƌƐ ?ĨĂŝůĞĚĂƚƚĞŵƉƚƐŝŶ ƚŚŝƐĞŶĚĞĂǀŽƵƌ
until they successfully managed to secure some limited reforms in 1959.  According to Shaw: 
 
 “,ŝƐĞĨĨŽƌƚƐŚŽǁĞĚ<ĞŶŶĞĚǇ ?ƐĂďŝůŝƚǇƚŽĨŝŶĚƚĂŶŐŝďůĞǁĂǇƐďƌĞĂŬĨƌĞĞĨƌŽŵƌŝŐŝĚ Cold War 
ƚŚŝŶŬŝŶŐ ? ?41 
 
Nevertheless, in spite of the repeated references Kennedy makes to the situation of 
dominated states (both through Western and Soviet imperialism), Shaw does not see these 
as a coalescence of idealism. 
 
Evidence that this idealism existed within John Kennedy and was real in his preconceptions 
about the role and position of the United States in the world at that time is borne out by his 
relationship with Lorna Hahn.  Hahn was a lecturer and writer attached to the faculty of 
Temple University between 1955 and 1960.  Her specialist area of study centred on how the 
United States was reacting to the developing situation in North Africa as the French battled 
to establish a post-imperial structure in Tunisia, Morocco and, especially, Algeria.  She was 
known as a critic of the Eisenhower regime: 
 
 “^ŝŶĐĞƚŚĞĞŶĚŽĨtŽƌůĚtĂƌ// ?ĨĞǁŝƐƐƵĞƐŚĂǀĞĐŚƌŽŶŝĐĂůůǇƉůĂŐƵĞĚŵĞƌŝĐĂŶƉŽůŝĐǇŵĂŬĞƌƐ
like that of trying to reconcile our commitments to our European allies with our "self 
determination for all" traditions. Eager to strengthen our NATO defenses, anxious to avoid 
being international busybodies, and wanting to offend nobody, we have adopted a neo-
Jeffersonian "government acts best which acts least" policy regarding the areas trying to 
shake off the last trappings of colonialism. Some of the bitter fruits of this have been 
dramatic, such as the tragic loss of Indochina, or the absurd position in which we found 
ourselves when our best allies attacked relatively peaceful Egypt, and the most we could 
muster was a plea that everybody calm down and behave. There are, however, other losses 
not quite as apparent, but none the less tragic: the sort that come from having missed - or 
worse still, openly rejected - opportunities. 
 
In no area have we missed more opportunities than in North Africa - probably because on 
no region have we been less accurately informed. There has been propaganda from many 
sources, yes - confusing at best, dishonest at worst, and producing a confusion which in a 
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sense makes it easy to understand the State Department's desire to wash its diplomatic 
hands of it. ?42 
 
<ĞŶŶĞĚǇǁĂƐŐƌĞĂƚůǇŝŵƉƌĞƐƐĞĚďǇ,ĂŚŶ ?ƐǀŝĞǁƐĂŶĚƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐŽĨƚŚĞhŶŝƚĞĚ^ƚĂƚĞƐŝŶ
the matters of its relations with the colonial powers and he wrote an introductory piece for 
 “North Africa: EĂƚŝŽŶĂůŝƐŵƚŽEĂƚŝŽŶŚŽŽĚ ? ?ƐƚĂƚŝŶŐ P 
 
 “>ŽƌŶĂ,ĂŚŶŚĂƐƉĞƌĨŽƌŵĞĚĂŶŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚƐĐŚŽůĂƌůǇĂŶĚƉƵďůŝĐƐĞƌǀŝĐĞŝŶƚŚŝƐďŽŽŬ ?/ƚƐƚĂŶĚƐ
unique as an effort to draw together the pattern of events in all of North Africa during these 
past years. Her chapters, which have both historic perspective and contemporary political 
detail, give us an image of North African nationalism seen in its proper context. For 
inescapably the nationalist movements in Morocco, Tunisia, and Algeria have common 
threads and interconnections. The relentless war in Algeria is not a self-contained historic 
drama nor were the independence movements in Morocco and Tunisia. The greatest 
tragedy of the Algerian war has been the fact that its influences cannot be isolated but that 
they have poisoned Western relations with almost all of Africa and at the same time drained 
ĐŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƚŝǀĞĞŶĞƌŐŝĞƐĂŶĚƵŶŝƚŝĞƐŝŶƚŚĞtĞƐƚ ? ?43 
 
Finding such direct references in the range of literary output is surprisingly difficult and even 
the most ƌĞĐŽŐŶŝƐĞĚǁŽƌŬƐĚŽŶŽƚĚǁĞůůŽŶ<ĞŶŶĞĚǇ ?ƐĐŽŶĐĞƌŶƐĨŽƌdŚŝƌĚtŽƌůĚĂŶĚĐŽůŽŶŝĂů
issues. 
   
ƌƚŚƵƌD ?^ĐŚůĞƐŝŶŐĞƌ:ƌ ? ?ǁƌŝƚŝŶŐŝŶ “dŚŽƵƐĂŶĚĂǇƐ ? ?ŐŝǀĞƐƌĞĐŽŐŶŝƚŝŽŶƚŽƚŚĞŝĚĞĂƚŚĂƚ
Kennedy, when President, offered an alternative to the Eisenhower years in terms of the 
attitude and approach of the United States in conducting foreign affairs relationships. 
 
 “dŚŽƵŐŚƚŚĞƵůůĞƐĚŽĐƚƌŝŶĞǁĂƐĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĂďůǇƚĞŵƉĞƌĞĚŝŶĂƉƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ ?ŚĞƐƵĐĐĞĞĚĞĚŝŶ
implanting both in American policy and in opinion the idea that those who were not with us 
around the earth were against us. 
 
Of the various transformations wrought in the Kennedy years none was less noted or more 
ŶŽƚĂďůĞƚŚĂŶƚŚĞƌĞǀŽůƵƚŝŽŶŝŶŵĞƌŝĐĂŶĂƚƚŝƚƵĚĞƐƚŽǁĂƌĚƐƚŚĞƵŶĐŽŵŵŝƚƚĞĚǁŽƌůĚ ? ?44 
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 ?ŶŽŶĞǁĂƐůĞƐƐŶŽƚĞĚŽƌ ŵŽƌĞŶŽƚĂďůĞ ? A remarkable echo of the words of another insider, 
Robert Komer.45  There was much discussion at the time Schlesinger was writing about 
ǁŚĞƌĞƚŚĞ “ŶŽŶ-ĂůŝŐŶĞĚ ?ƐƚĂƚĞƐƐƚŽŽĚŝŶƚĞƌŵƐŽĨƚŚĞŽůĚtĂƌ46 and it was within this 
context that Schlesinger made this remark, but it cuts very close to a declaration about 
Kennedy and his approach to the new nations that were being created as a result of the 
processes of decolonisation and it leaves the reader questioning why this opening was not 
pursued further. 
 
ǀŝĚĞŶƚůǇ ?ŝƚǁĂƐ^ĐŚůĞƐŝŶŐĞƌ ?ƐǁŝƐŚ ?ĂƐĂŶŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůǁŚŽǁĂƐĐůŽƐĞƚŽƚŚĞWƌĞƐŝĚĞŶƚ ?ƚŽ
ĚĞŵŽŶƐƚƌĂƚĞƚŚĞĐŽŶƚƌĂƐƚďĞƚǁĞĞŶ<ĞŶŶĞĚǇ ?ƐĂƚƚŝƚƵĚĞƚŽǁĂƌĚƐƚŚĞĚĞǀĞůŽƉŝŶŐǁŽƌůĚĂŶĚ
that taken by Eisenhower.  To this end he mentions the fact that the State Department: 
 
 “ ?ŚĂĚďĞĞŶĚŽŵŝŶĂƚĞĚďǇŵĞŶ ?ǁŚŽ ?ƌĞŐĂƌĚŝŶŐEdKĂƐŽƵƌƚŽƉƉƌŝŽƌŝƚǇ ?ĨůŝŶĐŚĞĚĨƌŽŵ
anything which might bruise the sensibilities of our European allies, some of whom still had 
ĐŽůŽŶŝĂůƉŽƐƐĞƐƐŝŽŶƐ ? ?47 
 
Schlesinger substantiates his reference ƚŽ<ĞŶŶĞĚǇ ?ƐĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚƚŚŝŶŬŝŶŐĂŶĚƉƌŝŽƌŝƚŝĞƐďǇ
citing the incident in December 1960 when a number of Asian and African states pressed 
the General Assembly of the United Nations to approve a declaration regarding self-
determination for all peoplĞƐ ?ŝƐĞŶŚŽǁĞƌ ?ƐĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶǁĂƐƚŽĂďƐƚĂŝŶ ?ĂƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶƚŚĂƚǁĂƐ
given prominence by the fact that the vote passed 89-0 in favour of the motion.  Very early 
in the new administration, a resolution was put to the General Assembly asking for 
delegates to uphold its policy on self-determination in the case of the Portuguese colony of 
Angola (where a nationalist revolt had engendered fierce fighting) and, according to 
Schlesinger: 
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 “ ?ĚůĂŝ ?^ƚĞǀĞŶƐŽŶĂŶĚ<ĞŶŶĞĚǇďŽƚŚƐĂǁƚŚĞŽƉƉŽƌƚƵŶŝƚǇƚŽŝŶŝƚŝĂƚĞĂĐŚĂŶŐĞŝŶŵerican 
ƉŽůŝĐǇ ? ?48 
 
To lay the ground Kennedy took steps to inform Portugal of his intentions and this went 
some way in deflecting criticism after the vote that he was jeopardising the unity of NATO.  
Schlesinger wrote: 
 
 “/ŶƚŚĞƚŚŝƌĚǁŽƌůĚƚŚĞŶĞǁĂĚŵŝŶŝƐƚƌation was acclaimed as the friend of oppressed 
ƉĞŽƉůĞƐ ? ?49 
 
It seems, therefore, that Schlesinger, as a person who was actively involved in the Kennedy 
administration, could readily identify the contrasting style of government coming out of the 
change from a Republican to a Democrat White House, but he does not contextualise what 
was happening as a new doctrine.  For Schlesinger, Kennedy was simply taking a more 
pragmatic line, one designed to steer the United States away from the entrenched positions 
that had created a stasis in foreign affairs, particularly in regard to the US position in 
relation to the Soviet Union. 
 
This point of view is echoed by Anders Stephanson, Professor of History at Columbia 
hŶŝǀĞƌƐŝƚǇ ?EĞǁzŽƌŬ ?ǁŚŽŚĂƐǁƌŝƚƚĞŶĂďŽƵƚ<ĞŶŶĞĚǇ ?Ɛ “ŝĚŝŽƐǇŶĐƌĂƐǇ ?ŝŶĚĞĂůŝŶŐǁŝƚŚŽůĚ
War matters.50  ĐĐŽƌĚŝŶŐƚŽ^ƚĞƉŚĂŶƐŽŶ ?<ĞŶŶĞĚǇ ?ƐĂůƚĞƌŶĂƚŝǀĞƚŚŝŶŬŝŶŐƐƚĞŵĞĚĨƌŽŵƚŚĞ
ĨĂĐƚƚŚĂƚŚĞǁĂƐ “ĞĂƐŝůǇďŽƌĞĚ ?ĂŶĚ ?ĂĐĐŽƌĚŝŶŐůǇ ?ŚĞƐŽƵŐŚƚƚŽĂĐƚĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚůǇďƵƚ ?
importantly: 
 
 “Idiosyncrasy, of course, never became apostasy.ǳ51 
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Because Kennedy would not have been elected President had it done so.  In a complicated 
ĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐŽĨ<ĞŶŶĞĚǇ ?ƐŵĂƚƵƌŝƚǇĂƐĂĨŽƌĞŝŐŶĂĨĨĂŝƌƐƐƉŽŬĞƐƉĞƌƐŽŶĚƵƌŝŶŐŚŝƐƚŝŵĞŝŶƚŚĞ
Senate, Stephanson compiles a basis of reasoning for explaining how Kennedy combined a 
conventional line in condemnation of the Soviet Union and all the evils that it represented 
(and the strong military stance that the US should adopt in meeting the challenges that this 
put forward) with a flexible set of ideas that could lift the Cold War out of the fixed position 
ŝƚŚĂĚďĞĐŽŵĞďǇƚŚĞůĂƚĞĨŝĨƚŝĞƐ ?ƌŝǀŝŶŐ<ĞŶŶĞĚǇ ?ƐƚŚŝŶŬŝŶŐǁĂƐƚŚĞĐŚĂŶŐŝŶŐŐĞŽƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů
structure of the world that was emerging as a result of the demise of the European empires: 
 
 “dŚĞƐƵďƐƚĂŶƚŝĂůpart of his critique had to do with ǲimperialismǳȂ anticolonial liberation 
was the wave, not only of the future but of the present, which would have happened with 
or without communism, and the United States should not subordinate its support for that 
wave to its coldwar concerns by supporting, in effect, the colonial powers of Western 




it does not form part of a larger work and leaves hanging many of the issues that it raises, 
but it is an insightful examination of the philosophical basis upon which Kennedy set his 
approach to leadership, both as a Senator and later as President.  Stephanson deserves 
credit for grasping the essence of the factors that drove Kennedy in his political ambitions 
and his vision for the United States in the world; it is unfortunate that this important aspect 
resides in an obscure and isolated article. 
 
The principle biographical histories, Schlesinger, Parmet. Dallek, Burns, et al, do not dwell on 
ƚŚĞ “ŝŵƉĞƌŝĂůŝŵƉĞƌĂƚŝǀĞ ?ƐŽŵƵĐŚĂƐƚŽŵĂŬĞŝƚƚŚĞŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚĂƐƉĞĐƚŽĨ<ĞŶŶĞĚǇ ?ƐƚŚŝŶŬŝŶŐ
that it became.  This is understandable in many ways  W all biographies will be limited or will 
be unreadable, so certain events and aspects receive more attention than others; but the 
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ĂďƐĞŶĐĞŽĨĂƐƵďƐƚĂŶƚŝĂůǁŽƌŬŽŶƚŚŝƐŵŽƐƚŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚĨĂĐĞƚŽĨ<ĞŶŶĞĚǇ ?ƐƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůŵĂŬĞ-up is 
a deficit in the record, leaving the fullest picture of the man incomplete.  What should also 
be noted is that most authors seem to dwell on the common theme that Kennedy was 
motivated to adopt a high profile stance on issues arising from the processes of 
decolonisation in order to promote his political career.   The common theme is that Kennedy 
used the issues arising from decolonisation in order to give his political persona a 
distinctiveness that would help him stand apart from both his political opponents and also 
those who might present themselves as rivals within the Democratic Party as he sought to 
ƐĞĐƵƌĞŚŝŐŚŽĨĨŝĐĞ ?ƐĂƉĂƌƚŽĨƚŚŝƐĐŽŵŵŽŶƚŚĞŵĞ ?<ĞŶŶĞĚǇ ?ƐƉƵƌƉŽƐĞƐĂƌĞƉŽƌƚƌĂǇĞĚŝŶ
different ways: 
x he was seeking to portray an image of empathy with suppressed peoples to help 
secure the votes of ethnic minorities; 
x he was creating a policy platform of sympathy with suppressed peoples overseas so as 
not to alienate his position with conservative elements of his own Party; 
x by concentrating on overseas matters he could avoid awkward questions about his 
stance on civil rights at home; 
x he used the colonial stick to beat the foreign policy management of the Eisenhower 
administration, separating himself from the Republicans and strengthening his 
election credentials. 
 
Though there may be plausibility in each of these explanations, they can all be questioned in 
ǀŝĞǁŽĨƐĞǀĞƌĂůĨĂĐƚŽƌƐ ?&ŝƌƐƚůǇ ?<ĞŶŶĞĚǇ ?ƐŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚĂŶĚƐƚǇůĞŽĨĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚĚĞǀĞůŽƉĞĚŽǀĞƌ
some years, beginning in earnest after his visit to Vietnam in October 1951.  Although he 
may always have had ambitions for high political office, it is unrealistic to suggest that he 
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could have been manoeuvring in this way before he was even established as a Senator.  
^ĞĐŽŶĚůǇ ?ŝƚŝƐĞǀŝĚĞŶƚƚŚĂƚ<ĞŶŶĞĚǇ ?ƐƐƚĂŶĐĞŽŶĐŽůŽŶŝĂůŵĂƚƚĞƌƐĐŽƐƚŚŝŵŵŽƌĞƚŚĂŶŚĞ
gained in terms of the approbation of senior colleagues in the Democratic Party and his 
consistent stand on issues such as Algerian independence caused consternation with 
political friends and foes alike.  Thirdly, Kennedy did seek to open new avenues in US foreign 
affairs management  W as demonstrated by his efforts to establish stronger ties with Poland.  
In the atmosphere of the late 1950s such actions could be highly charged and presented a 
considerable political risk on his part for which there was little to gain and much to lose. 
 
In 1957 / 1958 Kennedy may well have decided that he wished to try for election to the 
Presidency in 1960, but he would first have to secure the nomination of his party.  It would 
seem illogical, therefore, that he would persist with alternative policy proposals that would 
antagonise important elements within the Democratic Party.  A more rational conclusion 
might be that Kennedy was sincere in his beliefs regarding the ill-placed position of the 
United States as more and more nations joined the ranks of those freed from colonial 
oversight and, further, that these beliefs were anchored in his mind as a philosophical 





KENNEDY AND BOOKS AND KENNEDY AND IRELAND 
 
ƐƉĞĐƚƐŽĨ<ĞŶŶĞĚǇ ?ƐdŚŝŶŬŝŶŐŽŶƚŚĞZŽůĞŽĨƚŚĞh^ŝn World Affairs 
 
KƵƚƐŝĚĞŽĨŚŝƐĂĐƚŝǀŝƚŝĞƐĂƐĂ^ĞŶĂƚŽƌ ?ƚŚĞƌĞǁĞƌĞĂƐƉĞĐƚƐŽĨ<ĞŶŶĞĚǇ ?ƐůŝĨĞĂŶĚ
interests that also played a part in forming his approach to foreign affairs, 
imperialism, decolonisation and the role of the United States in the world. 
 
This chapter examines two such aspects  W Kennedy and Books and Kennedy and 
Ireland.  These are selected for the reasons set out in the Preface to this study, it 
being acknowledged that other aspects would also have contributed. 
 
Kennedy and Books  ? Author and Advocate Reader 
Following the publication of his book Profiles in Courage in May 1957, Kennedy 
became known as both a writer and a thinker, something of an intellectual.1  A 
signed copy of Profiles ǁĂƐŐŝǀĞŶƚŽĞĂĐŚŽĨ<ĞŶŶĞĚǇ ?ƐĨĞůůŽǁ^ĞŶĂƚŽƌƐ ?2 a gesture 
ƚŚĂƚďĞĐĂŵĞĂĨĞĂƚƵƌĞŽĨ<ĞŶŶĞĚǇ ?ƐĐŽŵŵƵŶŝĐĂƚŝŽŶƐǁŝƚŚůĂǁŵĂŬĞƌƐĂŶĚĂĚǀŝƐĞƌƐ P
in October 1962, at the height of the Cuban Missile Crisis, he gave each of those 
sitting in the advisory group that made up his inner cabinet a copy of Barbara 
dƵĐŚŵĂŶ ?ƐďŽŽŬThe Guns of August,3 a reminder of how war could result from the 
cumulative effects of disparate decision-making.4 
 
More pertinently, in February 1959 he gave each Senator a copy of the best selling 
novel, The Ugly American, by Eugene Burdick and William Lederer and, at the same 
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time and in company with other prominent individuals, published a full-page 
advertisement in The New York Times endorsing The Ugly American and describing 
why it was such an important work at that time in the USA.5  This book relates how 
US representatives, when located in developing countries, fail to learn about the 
places they visit before imposing themselves on the local populace to the detriment 
of the reputation of the United States as a whole.  Its narrative runs very closely to 
the liturgy of failings that Kennedy had identified when examining the actions of the 
US diplomats, agencies and representatives in Indochina and, as such, aligns with his 
stated ideas on how the United States needed to take a revised approach in its 
dealings with the developing world if it was to convince the indigenous peoples to 
steer away from what he viewed as the superficial attractions of Communism.  It was 
in the course of his efforts to secure the nomination of the Democratic Party for the 
Presidential race that the Senator spoke most forcefully on this point, once more 
ĐŽŶƚĞǆƚƵĂůŝƐŝŶŐƚŚĞh^ ?ƐĂŵďŝƚŝŽŶƐŝŶĨŝŐŚƚŝŶŐƚŚĞŽůĚtĂƌ ?ƚŚĞŐƌĞĂƚŝƐƐƵĞŽĨƚŚĞ
ƚŝŵĞƐ ?ǁŝƚŚŚŝƐǀŝĞǁƐŽŶƚŚĞ “ ?ĞŵĞƌŐŝŶŐĂŶĚĚĞǀĞůŽƉŝŶŐŶĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? ? P
 
 “ ?ǁĞǁĂŶƚĂŶŵĞƌŝĐĂ whose ability to meet its responsibilities at home makes it a 
model for all the nations of the world. Today our slowed-down economy, our 
overcrowded schools, our poor and our unemployed, our spreading slums and our 
thousands of abandoned farms are visible, tangible evidence of our failure to meet 
those responsibilities. And those failures are defeats for the cause of freedom. For 
today the Communists are determined to convince the emerging and developing 
nations of Asia and Africa and Latin America that only Communism will eliminate 
their poverty and hunger and disease - that the Communist road is the only road to a 
ďĞƚƚĞƌůŝĨĞ ? ?6 
 
In May 1960, as the intensity of his bid for the Presidential nomination increased, 
Kennedy published a compilation of his speeches on foreign policy under the title 
The Strategy of Peace.7  According to Shaw, the reasoning behind the timing and 
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ƉƌŽĚƵĐƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞďŽŽŬǁĂƐ P “ ?ƚŽƐŚŽǁůŝďĞƌĂůƐƚŚĂƚ<ĞŶŶĞĚǇǁĂƐŽŶĞŽĨƚŚĞŵĂŶĚ
to show the world that he was a man of ideas and intellecƚƵĂůĨŝƌĞƉŽǁĞƌ ? ?8  
Characteristically Kennedy instructed his office to send out 250 copies of the book to 
college professors and other well known intellectuals.9 
 
By the time Kennedy entered the White House in January 1961 the philosophical 
basis of his thinking in regard to the question of the United States in the world and, 
in particular, the correctness of its approach in containing the spread of Communism 
while upholding its founding values, was well established.  In seeking to ensure that 
his foreign affairs decision making as President conformed to the standards and 
beliefs that he had come to adopt, he found himself in frequent conflict with 
advisers and colleagues as much as with his political opponents.  There are different 
ways to explain this.  One might consider, as a fundamental factor, his youth.  In all 
the stages of his political career and development he was young and, to a degree, 
inexperienced.  He was a young Congressman in 1947, a young Senator in 1953 and a 
young President in 1961.  His youth had placed him in the position of having to 
establish his credentials in order to put himself forward for any position where he 
might make a forceful impact  W had he ventured too far too soon then he could 
easily have been dismissed as naïve and inexperienced by those who did not share 
his views.  This provides one explanation, at least, for why he chose to use books as a 
means for communicating his message to fellow politicians and others; scholarly and 
admired works could convey his philosophies and thinking in ways that, had he 
projected them directly, might more easily have been dismissed. 
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This was also a reason why he looked towards the possibilities that he might explore 
as a second term President, at which time he would have reached the limit of 
political ambitions and would be invulnerable to the objections that could more 
easily be raised against him while his political position was still uncertain.  As the 
Kennedy Presidency unfolded and came to its unexpected and premature end, 
Kennedy himself was laying the ground for what he hoped to achieve following re-
election.  While offering sufficient restraint to ensure that he did not confound his 
chances of securing a further four years in the White House, he became bolder and 
more direct in his speeches; he grew more assertive in stating clearly his principles 
regarding war and peace, the state of the world and the role of the United States as 
the leader of the free nations.  At a time when he was being urged to expand its 
commitment, Kennedy opened the possibility of ending the US presence in Vietnam; 
as the Cold War intensified he took the first tentative steps for rapprochement with 
the Soviet Union, for reducing arms and for developing ideas that would allow for 
peaceful co-existence.  How far these overtures to the future could have succeeded 
had he lived is a moot question, but they help to explain the extent to which 
<ĞŶŶĞĚǇ ?ƐǀŝĞǁŽĨĂǁŽƌůĚŝŶĐŚĂŶŐĞŝŶĐŽƌƉŽƌĂƚĞĚĂĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚƐƚǇůĞŽĨƚŚŝŶŬŝŶŐĨƌŽŵ
both the Eisenhower and the Johnson administrations.  This style was much more 
receptive to the possibilities that could be realised by embracing and nurturing the 
friendship of the new nations that were emerging, whether from the retreat of the 
decaying European empires or from the struggles of minorities within recognised 
entities. 
 
Kennedy and Ireland 
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The Kennedy family was famously Irish and was most strongly associated with 
Boston, where there existed a substantial Irish immigrant population.  Kennedy was 
not averse to reaching into his Irish and Catholic roots in order to secure a political 
advantage,10 but it is interesting to observe that his father, JPK, had strived to 
distance himself and his offspring from their Catholic connections.11  This is not 
ƐƵƌƉƌŝƐŝŶŐ ?<ĞŶŶĞĚǇ ?ƐĂƚŚŽůŝĐŝƐŵǁas a live issue at the time of the 1960 
Presidential race and his political opponents were able to use this factor to suggest 
that a Catholic President would hold first allegiance to the Vatican, that the Church 
would be influential in policy making and that the long held US tradition of 
separation of state and religion could be compromised.  It should be added that, 
ǁŚŝůĞ<ĞŶŶĞĚǇ ?ƐƌŽŽƚƐŵĂǇŚĂǀĞďĞĞŶĞůĞĐƚŽƌĂůůǇĂĚǀĂŶƚĂŐĞŽƵƐŝŶĂƌĞĂƐǁŚĞƌĞƚŚĞƌĞ
were large numbers of voters with Irish ancestry, they could be less than helpful with 
voters who were disparaging about Ireland.  In this context, it should be 
remembered that Irishness (if such a term can be used) did not have the popular 
appeal that later came to characterise its people and diaspora.  
 
While engaged as a journalist in 1945, Kennedy wrote an article that focused on the 
relationship between the Republic of Ireland (at that time referred to Eire) and the 
United Kingdom.12  Written from London on 26th July, the contents of the piece 
describe the struggle within Irish politics between those who wished to develop ties 
with Great Britain and those who sought a united Ireland, apart and distanced from 
its dominant neighbour.  Kennedy also touched upon the apparent contradiction of 
Irish membership of the British Commonwealth.  In no part of the article, however, is 
there a comment, judgement or even hint that the issues at hand related to a 
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colonial past or that they fitted with the processes of decolonisation that were just 
beginning.  Indeed, Kennedy studiously avoids the question by calling the situation 
 “ ?ƚŚĞĂŐĞ-ŽůĚƋƵĂƌƌĞůǁŝƚŚŶŐůĂŶĚ ? ?13 ĂŶĚ ?ĐŝƚŝŶŐ^ŚĞƌŝĚĞŶ ? “ƋƵĂƌƌĞůŝƐĂǀĞƌǇ
ƉƌĞƚƚǇƋƵĂƌƌĞůĂƐŝƚƐƚĂŶĚƐ ?tĞƐŚŽƵůĚŽŶůǇƐƉŽŝůŝƚďǇƚƌǇŝŶŐƚŽĞǆƉůĂŝŶŝƚ ? ?14 
 
More famously, Kennedy visited Ireland as President in 1963, an occasion perhaps 
best remembered for the stirring speech he gave before the Irish parliament, the 
Houses of the Oireachtas, on 28th June.  There is much in the speech about the 
struggles of Ireland in history, and much about the close links between the Irish and 
the United States; there is a great deal also about Irish literature and cultural 
ĂĐŚŝĞǀĞŵĞŶƚƐ ?ĂďŽƵƚ/ƌĞůĂŶĚ ?ƐƉůĂĐĞŝŶƚŚĞǁŽƌůĚĂŶĚĂďŽƵƚ “ĨƌĞĞĚŽŵ ?ŐĞŶĞƌĂůůǇ ?
Although implicit throughout the speech, there is no direct menƚŝŽŶŽĨ/ƌĞůĂŶĚ ?Ɛ
endurances as a colony of Great Britain - there is barely a mention of Britain itself 
and not at all in the manner of being an imperialist power.  Where the speech cuts 
closest to this unspoken issue Kennedy moves the subject matter to contemporary 
challenges, related to the absence of freedom in Communist dominated states: 
 
 “The central issue of freedom, however, is between those who believe in self-
determination and those in the East who would impose upon others the harsh and 
oppressive Communist system; and here your nation wisely rejects the role of a go-
between or a mediator. Ireland pursues an independent course in foreign policy, but 
it is not neutral between liberty and tyranny and never will be. ?15 
 
There are several reasons why Kennedy might have chosen not to highlight the 
ĐŽůŽŶŝĂůĂƐƉĞĐƚŽĨ/ƌĞůĂŶĚ ?ƐƐƚƌƵŐŐůĞƐĨŽƌĨƌĞĞĚŽŵ ?/ŶƚŚĞĨŝƌƐƚƉůĂĐĞ ?ƚŚĞ/ƌŝƐŚǀŝƐŝƚ
was a prelude to an important engagement in Britain itself, which was to follow on a 
few days afterwards.  Such a reference may have served to distract from the 
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business of that occasion and, anyway, might have been seen as offensive.  Further, 
the emphasis that Kennedy placed on freedom from domination and self-
determination was unanswerable in the context of the history of the USA and, as he 
endeavoured to demonstrate, in the case of Ireland as well.  Also, he may have 
viewed the matter of colonial domination as a dead letter in Ireland and the debate 
regarding unification as a distortion of a painful independence.  As uplifting and 
inspiring as his words were for those in the audience and in Ireland in general, they 
did not stray from the facts of events as they had unfolded over the years and 
therefore did not present a challenge to the manifestations and emotions that 
enveloped those facts. 
 
Ireland was clearly important to Kennedy for many reasons  W his background, his 
Catholicism, its parallel history, but it was not a key consideration for him in the 
modern world of foreign affairs management and decision-making.  His speech used 
the Irish experience as an example of what to avoid in decoupling a nascent state 
from foreign domination  W the terrible conflict, the inability of the protagonists to 
reconcile differences that would, in time, be resolved anyway.  He was able to point 
to the Ireland of the 1960s as an example of what could be achieved through 
freedom and independence, but its battles for its status were over and gone and 
only served to illustrate the price of a failing on the part of the dominant power to 
accommodate the inevitable.  It was to the emerging nations that Kennedy sought to 
direct his energies and it was the example of Ireland in 1963 that helped coalesce his 
ideas on how the failings of the past could be avoided.  Further, in his expressions of 
admiration for the extent to which Ireland had developed its place in the world he 
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was emphatic in describing its progress as incomplete.16 
 
In 2013, in recognition of fifty years passing since the assassination of Kennedy, The 
Irish Times ran a series of articles to commemorate the event and remind readers of 
the impact that the President had made in Ireland as a result of his visit in 1963.  Dan 
Keenan wrote, on 19th June 2013, under the headline: 
 
 “,ĞƌŽŝĐƐĂŵĞ>ŽŶŐĨƚĞƌƚŚĞ,ĞƌŽ P:&< ?ƐĐŽŶƚƌŝďƵƚŝŽŶ to Irish political concerns was 
minimal.  On the national question, the true heroes were Jimmy Carter, Ronald 
ZĞĂŐĂŶĂŶĚŝůůůŝŶƚŽŶ ? ?17 
 
<ĞĞŶĂŶƉƌŽũĞĐƚĞĚƚŚĂƚ<ĞŶŶĞĚǇ ?ƐĂƚƚŝƚƵĚĞƚŽ/ƌĞůĂŶĚhad allowed for no contribution 
to settling the political conflictions that stood unresolved at the time of his visit: 
 
 “:&< ?ƐĂƉƉĞĂůŝŶ/ƌĞůĂŶĚǁĂƐŽǀĞƌǁŚĞůŵŝŶŐůǇĞŵŽƚŝŽŶĂů ?ĂƐƚŚĞŶĞĂƌŚǇƐƚĞƌŝĂ
surrounding his visit showed.  (In contrast), his contribution to Irish political life was 
minimal, especially when it came tŽŵĞŶƚŝŽŶŽĨEŽƌƚŚĞƌŶ/ƌĞůĂŶĚĂŶĚƵďůŝŶ ?Ɛ
relations with London.  There were other, much more important issues to deal with 
in 1963 under the cloud of the Cold War, and the Kennedy White House let nothing 
ŽďƐƚƌƵĐƚƚŚĂƚƉƌŝŽƌŝƚǇ ? ?18 
 
 
In what appears as a gĞŶƚůĞƌĞďƵŬĞ ?<ĞĞŶĂŶƌĞĨĞƌƐƚŽdĂŽŝƐĞĂĐŚ^ĞĂŶ>ĞŵĂƐƐ ?
apparent acceptance of what might have been a missed opportunity and cites his 
later visit to the White House (in October 1963) where: 
 
 “ZĞĨĞƌƌŝŶŐƚŽƚŚĞĨůŽŽĚŽĨŶĞǁůǇŝŶĚĞƉĞŶĚĞŶƚĨƌŝĐĂŶƐƚĂƚĞƐĂƐĚĞĐolonisation swept 
through that continent, Kennedy held up Ireland as the shining example of a small 
state winning its freedom. 
 
 “ ? ? ?ƚŚĞŵŽƐƚƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶƚĞǆĂŵƉůĞ ?ƚŚĞƉƌĞĚĞĐĞƐƐŽƌŽĨƚŚŝƐƚƌĞŵĞŶĚŽƵƐƉĂƌĂĚĞ ?ǁŚŝĐŚ
has been the most astonishing fact of post-war life, the most unique example of 
course was Ireland which blazed the trail, set the example, was the point of the 
ƐƉĞĂƌ ?ƚŚĞĂƌƌŽǁŚĞĂĚ ? ?ŚĞƐĂŝĚ ? 
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He spoke as if the unresolved Irish issue had been settled.  Lemass responded with 
remarks that would seem cap-in-ŚĂŶĚŝŶƚŚĞĐŽŶƚĞǆƚŽĨƚŽĚĂǇ ?ƐǁŽƌůĚ ? 
 




the consistency of our support for the aims and principles by which you have guided 
ǇŽƵƌƉŽůŝĐǇĂŶĚ ?ŝŶĚĞĞĚ ?ƵƉŽŶǁŚŝĐŚƚŚĞĨƵƚƵƌĞŽĨŵĂŶŬŝŶĚĚĞƉĞŶĚƐ ? ?/ŶŽƚŚĞƌǁŽƌĚƐ
 W ǁĞŚĂǀĞůŝƚƚůĞƉŽůŝĐǇŽƚŚĞƌƚŚĂŶƚŽƐƵƉƉŽƌƚǇŽƵƌƉŽůŝĐǇ ?ǁŚĂƚĞǀĞƌƚŚĂƚŝƐ ? ?19 
 
 
&ŽůůŽǁŝŶŐ<ĞŶŶĞĚǇ ?ƐĚĞĂƚŚ>Ğŵass recorded his memories as a contribution to the 
<ĞŶŶĞĚǇ>ŝďƌĂƌǇKƌĂů,ŝƐƚŽƌǇWƌŽŐƌĂŵ ?/ŶƚĞƌǀŝĞǁĞĚďǇ:ŽƐĞƉŚ ?K ?ŽŶŶŽƌŝŶƵŐƵƐƚ
1966, Lemass spoke of the Kennedy visit to Ireland and his return journey to 
Washington at length, but only in terms of commonplace observations.  Perhaps the 
nearest that the conversation gets to looking at Kennedy and the issues of Irish 
unification is the reference to the wreath laying ceremony that took place to mark 
the 1916 uprising in Dublin.  Lemass described the scene: 
 
 “tĞĨŝƌƐƚǁĞŶƚƚŽƚŚĞƌďŽƵƌ,ŝůůDĞŵŽƌŝĂů'ĂƌĚĞŶǁŚĞƌĞŚĞůĂŝĚĂǁƌĞĂƚŚŽŶƚŚĞ
graves of the 1916 leaders. I want you to understand that this was, itself, an event 
for us of great emotional significance. He was, I think, the first head of state ever to 
go through the ceremony of honouring the executive leaders of the 1916 rising. 
 
Many heads of state have done it since, but he was the first. The fact that he, as the 
President of the United States, the greatest nation in the world, of Irish origin, 
performed the ceremony had to have a tremendously emotional effect upon the 
Irish people. ?20 
 
 
ǀĞŶƚƵĂůůǇK ?ŽŶŶŽƌĂƐŬƐĂďŽƵƚƵŶŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ P 
 
 “K ?ŽŶŶŽƌ PŝĚŚĞĞǀĞƌƚĂůŬƚŽǇŽƵŝŶǇŽƵƌĚŝƐĐƵƐƐŝŽŶƐǁŝƚŚŚŝŵĂďŽƵƚƐŽŵĞŽĨƚŚĞ
problems of Ireland such as  W the major problem I can think of immediately is 
unification? ?21 
 
 Lemass responded: 
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 “EŽ ?ŶŽƚƌĞĂůůǇ ?ŝŶƚŚĞƐĞŶƐĞŽĨŚĂǀŝŶŐĂŶǇƐŽůƵƚŝŽŶŽĨŽƵƌƉƌŽďůĞŵƐƚŽŽĨĨĞƌ ?,ĞǁĂƐ
certainly interested in them and asked of them.  Well, there was one situation which 
arose in that regard that I should mention. 
 
While we were in Washington, we discussed various forms of cooperation between 
the two countries, showing his desire to help us if there was any way in which we 
needed help.  dŚĞƌĞǁĂƐŶ ?ƚĂŶǇƚŚŝŶŐƚŚĂƚ/ĐŽƵůĚƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐĂůůǇƐƵŐŐĞƐƚ that was of 
great importance to us that was immediately preferable for him to do.  But we did 
get on to discussing the question of the development of fisheries in the North 
Atlantic. He was tremendously interested in the fisheries ? ?22 
 
Lemass conveys the impression of avoiding the ƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶ ?ďƵƚK ?ŽŶŶŽƌŶĞŝƚŚĞƌ
persisted nor followed up on the response that he was given so it is difficult to 
ĐŽŶĐůƵĚĞǁŚĂƚƚŽŽŬƉůĂĐĞǁŚĞŶ “,ĞǁĂƐĐĞƌƚĂŝŶůǇŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚĞĚŝŶƚŚĞŵĂŶĚĂƐŬĞĚŽĨ
ƚŚĞŵ ? ?WĞƌŚĂƉƐƚŚĞƐŝŵƉůĞĞǆƉůĂŶĂƚŝŽŶŝƐƚŚĞďĞƐƚ ?<ĞŶŶĞĚǇŚĂd family ties to 
Ireland and seemed to hold a genuine affection for the country of his ancestors; his 
1963 visit was not made on the back of any crisis or difficulty, neither existing nor 
anticipated and, as Lemass states in his interview, there were no great issues at 
point between the United States and Ireland at the time.  Kennedy was able to use 
his time in Ireland to raise his profile and popularity, factors which would assist him 
in his domestic political ambitions.  In geopolitical terms Ireland did not have great 
significance for the President and he was not about to risk causing an upset of any 
kind, especially with his forthcoming visit to the United Kingdom taking place directly 
afterwards. 
 
This is not sufficient an explanation for Keenan though.  His article sets off the visit as 
an act of abdication and deleterious to the prevailing situation of the Irish: 
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 “<ĞŶŶĞĚǇ ?Ɛ/ƌŝƐŚďŽŶĚƐŵĂǇŚĂǀĞďĞĞŶŐĞŶƵŝŶĞ ?ďƵƚƚŚĞǇǁĞƌĞŶŽƚƚŽďĞƚƌĂŶƐůĂƚĞĚ
into political clout to be used to lever London away from its 40-year-old hands-off 
ĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚƚŽEŽƌƚŚĞƌŶ/ƌĞůĂŶĚŶŽŵĂƚƚĞƌǁŚĂƚǁĂƐŐŽŝŶŐŽŶƚŚĞƌĞ ? ?23 
 
For Keenan the succeeding Presidents were far more influential in forcing political 
issues than was Kennedy.  For Carter it was the offer, in 1977, that the US would 
underwrite any agreement that might be reached for settling issues in Northern 
Ireland. 
 
 “ƐƐƚĂƚĞŵĞŶƚƐŐŽ ?ŝƚǁĂƐďůĂŶĚ ?ƐĨĂƌĂƐh^-British diplomacy goes, the effect was 
seismic. The White House signalled it had a right to express an opinion, which 
reflected Dublin and SDLP [Social Democratic and Labour Party] opinion, in the face 




Reagan, as Keenan states, convinced UK Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher to sign 
the Anglo-Irish Agreement with Garret FitzGerald in 1985 and Clinton granted a visa 
for Nationalist leader Gerry Adams to visit the USA before playing a pivotal part in 
ensuring the Good Friday Agreement was signed in 1998.  As Keenan concludes: 
 
 “dŚĞƐĞƉƌĞƐŝĚĞŶƚƐ W from Carter to Clinton  W showed what JFK could not do, namely 





This is clearly a criticism of Kennedy and comes from someone who is a respected 
and knowledgeable writer on the affairs of Ireland and Northern Ireland; it is not to 
be dismissed lightly.  But context is everything. 
 
What advantages could have been secured, for the United States, for Ireland, for 
Kennedy himself, had the President chosen to step into the question of unification?  
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In 1963 Northern Ireland was dominated by the Protestant, Unionist majority; if self 
determination of peoples was a deciding factor then Kennedy could have been seen 
to be contradicting his own principles by urging actions that would have appeared to 
run counter to this tenet.  The issue of unification, though live and unresolved at the 
ƚŝŵĞŽĨ<ĞŶŶĞĚǇ ?ƐǀŝƐŝƚ ?ǁĂƐŶŽƚĂĐƚƵĂůůǇĞǆƉůŽƐŝǀĞ ?Ǉ the time Carter, Reagan and 
Clinton were involved and making a contribution there was widespread violence and 
loss of life in the region and the urgency for some resolving action was much 
heightened.  Kennedy may not have been a hero, but he was not a provocateur 
either, and this might actually have rendered higher service to the well being of this 
part of the world than would have an untimely intervention. 
 
/ƚŝƐŝŶƐƚƌƵĐƚŝǀĞƚŽƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶ<ĞŶŶĞĚǇ ?ƐĚŝĨĨŝĚĞŶĐĞŝŶƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƚŽ/ƌĞůĂŶĚ ?ƐĐŽůŽŶŝĂůƉĂƐƚ ?
His close ties to the British establishment go some way to explain his avoidance of 
the issue and it is reasonable to suggest that he viewed the history of Irish 
independence differently from how he saw the exercise of imperialism in other parts 
of the world.  Ireland had been, for example, an integral part of the United Kingdom, 
where the rights of the people were undivided and there was ostensible equality.  
There was never any possibility that the USA would become embroiled in Irish affairs 
in the same way that it had intervened in the Philippines, Korea, Indochina and 
elsewhere, so this may also have been a factor.  What is most interesting for this 
ƐƚƵĚǇĂďŽƵƚ<ĞŶŶĞĚǇ ?ƐĂƚƚŝƚƵĚĞŝƐƚŚĂƚŚĞƉŽŝŶƚĞĚůǇĂǀŽŝĚĞĚŵĂŬŝŶŐ/ƌĞůĂŶĚĂǀŝĐƚŝŵ ?
Kennedy praised Ireland, holding it up as a new nation that was making progress and 
which could look forward to a prosperous future without entanglement in the 
corrosive and debilitating Cold War.  For Kennedy, Ireland presented an example of 
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ǁŚĂƚĐŽƵůĚďĞĂĐŚŝĞǀĞĚŝŶƚŚĞ “ƉŽƐƚ-impeƌŝĂů ?ǁŽƌůĚ ?dŚŝƐƉƌŽǀŝĚĞƐĨƵƌƚŚĞƌŝŶƐŝŐŚƚ
into the future that Kennedy envisioned and adds to our understanding of his actions 








An exploration of how John F Kennedy was influenced by matters of colonialism and 
decolonisation and how these came to bear upon his thinking on issues of foreign 
affairs, with particular reference to Vietnam. 
 
 
The question posed by the terms of reference under which this study has been 
conducted now arises.  To what extent did matters of colonialism and decolonisation 
influence Kennedy in his foreign affairs considerations? 
 
It has been shown that Kennedy, as a young man in London at the time the Second 
World War began to break, gained a close insight into imperialism in practice.  It has 
also been seen that the matter occupied his thinking before he entered politics 
when, as a journalist, he made reference, both direct and oblique, to the concept.  
<ĞŶŶĞĚǇ ?ƐũŽƵƌŶĂůŝƐƚŝĐŽƵƚƉƵƚŝƐĞƐƉĞĐŝĂůůǇĞŶůŝŐŚƚĞŶŝŶŐďĞĐĂƵƐĞŝƚƌĞǀĞĂůƐĂŵŝŶĚƚŚĂƚ
is still in the phase of discovery and learning; one can see that the beginnings of a 
weltanschauung ŚĂǀĞďĞĞŶĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚĞĚŝŶ<ĞŶŶĞĚǇ ?ƐƚŚŝŶŬŝŶŐǁŝƚŚŚŝƐƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƐƚŽ
how the world was changing after the devastation of widespread conflict.  With the 
defeat of the fascist powers, the introduction of nuclear weapons and the 
establishment of the United NatŝŽŶƐĂŶĚŝƚƐĚĞĐůĂƌĂƚŝŽŶƐƌĞŐĂƌĚŝŶŐƉĞŽƉůĞƐ ?ƌŝŐŚƚƐƚŽ
choose their own governments, Kennedy could envisage a changed world order that 
would test the resolve of the USA as the most powerful state on earth with a new 
role as an outward looking nation. 
 
Christopher John Hurley  W MA Research, 2016 - 2018 127 
As he considered how this changed world would evolve he was conscious of the 
unknown impacts that the establishment of dozens of new nations would have  W for 
all parts of the world.  Following election into public office Kennedy recognised the 
peril that the Cold War presented and did not become distracted from the demands 
it placed on the USA for homeland security, but he differed from his political 
contemporaries in his views on how it should be tackled.  As he gained more 
understanding and experience of developing issues, he became more outspoken and 
a pattern of consistency in his thinking emerges. 
 
This constancy becomes marked after his visit to Asia in October 1951.  It is from this 
point on that his pronouncements, broadcasts, formal speeches and writings 
demonstrate a retained theme: that winning the Cold War required a change of 
ĚŝƌĞĐƚŝŽŶŝŶh^ĨŽƌĞŝŐŶĂĨĨĂŝƌƐŵĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚ ?/Ŷ<ĞŶŶĞĚǇ ?ƐǀŝĞǁ ?ƚŚĞh^ŶĞĞĚĞĚƚŽ
reach out to the new nations that were emerging from the decline of the European 
empires; it needed to extend a hand of friendship and recognition to these new 
states and help them in the nation-building that would see them prosper and grow, 
as had the United States itself after throwing off the chains of imperial oversight.  If 
the peoples of these emerging countries could be converted to the ideals and 
principles that had made the USA  prosperous and successful, then the influence and 
reach of the Soviet Union would be commensurately diminished.  But to do so the 
USA must change its approach: it must not assume an air of authority, it must not 
become overbearing, it must not take on the appearance of a neo-colonial power.  
Instead it must treat with the new nations as equals in a democratic world; it must 
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learn, understand and respect the traditional values that guided their own thinking, 
recognising all the while that such values may be different, alien even, to the USA. 
 
In a further departure from the accepted thinking of the times, Kennedy also cast the 
Soviet Union as a predatory imperial power.  His efforts to secure the support of the 
US political establishment for opening relations with Poland were both radical and, 
for him personally, politically dangerous  W a high risk venture that could have 
undone his ambitions for advancement. 
 
Nevertheless, as the literature review above demonstrates,1 the great biographical 
ĂŶĚƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůĂŶĂůǇƐĞƐŽĨ<ĞŶŶĞĚǇ ?ƐůŝĨĞĂƉƉĞĂƌŶŽƚƚŽƉůĂĐĞŐƌĞĂƚĞŵƉŚĂƐŝƐŽŶƚŚĞ
ŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶĐĞƚŚĂƚ<ĞŶŶĞĚǇǀĞƐƚĞĚŝŶƚŚĞ “ŝŵƉĞƌŝĂůĨĂĐƚŽƌ ?ĂŶĚŚŝƐŐƵŝĚŝŶŐďĞůŝĞĨƐĂƐĂ
politician.  There may be many reasons why this is so but one that stands out is that 
the world did not transpire as the young Congressman and Senator envisaged. 
 
<ĞŶŶĞĚǇ ?ƐĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞƐŚĂĚƚĂƵŐŚƚŚŝŵƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƐŚĂƉĞŽĨƚŚĞĨƵƚƵƌĞǁŽƌůĚǁŽƵůĚďĞ
conditioned by the existence of the new independent nations.  They may be 
endowed with little in the way of great power or wealth, but they would have 
strategic impacts as buffer zones between the Great Powers, as ports of call for naval 
vessels, as providers of raw materials, as transport and communication links and, 
perhaps most importantly, as political entities with a common colonial past that 
would condition their attitudes towards the United States and the Communist 
powers. 
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His experiences also taught him that the impact of the Second World War had drawn 
the great powers into showing a determination for improved international relations 
by the establishment of the United Nations.  Kennedy was greatly impressed by the 
fact that somehow, despite immense political differences, despite mistrust and 
antagonism, despite the willingness of Capitalism and Communism to face out each 
other to the point of extinction, the nations of the world had consented to common 
standards, codes of conduct and mutual agreement.  These principles, which were 
theoretically binding upon the signature nations, were potent influences that would 
limit the actions of the powerful states to make war and would add to the strength 
and authority of the new nations in their efforts to become established and 
influential.  For Kennedy (and those who helped launch the United Nations) the 
future conduct of international relations would be radically altered from the 
haphazard and dangerous ways of the past.  Crisis events would, of necessity, be 
subjected to wider and deeper consideration before engulfing actions were taken; 
war, in the future, would be subject to pre-consideration. 
 
Whether he believed it, envisaged it, expected it or thought it inevitable, Kennedy 
saw a future where the existence of the United Nations would provide the new 
states the means for being heard around the world.  Notwithstanding the role of the 
Security Council, the UN would be mightily influential and, by default, the great body 
of new nations would wield a separate influence that would stretch beyond their 
significance as individual states.  In this future world, the challenges the United 
States would face in fighting the Cold War would have to take account of new 
realities: if Communism was to be contained, then the new nations would have to be 
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converted to the idea that their best interests were served by alignment with the 
United States, that benevolent capitalism offered their peoples the greatest 
opportunities for progress and well-being and that Communism showed only a way 
to poverty and unhappiness.  If Communism was to be defeated then, one way or 
another, attempts to do so would escalate to nuclear war; this would signal a self-
destruction of sorts, making it self-defeating.  So war must be avoided at all costs.  If 
Communism could not be defeated but could be contained, then the United States 
and the Soviet Union would have to learn to live together, as harmoniously as 
possible. 
 
While occupying the White House Kennedy moved to take on these challenges: 
x As a means for containing the spread of Communism, he courted the new 
nations and the smaller states of the world, meeting directly with their leaders 
and representatives and seeking to assure them of the good will of the United 
States as their friend and supporter; 
x He repeatedly refused to deploy the armed forces of the United States to 
resolve issues in Cuba, Vietnam, Laos, Berlin and elsewhere, believing that to 
do so would raise the risks of escalation, nuclear war and the ruination of the 
world.  He also believed that overbearing use of US military power would raise 
the spectre of imperialism, casting the US in an unfavourable light with those 
nations that were throwing off the yoke of a colonial past.  By doing so he 
incidentally raised his personal profile in the new and aspirant nations, which 
made him a figure of hope for peoples in the rapidly evolving Third World; 
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x He came to the view that the Cold War could be ended by the Capitalist and 
ŽŵŵƵŶŝƐƚĞŶĐĂŵƉŵĞŶƚƐĨŝŶĚŝŶŐƚŚĞŵĞĂŶƐƚŽůŝǀĞǁŝƚŚŽŶĞĂŶŽƚŚĞƌ ?Ɛ
differences, thereby eliminating the tensions that could lead to destructive 
war. 
 
Kennedy articulated the first of these points in a speech he made to Congress just 
ƚǁŽŵŽŶƚŚƐŝŶƚŽŚŝƐWƌĞƐŝĚĞŶĐǇ ?dŝƚůĞĚ “^ƉĞĐŝĂůDĞƐƐĂŐĞƚŽŽŶŐƌĞƐƐŽŶ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶŝĚ ?
the new President lamented the entanglement of agency responsibilities that had 
dissipated the effectiveness of US overseas aid programmes.  Although constructed 
on the premise of revitalising these programmes, the speech was clearly directed at 




 “The economic collapse of those free but less-developed nations which now stand 
poised between sustained growth and economic chaos would be disastrous to our 
national security, harmful to our comparative prosperity and offensive to our 
conscience. 
 
 ?dŽĨĂŝůƚŽŵĞĞƚƚŚŽƐĞŽďůŝŐĂƚŝŽŶƐ ?ƚŽƵŶĚĞǀĞůŽƉĞĚŶĂƚŝŽŶƐ ?ŶŽǁǁŽƵůĚďĞ
disastrous; and, in the long run, more expensive.  For widespread poverty and chaos 
lead to a collapse of existing political and social structures which would inevitably 
invite the advance of totalitarianism into every weak and unstable area.  Thus our 
own security would be endangered and our prosperity imperilled.  A program of 
assistance to the underdeveloped nations must continue because the nation's 
ŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚĂŶĚƚŚĞĐĂƵƐĞŽĨƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůĨƌĞĞĚŽŵƌĞƋƵŝƌĞŝƚ ? ?2 
 
 
/ƚǁĂƐĐŚĂƌĂĐƚĞƌŝƐƚŝĐŽĨ<ĞŶŶĞĚǇ ?ƐƉƌĂŐŵĂƚŝĐĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚƚŽpolitics3 that he should 
sometimes convey his stronger and more controversial political thinking through 
uncontroversial subjects and words that could not offend or alienate his political 
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ƐƵƉƉŽƌƚ ?tŚŽĂŵŽŶŐƐƚƚŚĞhŶŝƚĞĚ^ƚĂƚĞƐ ?ĞůĞĐƚĞĚĨĞĚĞƌĂůƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂƚŝǀĞƐĐŽƵůĚ
easily voice opposition to the evidently benevolent overseas aid programmes?  It is a 
ůŽƐƐƚŽŽƵƌƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐŽĨ<ĞŶŶĞĚǇ ?ƐƚŚŝŶŬŝŶŐƚŚĂƚŚŝƐĐŽŶƚƌŝǀĂŶĐĞƐĨŽƌĞǆƉůĂŝŶŝŶŐ
or reinforcing his messages have not always been fully understood or properly 
examined by analysts. 
 
On other occasions, of course, he would speak more directly and it was during his 
campaign for the Democratic Party nomination for the Presidency that he gave fuller 
rein to his beliefs, concerns and the different ways in which he intended to tackle the 
issues of the day.  One example among many that illustrate this point is the speech 
he made in Salt Lake City on 30th January 1960 to mark the birthday anniversary of 
&ƌĂŶŬůŝŶ ?ZŽŽƐĞǀĞůƚ ?ƚŝƚůĞĚ “dŚĞŚĂůůĞŶŐĞƐŽĨƚŚĞ ? ?Ɛ ? <ĞŶŶĞĚǇƐƉŽŬĞĨŽƌĐĞĨƵůůǇ
about how he envisaged the changing world: 
 
 “ƵƌŝŶŐƚŚĞĐŽŵŝŶŐĚĞĐĂĚĞ ?ŚĂůĨĂďŝůůŝŽŶƉĞŽƉůĞǁŝůůďĞĂĚĚĞĚƚŽƚŚĞƉŽƉƵůĂƚŝŽŶŽĨ
the world.  The burden of this fantastic increase  W which will be approximately equal 
to the entire population of Europe  W will fall upon those nations in the bottom half of 
the globe which are least able to bear it  W the nations of Africa and Asia, the Middle 
East and Latin America.  And these same troubled areas of the world will continue to 
see the birth of struggling new nations  W ĨŽƌŵĂŶ ?ƐĞƚernal desire to be free and 
independent will continue to rise to the fore. 
 
The future of those areas holds the key to our own future.  If we cannot help them 
conquer their poverty  W if we cannot help them achieve a secure and stable society  W 
then our futƵƌĞĂƐǁĞůůĂƐƚŚĞŝƌƐǁŝůůďĞĞŶĚĂŶŐĞƌĞĚ ?dŚĞŽƵƚĐŽŵĞŽĨ/ŶĚŝĂ ?ƐĨŝĞƌĐĞ
economic struggle with Red China may well determine the future of all Asia. 
 
If these countries are to get ahead of their population increases, they must step up 
the expansion of their economies  W and this means they must obtain development 
capital from the wealthy nations of the West.  And if those now struggling to win 
their freedom are to look toward the West  W and not to Moscow or Peiping  W once 
that freedom is achieved, we must make completely clear our strong, unequivocal 
stand for self-determination.  This nation  W itself born in revolution from foreign rule 
 W should lead this nationalist surge instead of helping to throttle it.  Perhaps it will be 
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too late for the next President to deal with this crisis in some areas  W but in Africa 
ĂŶĚĞůƐĞǁŚĞƌĞ ?ƚŚŝƐĐƌŝƐŝƐŝƐƐƚŝůůƚŽďĞŵĞƚ ? ?4 
 
dŚĞƌĞŝƐŶŽĨƵƌƚŚĞƌĞǆƉůĂŶĂƚŝŽŶĨŽƌƚŚĞƐƚĂƚĞŵĞŶƚ “Perhaps it will be too late for the 
next President to deal with this crisis in some areas  W but in Africa and elsewhere, 
this crisis is still to be meƚ ? ? ?ďƵƚŝƚǁŽƵůĚƐĞĞŵƚŽďĞĂƐŝĚĞǁĂǇƐreference to South 
ĂƐƚƐŝĂ ?ŐŝǀĞŶ<ĞŶŶĞĚǇ ?ƐĞǆƚĞŶƐŝǀĞŝŶǀŽůǀĞŵĞŶƚƚŚĞƌĞ ?ƚ ƚŚĞƚŝŵĞǁŚĞŶŚĞŵĂĚĞ
this speech matters were still evolving in Algeria but the presence of De Gaulle 
would have given hope that a settlement could be reached.  South Vietnam, by 1960, 
had settled into the style of governance that Kennedy viewed as counterproductive 
both to its own and US interests  W an evolving dictatorship functioning through 
power bases and nepotism.  His disillusionment with Diem would certainly have 
started by this time. 
  
The second point above, that Kennedy was known and respected in the Third World, 
is also much understated in terms of our understanding of the impact that he had 
made as the leader of the free world.  As has been shown5 ƚŚĞhŶŝƚĞĚ^ƚĂƚĞƐ ?
perception of how it appeared in the world was sometimes misplaced; equally, the 
methods used by different US agencies for pressing foreign affairs objectives were 
often ineffective.  Nowhere was this more clearly apparent than in South Vietnam 
where the presence of US government agencies for almost a decade had, by the time 
ŽĨ<ĞŶŶĞĚǇ ?ƐĚĞĂƚŚ ?ĨĂŝůĞĚƚŽĂĚǀĂŶĐĞƚŚŽƐĞŽďũĞĐƚŝǀĞƐƚŽĂŶǇĚŝƐĐĞƌŶŝďůĞĚĞŐree.  In 
terms of costs, human as well as economic, this assessment is startling and it was 
ƌĞĐŽŐŶŝƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚŝƐƚŚĂƚĐŽŶƚƌŝďƵƚĞĚƚŽ<ĞŶŶĞĚǇ ?ƐŝĚĞĂƐĂďŽƵƚŚĞĐŚĂŶŐĞƐƚŚĂƚǁŽƵůĚ
have to be made for greater effectiveness in the future. 
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Indeed, it was KennedǇ ?ƐƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐŝŶƚŚĞĚĞǀĞůŽƉŝŶŐŶĂƚŝŽŶƐƚŚĂƚ ?ŝŶĨŽƌĞŝŐŶĂĨĨĂŝƌƐ
terms, marks him out as different from both his predecessors and successors.6  This 
ŚĂƐďĞĞŶƌĞĐŽŐŶŝƐĞĚďǇZŽďĞƌƚZĂŬŽǀĞŝŶŚŝƐďŽŽŬ “<ĞŶŶĞĚǇ ?:ŽŚŶƐŽŶĂŶĚƚŚĞEŽŶ-
ůŝŐŶĞĚtŽƌůĚ ? ?tƌŝƚŝŶŐĂďŽƵƚƚŚĞĞĨĨĞĐƚƐƚŚĂƚ<ĞŶŶĞĚǇ ?ƐĂƐƐ ƐŝŶĂƚŝŽŶŚĂĚĂƌŽƵŶĚ
the world, Rakove makes a number of observations to demonstrate this assertion: 
 
 “ ?^ĞůĚom have the Indian people been so shocked and dazed by the assassination of 
ĂůĞĂĚĞƌŽĨĂŶŽƚŚĞƌĐŽƵŶƚƌǇ ? ?ŽďƐĞƌǀĞĚƚŚĞTimes of India.  In Indonesia, President 
^ƵŬĂƌŶŽƚĞĂƌĨƵůůǇƌĞŵĂƌŬĞĚŝŶĂůĞŶŐƚŚǇĞƵůŽŐǇ ? “dŚĞŐŽŽĚ ŝĞǇŽƵŶŐ ? ?&ůĂŐƐŝŶ
Jakarta flew at ŚĂůĨŵĂƐƚ ?'ŚĂŶĂ ?ƐWƌĞƐŝĚĞŶƚ<ǁĂŵĞEŬƌƵŵĂŚĞƵůŽŐŝǌĞĚ “ĂŐƌĞĂƚ
ǁŽƌůĚƐƚĂƚĞƐŵĂŶĂŶĚĂƌĞůĞŶƚůĞƐƐĨŝŐŚƚĞƌĨŽƌĞƋƵĂůŝƚǇĂŶĚŚƵŵĂŶĚŝŐŶŝƚǇ ? ?
 
This striking outpouring by Indians, Indonesians, Egyptians, Algerians, and other 
peoples across the newly independent states of Africa and Asia reflected the 
profound power of the Kennedy image in the postcolonial world.  As a young, 
charismatic, dynamic American leader with an interest in fostering development and, 
by the summer of 1963, combating segregation, Kennedy was idolized in life and 
mourned in death.  There was, however, another common feeling that brought 
ordinary people of African and Asia to grief: that Kennedy seemed to have 
understood the issues that galvanized them.  His policies had narrowed the gap 
between the United States and the postcolonial world.  At his death, millions of 
ƉĞŽƉůĞŝŶƉůĂĐĞƐůŝŬĞŐǇƉƚ ?/ŶĚŝĂĂŶĚůŐĞƌŝĂǀŝĞǁĞĚŚŝŵĂƐĂĨƌŝĞŶĚ ?<ĞŶŶĞĚǇ ?Ɛ
policies, as understood by the peoples of the developing world, made them 
receptive to his image.  Without this perception, the murder in Dallas would have 
struck the average resident of Cairo or New Delhi as a distant tragedy, not a 
ƵŶŝǀĞƌƐĂůĐĂůĂŵŝƚǇ ? ?7 
 
The third point above, that Kennedy came to the conclusion that the Communist 
East and the Capitalist West would have to learn to live in tolerance of one another if 
a catastrophic war was to be avoided, was most clearly articulated in his Peace 
^ƉĞĞĐŚŝŶ:ƵŶĞ ? ? ? ? ?dŚĞƌŽŽƚƐŽĨ<ĞŶŶĞĚǇ ?ƐƚŚŝŶŬŝŶŐ ?ŚŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ĚĂƚĞďĂĐŬƚŽŚŝƐ
time as a young reporter for the Journal American in 1945.  It was then that he first 
made the assertion that war must be avoided8 and the belief stayed with him 
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throughout his political career.  After navigating a passage through the Cuban crisis 
of October 1962 Kennedy became more convinced than ever that the most 
devastating consequences could arise from the most localised of disputes and he 
resolved to try and create the conditions where there could be no re-occurrence of 
such a situation.  As the two great powers of the world vied for influence and 
domination over the newly created nations coming out of the demise of European 
imperialism, Kennedy also realised that the potential for such instances was much 
heightened.  His great concern was that a war of destruction might occur as a result 
of miscalculation or misunderstanding9 and he worked specifically to reduce this 
possibility with the measures taken once the Cuban crisis was settled.  Perhaps the 
most far-reaching of these endeavours was the Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, 
which was signed in Moscow on 5th August 1963, approved by the Senate on 23rd 
September and signed in ratification by the President on 7th October. 
 
Just days before the Senate vote, on 20th September 1963, President Kennedy made 
a speech before the General Assembly of the United Nations in New York, the 
second time he had appeared in that forum.  In what may be described as a follow-
up statement on his Peace Speech three months earlier, the President began by 
referring to changes in the world situation from the time of his previous address to 
the UN in September 1961 and suggested that tensions had eased: 
 
 “Today the clouds have lifted a little so that new rays of hope can break through. The 
pressures on West Berlin appear to be temporarily eased. Political unity in the Congo 
has been largely restored. A neutral coalition in Laos, while still in difficulty, is at 
least in being. The integrity of the United Nations Secretariat has been reaffirmed. A 
United Nations Decade of Development is under way.  And, for the first time in 17 
ǇĞĂƌƐŽĨĞĨĨŽƌƚ ?ĂƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐƐƚĞƉŚĂƐďĞĞŶƚĂŬĞŶƚŽůŝŵŝƚƚŚĞŶƵĐůĞĂƌĂƌŵƐƌĂĐĞ ? ?10 
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He then used the example of the efforts that had been made by the United States 
and the Soviet Union in creating the nuclear treaty to press for peace in other parts 
of the world and, in an echo of the words he spoke at his inauguration address,11 he 
urged the case for negotiation as the means for resolving problems: 
 
 “dŚĞƌĞĚƵĐƚŝŽŶŽĨŐůŽďĂůƚĞŶƐŝŽŶŵƵƐƚŶŽƚďĞĂŶĞǆĐƵƐĞĨŽƌƚŚĞŶĂƌƌŽǁƉƵƌƐƵŝƚŽĨ
self-interest. If the Soviet Union and the United States, with all of their global 
interests and clashing commitments of ideology, and with nuclear weapons still 
aimed at each other today, can find areas of common interest and agreement, then 
surely other nations can do the same - nations caught in regional conflicts, in racial 
issues, or in the death throes of old colonialism. Chronic disputes which divert 
precious resources from the needs of the people or drain the energies of both sides 
serve the interests of no one - and the badge of responsibility in the modern world is 
a willingness to seek peaceful solutions. 
 
It is never too early to try; and it's never too late to talk; and it's high time that many 
disputes on the agenda of this Assembly were taken off the debating schedule and 
placed on the negotiating table ? ?12 
 
It should not be forgotten that this speech was made in September 1963, at a time 
when Kennedy was moving to prepare the ground for the 1964 Presidential election.  
His stall was set for seeking re-election on the basis of these statements which, as his 
ŵŽƐƚƌĞĐĞŶƚƵƚƚĞƌĂŶĐĞƐ ?ǁŽƵůĚďĞƵƉƉĞƌŵŽƐƚŝŶǀŽƚĞƌƐ ?ŵŝŶĚƐ ?,ŝƐƐĞĐŽŶĚƚĞƌŵ ?
should it materialise, would see him freed from the constraints of political ambition 
and expediency.  It may be concluded, therefore, that these words in the last few 
months of his life were his most clarifying in terms of his thinking. 
 
These are the conclusive outcomes of the Kennedy record on foreign affairs 
management, based as they are on his own words and actions.  As matters 
transpired, the world did not evolve to the pattern upon which Kennedy based his 
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thinking, decisions and actions.  The authority of the United Nations was repeatedly 
usurped as the imperatives of national or idealistic objectives took precedence.  
Britain and France moved on Suez in 1956, the US fought in Vietnam in the 1960s, 
there were repeated Arab / Israeli conflicts, Soviet forces were active in Eastern 
Europe and, later, in Afghanistan.  On occasions the United Nations was used as a 
ĐĂƚ ?Ɛ paw, as with the UN sponsored war in Korea in 1950.  At that time the US took 
advantage of the absence of the Soviet Union to instigate the war and the USSR 
enjoyed a degree of schadenfreude in watching its rivals become entangled. 
 
<ĞŶŶĞĚǇ ?ƐǀŝĞǁƉŽŝŶƚŚĂĚůĞĚŚŝŵƚŽďĞůŝĞǀĞƚŚĂƚ ?ŝĨƚŚĞhŶŝƚĞĚ^ƚĂƚĞƐĨĂŝůĞĚƚŽ
befriend the new nations as they were released from colonial oversight, then they 
ǁŽƵůĚǇŝĞůĚƚŽŽŵŵƵŶŝƐŵ “ ?ŐůŝƚƚĞƌŝŶŐĂŶĚƐĞĚƵĐƚŝǀĞŝŶŝƚƐƐƵƉĞƌĨŝĐŝĂůĂƉƉĞĂů ? ? ?13  
But they did not become vassal states of Communism and neither, on the whole, did 
they become pluralist democracies.  For the most part the ex-colonies succumbed to 
the less admirable aspects of human nature with over-bearing dictators or despots, 




basis as had the Eisenhower administration.  Interventions, both open and covert 
took place in various sovereign states, generally justified by the need for 
containment of Communism and the forewarnings of the Domino Theory.  The 
United States continued with its overseas adventures after the Cold War ended in 
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 ? ? ? ?ǁŚĞŶŽƚŚĞƌ “ƚŚƌĞĂƚƐ ? ?ƌĞĂůŽƌ imagined, were put forward as reasons for such 
actions. 
 
Kennedy was in error, therefore, when he spoke in the Senate on 2nd July 1957: 
 
 “Dƌ ?WƌĞƐŝĚĞŶƚ ?ƚŚĞŵŽƐƚƉŽǁĞƌĨƵůƐŝŶŐůĞĨŽƌĐĞŝŶƚŚĞǁŽƌůĚƚŽĚĂǇŝƐŶĞŝƚŚĞƌ
communism nor capitalism, neither the H-bomb nor the guided missile it is man's 
eternal desire to be free and independent. The great enemy of that tremendous 
force of freedom is called, for want of a more precise term, imperialism - and today 
that means Soviet imperialism and, whether we like it or not, and though they are 
not to be equated, tĞƐƚĞƌŶŝŵƉĞƌŝĂůŝƐŵ ? ?14 
 
 
 “DĂŶ ?ƐĞƚĞƌŶĂůĚĞƐŝƌĞƚŽďĞĨƌĞĞĂŶĚŝŶĚĞƉĞŶĚĞŶƚ ? ?ǁĂƐ ?ŝŶĨĂĐƚ ?ĂůĞƐƐƉŽǁĞƌĨƵů
ĨŽƌĐĞƚŚĂŶŵĂŶ ?ƐŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůŐƌĞĞĚĂŶĚŚŝƐĞƚĞƌŶĂůĚĞƐŝƌĞƚŽďĞƌŝĐŚ ?ŝŶĨůƵĞŶƚŝĂůĂŶĚ
master of what he surveyed, for it was these traits that came to characterise the 
ŶĂƚŝŽŶƐĞŵĞƌŐŝŶŐĨƌŽŵ “tĞƐƚĞƌŶŝŵƉĞƌŝĂůŝƐŵ ?ĂŶĚƐŽŵĞƚŚŝŶŐƐŝŵŝůĂƌǁĂƐŽĨƚĞŶŝŶ
evidence in lands that were freed from the Soviet yoke after the end of the Cold 
War. 
 
Kennedy tried, as President of the United States, to manage foreign affairs in the 
spirit of the world he saw emerging; he used the UN, avoided military encounters 
and showed faith in leaders of small and nascent nations, but world affairs ran in 
directions that did not conform to the future for which he planned. 
 
It may be construed, therefore, that there is a strong thread of consistency that links 
<ĞŶŶĞĚǇ ?ƐŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞĂŶĚƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐŽĨŝŵƉĞƌŝĂůŝƐŵĂŶĚĚĞĐŽůŽŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶƚŽŚŝƐ
decision making in foreign affairs matters.  It may be further asserted that this 
Christopher John Hurley  W MA Research, 2016 - 2018 139 
consistency is most evident in his approach to Vietnam and the altering 
circumstances in that region during his time as President. But these statements must 
be made in recognition of the fact that he misread the ways in which the world 
would change and his conceptual philosophy for approaching foreign affairs matters 






The following identifies the concerns of the major powers regarding the issue of 
decolonisation following the end of the Second World War.  It was the actions of the 
fascist powers before the war, as they overran and conquered other nations without 
concern for world opinion, that helped bring about the establishment of the United 
Nations and added momentum to the concept of free determination and 
government by the will of the people.  Although all signatories to the UN Charter 
assented to these principles they were interpreted in different ways, according to 
the particular interests of different states, thus engendering varying attitudes 
towards the decolonisation process. 
 
The USA and Decolonisation 
 
As the Cold War erupted there was, within the United States, a deep concern about 
the possibility that there might be an economic retreat that would have 
consequences even more far-reaching than the Great Depression of the nineteen 
thirties.1  Two principal factors gave momentum to this fear  W that the end of 
wartime production would release great numbers of workers and that export 
demand would collapse due to the destruction of the European markets.  Attention 
within the federal government, therefore, was focussed upon ensuring a revitalised 
economy at home and, for security of output, injecting capital overseas to restore 
the broken economies of Europe and stabilise markets for US goods.  Given the 
urgency of these requirements, together with the breakdown of relations with 
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former ally the Soviet Union, the United States paid relatively little attention to the 
consequences of decolonisation and the creation of new nations that was taking 
place as a result of its gathering pace. 
 
As the exigencies of the Cold War intensified, so the projected aims of United States 
foreign policy were adapted and, where matters involving former colonies or 
aspirant nations emerged, these were considered within the context of the US's 
priorities in fighting the Cold War.  Having a monopoly on nuclear weapons also 
contributed to the shape of US foreign policy in the early years of the Cold War and 
there was considerable debate on how the new technologies should be deployed.  
For the time being at least, the USA was able to use the atomic bomb as a strategic 
weapon that would reduce the need for a standing army, providing a cheaper 
defence alternative as well as releasing much needed manpower for a growing 
domestic economy.  After the Soviets acquired the atomic bomb in 1949 this policy 
did not fundamentally change, except that a nuclear arms race was engendered and 
the USA engaged upon a building programme aimed at ensuring it was always at an 
advantage in nuclear weapons when compared with the Soviets. 
 
What this meant in practice was that the Cold War began as a conflict between 
nations that were differentially matched.  The Soviets had a large number of men in 
arms, trained and equipped and experienced in war and the occupation of foreign 
territories.  The United States, by contrast, had superiority in destructive power that 
could be used to threaten or bully the Soviets into holding back from using its 
advantage in manpower to take over US interests.  This balance of the forces was 
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effective enough as points of conflict emerged, but the United States was conscious 
of the need for resistance on the ground to secure areas threatened by Communist 
insurgency.  It overcame this problem by using its tremendous economic wealth to 
buttress and support nations and peoples who purported to be resisting the spread 
of Communism and, thereby, endeavoured to confound the ambitions of the Soviet 
hŶŝŽŶĂŶĚƚŚĞWĞŽƉůĞƐ ?ZĞƉƵďůŝĐŽĨChina (PRC).  This approach was encapsulated in 
the Mutual Defence Assistance Act, created by President Truman in 1949, a measure 
which (after revision) extended the reach of US involvement in overseas territories 
and left it supporting governments and individuals who frequently did not fit with 
the ideals of democracy and free choice.  Concomitant with public displays of 
resistance to spreading Communist influence overseas were a number of covert 
operations, sponsored by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and aimed at securing 
anti-Communist regimes or toppling those that seemed threatening.  Such actions as 
these, both known and suspected, sometimes placed the United States in difficult 
positions, especially in view of the fact that it had supported and agreed to the 
United Nations Charter guaranteeing self-government for all peoples. 
 
An additional contradiction in the position of the USA during these early years of the 
Cold War was that its efforts in using the ground forces of friendly nations to combat 
spreading Communism meant that it was cast as giving succour to the Empire 
nations as they endeavoured either to hold on to their colonies or recover territories 
that had been lost during the War.  This problem was exemplified by US involvement 
in Indochina where it provided arms and supplies to French forces seeking to re-
establish the pre-War colonial status. 
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So it was that the United States held a lesser regard for the establishment and 
development of new, free nations than it did for securing its interests in fighting the 
Cold War.  As a consequence it became intertwined with unsavoury and unreliable 
individuals and was driven to support governments that did not fit with its own 
ideals regarding democratic accountability.2  For the United States, the wellbeing 
and value of the new nations was weighed by the extent to which they could be 
persuaded, one way or another, to develop political and economic systems that 
were compatible with US Cold War priorities. 
 
The Soviet Union and Decolonisation 
 
Soviet concerns for the fate of the emerging nations were more complex.  A 
characteristic of the Soviet Union in the years immediately following the Second 
World War was security of its borders against invasion from the west.  To this end 
Russia, which dominated the affairs of the Soviet Union, sought to integrate certain 
areas on its immediate borders3 while maintaining compatible governments in the 
states of Eastern Europe that were not part of the Union.  Many of the nations that 
grew out of the dismantled European empires did not impinge upon the Soviet 
hŶŝŽŶ ?ƐĚŝƌĞĐƚƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚƐ ?ďĞŝŶŐŐĞŽŐƌĂƉŚŝĐĂůůǇƌĞŵŽƚĞ ?ďƵƚƚŚĞŝŵƉĞƌĂƚŝǀĞƐŽĨ
the Cold War developed to broaden the definitions of what constituted vital 
interests for the Soviets.  As events unfolded, it became necessary to create and 
oversee a large navy and navies require bases and friendly calling ports to sustain 
ƚŚĞŝƌŶĞĞĚƐ ?dŚŝƐƐĞƌǀĞĚƚŽƐƚƌĞƚĐŚƚŚĞďŽƵŶĚĂƌŝĞƐŽĨƚŚĞ^ŽǀŝĞƚhŶŝŽŶ ?ƐƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇ
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requirements and led it to reach into parts of the world that, previously, had not 
been of strategic importance. 
 
A characteristic of Soviet economic management was its lack of flexibility, resulting 
in surpluses and shortages, over and under production.  Economic exploitation of 
regional assets was widely used by the Soviets to disguise or overcome (however 
temporarily) these difficulties4 and it is evident that undeveloped nations in resource 
rich areas presented attractive alternatives for this purpose.  It is for this reason, 
among others, that the Soviet Union retained an interest in the African nations that 
emerged after the break-up of the great European empires.  It would be 
disingenuous to pretend that the United States, the former Empire powers and other 
states did not also cast covetous eyes upon the unexploited riches of the new 
nations. 
 
The Peoples' Republic of China and Decolonisation 
 
The creation of Communist China was not overtly part of the decolonisation process 
but there were strong associations.  Once established the PRC also looked at means 
for securing its continued existence and, as European colonies on its periphery 
sought independence after 1945, acted according to what it perceived as its vital 
concerns, including border security and relations with the United States.  There is 
much to be examined regarding the part that the PRC played in the course of 
Indochinese history following WWII, but it should be noted that there is not a linear 
consistency in how the PRC dealt with the issues it faced on its perimeter - in Korea, 
Indochina and elsewhere. 
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Great Britain, Europe and the Established Empires and Decolonisation 
 
As Kennedy had observed in the course of reporting on international affairs during 
1945, the European empire states were reluctant to relinquish their hold over the 
areas of the world that had been subjugated previously.  France fought to retain 
Indochina long after the costs of war exceeded any economic benefits it could have 
gained had its position there been secured; it was a similar story in Algeria, although 
French oversight in other parts of the Levant was loosened.  Portugal remained 
particularly obdurate about holding onto to its overseas possessions, a factor that 
featured during the Kennedy Presidency when fighting flared in Angola. 
 
Great Britain emerged from the Second World War with much of her Empire intact, 
but her domestic resources were greatly depleted.  Apart from imperial possessions, 
Great Britain had military and mandated responsibilities in Greece, Turkey and the 
Middle East.  It was economic necessity that forced her hand in withdrawing from 
the Near East in 1947, a state of affairs that acted as a secondary driving force for 
foreign policy making in the United States which, as a feature of the emergent Cold 
tĂƌ ?ƌĞƐƵůƚĞĚŝŶƚŚĞdƌƵŵĂŶĞĐůĂƌĂƚŝŽŶĂŶĚƚŚĞh^ ?ƐĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚĂƐĂŶĂĐƚŝǀĞ
world power with a direct presence overseas. 
 
There was a variety of reasons behind the thinking and rationale that led to Great 
ƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶƚŽǁŝƚŚĚƌĂǁĨƌŽŵƚŚĞƐŝĂŶƐƵďĐŽŶƚŝŶĞŶƚŝŶ ? ? ? ? ?ďƵƚŝƚƐ
pertinence to this study is more geared to the effects than the causes.  Coming out 
of India initiated a programme of general withdrawal from Empire and the 
Christopher John Hurley  W MA Research, 2016 - 2018 146 
reorientation of British power as it sought to defend itself as a protagonist in the 
Cold War.  British military strength was henceforth directed at blunting the threat of 
Soviet expansionism in Europe and, where its forces were deployed in what might be 
ĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞĚĂƐ “ŵƉŝƌĞǁĂƌƐ ? ?ƚŚĞŽďũĞĐƚŝǀĞƐǁĞƌĞŵŽƌĞŽĨƚĞŶĚŝƌĞĐƚĞĚĂƚŶĞƵƚƌĂůŝƐŝŶŐ
Communist based insurgencies than prolonging imperial domination. 
 
That Kennedy focused most of his attention during his senatorial career on the 
struggles of the French in maintaining their imperial position, as opposed to the 
British, requires some explanation.  Firstly, it should be understood that Kennedy 
had a strong relationship with Great Britain; his closeness to a number of influential 
individuals and families in the United Kingdom had arisen as a result of his family 
connections and the time he had spent there as a young man.  He had a direct 
understanding of the British Empire, what it meant to those who administered it and 
what was happening as it ran down its colonial position.  He observed, at first hand 
during his tour of 1951,5 how India was seeking to drive a course that did not make it 
captive of either Soviet or US interests.  As the concept of neutrality in the Cold War 
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NOTES TO CHAPTERS 
 
Preface 
1 Address at a White House Reception for Members of Congress and for the 
Diplomatic Corps of the Latin American Republics, March 13, 1961.  John F. 
Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum 
 
This speech marked the launch of the Alliance for Progress (Alianza para el 
Progreso) 
 
2 Robert W. Komer, recorded interview by Elizabeth Farmer, June 18, 1964, 
(11), John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum Oral History Program 
 
3 The Senate baulked at adopting Article X of the proposed Covenant of the 
League of Nations, not wishing to reduce the capacity of the United States to 
make war on its own account with a resultant loss of sovereignty. 
 
Robert McNamara and James Blight have compared the situation that Wilson 
faced following the end of WWI with the state of the world at the beginning 
of the 21st ĐĞŶƚƵƌǇ ?dŚĞǇŚĂǀĞŝĚĞŶƚŝĨŝĞĚ ?ǁŝƚŚŝŶtŝůƐŽŶ ?ƐĞŶĚĞĂǀŽƵƌƐ ?ƚǁŽ
imperatives: the Moral and the Multilateral, that foundered as the ideal of 
the League of Nations failed to materialise with US leadership: 
 
 “EŽŽŶĞĐĂŶƐĂǇǁŚĞƚŚĞƌŵĞƌŝĐĂŶůĞĂĚĞƌƐŚŝƉŽĨƚŚĞ League of Nations could 
have prevented World War II.  Yet surely it would have lowered the likelihood 
of that bloodbath.  But Wilson failed to prevent the punitive actions against 
Germany that provided the breeding ground for a vengeful Adolf Hitler, while 
the failure to implement Article X led to exactly the sort of waffling and 
fudging with the Nazis in the 1930s that forever gave a bad name to the term 
 “ĂƉƉĞĂƐĞŵĞŶƚ ? ? ? 
 
McNamara, Robert S., and Blight, James G., tŝůƐŽŶ ?Ɛ'ŚŽƐƚ ?ZĞĚƵĐŝŶŐƚŚĞZŝƐŬ
of Conflict, Killing, and Catastrophe in the 21st Century (Public Affairs, a 
division of the Perseus Books Group, New York, 2003), 8 
 
John Kennedy also confronted the prospect of destructive war, made the 
more real by nuclear weaponry, during his time in the White House.  His own 
ǀŝƐŝŽŶĨŽƌĂĨƵƚƵƌĞtŽƌůĚWĞĂĐĞďĞĂƌƐƚŚĞĚŝƐƚŝŶĐƚŵĂƌŬƐŽĨtŝůƐŽŶ ?ƐƚŚŝŶŬŝŶŐ
and identifies further the unique situation of the United States as the only 
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nation of the world capable of initiating an idea of such scale and ambition. 
(See p84) 
 
4 See p84 and p136 
 
5 Although the Eisenhower administration did make assertions about turning 
back the rising tide of Communism.  See p63 and endnotes 25 and 26 
 
6 Domino theory, also called Domino Effect.  Theory in US foreign policy after 
World War II ƐƚĂƚŝŶŐƚŚĂƚƚŚĞ “ĨĂůů ?ŽĨĂŶŽŶ-communist state to communism 





7 Remarks of Senator John F. Kennedy at the Los Angeles World Affairs Council 
Luncheon at the Biltmore Hotel on September 21, 1956. 
 





8 K ?ƌŝĞŶ ?DŝĐŚĂĞů ?John F. Kennedy, A Biography  ?^ƚDĂƌƚŝŶ ?ƐWƌĞƐƐ ?EĞǁzŽƌŬ ?
2005) 356 
 
9 Dean Rusk, recorded interview by ĞŶŶŝƐ: ?K ?ƌŝĞŶ ?ĞĐĞŵďĞƌ ? ? ? ? ? ? 
(p22), John F. Kennedy Library Oral History Program 
 
10 Rusk ?s analysis of how US involvement in Vietnam escalated from an advisory 
role to active military participation is itself interesting in terms of our 
ƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐŽĨ<ĞŶŶĞĚǇ ?ƐĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚƚŽĨŽƌĞŝŐŶĂĨĨĂŝƌƐŵĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚ ?/ŶƚŚĞ
ĐŽƵƌƐĞŽĨŚŝƐĨŝƌƐƚŝŶƚĞƌǀŝĞǁǁŝƚŚĞŶŶŝƐK ?Brien Rusk several times makes the 
point that President Johnson endeavoured to continue the policies of the 
Kennedy administration in regard to South East Asia.  He then reasons that 
:ŽŚŶƐŽŶ ?ƐƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶǁĂƐĨŽƌĐĞĚďǇƚŚĞŝŶĐƵƌƐŝŽŶŽĨƌĞŐƵůĂƌEŽƌƚŚsŝĞƚŶĂŵĞƐe 
troops into the South (in addition to the guerrilla forces that had operated 
there previously): 
 
 “But throughout the period from November of '63 until the spring of '65 
President Johnson was following what he judged to be the general policy of 
President Kennedy toward the situation: to give the South Vietnamese 
support and give them advisers and give them plenty of equipment, 
ammunition, and economic support and things of that sort, but to put them 
in position to deal with these guerrillas pretty much on their own without the 
involvement of American combat troops.  When the North Vietnamese 
decided to send in regular elements of their armed forces, then President 
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Johnson had to make the decision as to whether we would commit American 
combat forces in substantial numbers, and he made the decision, of course, 
that we would do so. ? 
 
Ibid. Kennedy Library, pp53-54 
 
At no point in the interview does Rusk refer to the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution 
which passed Congress in August 1964 and is generally viewed as the first 
stage of direct US military involvement in Vietnam.  This was a development 
ƚŚĂƚǁĂƐƵŶŝƋƵĞůǇ:ŽŚŶƐŽŶ ?ƐĂŶĚ ?ŝŶǁŚĂƚŝƐĂƐƚƌŽŶŐŝŶĚŝĐĂƚŝŽŶŽĨŚŝƐ
intentions at the time, was based upon a falsified premise.  Equally, Rusk 
ĚŽĞƐŶŽƚĐŽŵŵĞŶƚƵƉŽŶ<ĞŶŶĞĚǇ ?ƐƐƚƌĂƚĞŐǇƌĞŐĂƌĚŝŶŐsŝĞƚŶĂŵĚƵƌŝŶŐƚŚĞ
final months of his Presidency; it was at this time that he initiated moves to 
withdraw US troops from the conflict.  It would appear that Kennedy had 
taken a dual approach to dealing with the situation in Vietnam.  While his 
advisers and appointees urged him to engage militarily, he increased troop 
numbers but only for support and back-up roles, refusing to insert combat 
forces.  As the numbers grew and the situation on the ground did not 
improve he gave himself the wherewithal to assert that the military proposals 
were not working, leaving open the option for withdrawal. 
 
/ƚƐŚŽƵůĚďĞĨƵƌƚŚĞƌƐƚĂƚĞĚƚŚĂƚZƵƐŬ ?ƐĞǆƉůĂŶĂƚŝŽŶŽĨ<ĞŶŶĞĚǇĂŶĚ:ŽŚŶƐŽŶŝŶ
Vietnam does not at all accord with the recollections of Roger Hilsman.  See 
Chapter 4, p94, endnote 59 below.  
  
11 It should also be noted that Rusk was speaking in 1969.  It remained the case 
that, at this time, most interpretations of John Kennedy (and, to a lesser 
extent, his Presidency) were deferential; Rusk could not easily have made 
comments that ran against this general tide of approbation.  It was only later 
ƚŚĂƚ “ƌĞǀŝƐŝŽŶŝƐƚ ?ĂŶĚŵŽƌĞĐƌŝƚŝĐĂůĞǆƉůĂŶĂƚŝŽŶƐƌĞŐĂƌĚŝŶŐ<ĞŶŶĞĚǇŵĂĚĞ
their way into mainstream commentary and the image of both the man and 
the public representative was redrawn.  These later works tended to look at 
behaviour and conduct as indicators for performance (though questions 
should be raised regarding the evidential basis upon which KenneĚǇ ?Ɛ
character has been reconstructed) but Rusk asked historians to rely upon the 
record  W what Kennedy said and did.  The first of the eight interviews that 
Rusk conducted with the Kennedy Library ends with a summing up on this: 
 
 “Well, I think that I would come back to the point that I made earlier that 
President Kennedy's attitude on Vietnam ought to be derived from what he 
said and did while he was President, that he felt very strongly that we had a 
commitment there, that the security of Southeast Asia was important to the 
security of the United States, that we could not let a course of aggression 
develop momentum in Southeast Asia that could well set us on a course 
toward World war III, and that in any event the commitment of the United 
States under security treaties is the principal pillar of peace in the world and 
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what happens to those security treaties is the most important thing there is 
to the safety of the American people ? ?
 
Ibid. Kennedy Library, p55 
 
12 See endnote 3 above 
 
13 Inaugural Address of President John F. Kennedy, Washington, D.C. January 
20, 1961. 
 





14 See quotation on p71 
15 See pp68-72 for further discussion of this analysis. 
 
16 Robert W. Komer, recorded interview by Elizabeth Farmer, June 18, 1964, 
(p1), John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum Oral History Program. 
 
17 See: Robert Dallek, Atlantic Monthly, June 2003: 
  
  “He [also] doubted the effectiveness of a purely military approach to many 
political problems, especially in light of what he observed during his extensive 
travels to Europe, the Middle East, and Asia in the late 1930s and after World 
War II. "If one thing was borne into me as a result of my experiences in the 
Middle as well as the Far East," Kennedy said after a trip as a congressman in 
1951, "it is that communism cannot be met effectively by merely the force of 
ĂƌŵƐ ? ? ? 
 
18 It may be argued that this statement cannot be applied to the situation of 
Vietnam where, during the course of the Kennedy presidency, the number of 
advisory and training troops maintained by the United States rose from some 
few hundreds to almost 16,000.  This matter is dealt with more extensively in 
the text of the thesis (see Endnote 10 above and page 79 - Kennedy and 
Vietnam in the White House). 
 
19  “To me, John Kennedy was the first American President who really 
understood the nationalist revolution and the revolution of modernization in 
the under-developed areas and the necessity of both adjusting to it and 
ĨĞĞĚŝŶŐŝƚŝŶŽƌĚĞƌƚŽŐƵŝĚĞŝƚŝŶĚŝƌĞĐƚŝŽŶƐƚŚĂƚƐĞƌǀĞĚŽƵƌŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚƐ ? ?
 
 Kramer, Ibid 3 
 
20 See page 61 
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21 ^ƚĂƚĞŵĞŶƚƐƌĞŐĂƌĚŝŶŐ<ĞŶŶĞĚǇ ?ƐƉƌĂŐŵĂƚŝƐŵĂƌĞƐŽŶƵŵĞƌŽƵƐƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƌĞ is 
little value in attempting to provide a definitive source reference for 
substantiating this description of him.  It is interesting to note, nevertheless, 
that the Soviet Embassy identified the new President in just this way when 
filing an assessment report following his election to the White House in 1960: 
 
 “Foreshadowing <ŚƌƵƐŚĐŚĞǀ ?ƐůĂƚĞƌĚĞƐĐƌŝƉƚŝŽŶŽĨŚŝƐĐŽƵŶƚĞƌƉĂƌƚ as 
 “ĨůĞǆŝďůĞ ? ?ƚŚĞĞŵďĂƐƐǇĨŝŶĚƐ:&< Ă “ƚǇƉŝĐĂůƉƌĂŐŵĂƚŝƐƚ ? ?ƌĞĂĚǇƚŽĐŚĂŶŐĞ 
positions according to shifting calculations of situations and his own 
interests ? ? 
 
See:  “dǇƉŝĐĂůWƌĂŐŵĂƚŝƐƚ ? PdŚĞ^ŽǀŝĞƚŵďĂƐƐǇWƌŽĨŝůĞƐ:ŽŚŶ& ?<ĞŶŶĞĚǇ, 
1960 (Cold War International History Project Bulletin, Issue 4, Fall 1994, 
Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington, D.C.) 64 
 
22 See: Gardini, Gian Luca, and Lambert, Peter, (eds.), Latin American Foreign 
Policies  W Between Ideology and Pragmatism  ?^ƚDĂƌƚŝŶ ?ƐWƌĞƐƐ>> ?EĞǁ
York, 2011): 
 
  “ ?ǁŚĂƚŝƐƐƚƌŝŬŝŶŐŝƐƚŚĞŽƌŝŐŝŶĂůƐǇŶƚŚĞƐŝƐďĞƚǁĞĞŶŝĚĞŽůŽŐǇĂŶĚƉƌĂŐŵĂƚŝƐŵ ?
These two elements are integral components of political behaviour in 
general, but what constitutes an innovative element is the considered and 
calculated variety in intensity, circumstance, purpose, and arena of the mix of 
ideology and pragmatism.  They appear to coexist well in contemporary Latin 
American foreign policies, and represent an evident tenet of the highly 





Gardini and Lambert cite Gunther Hellmann and his article in International 
Studies Review (11:3, September 2009, pp. 638-662).  In the context of 
ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůĨŽƌĐŝŶŐĨĂĐƚŽƌƐ ?,ĞůůŵĂŶĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞƐ “ƉƌĂŐŵĂƚŝƐŵ ?ĂƐ  P “ ?ƚŚĞ
ƋƵŝŶƚĞƐƐĞŶƚŝĂůŵĞƌŝĐĂŶ “ŝƐŵ ? ? ? 
 
Op cit. 638 
 
23 See Chapter 5, especially pp99-112  
24 See Chapter 6, page 113 
 
25 See p97 
 
26 See p98 
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27 We have been led to understand, as axiomatic, that Kennedy was reckless 
and urgent because he was a sick man who did not expect to live long.  
Further, that he placed a premium on appearance as a political persuader, 
wearing tailored, modern clothing, being carefully groomed and ensuring 
that his glamorous wife was a prominent consort. 
 
 See, for example: White, Mark, Apparent Perfection: The Image of John F. 
Kennedy (The Historical Association, Blackwell Publishing, Oxford, 2013) 
 
Chapter One 
Events and Experiences that Shaped Kennedy 
 
1 See: Shipway, Martin, Decolonization and Its Impact: A Comparative 
Approach to the End of the Colonial Empires (Wiley-Blackwell Publishing, 
Oxford, 2008). 
 
^ŚŝƉǁĂǇĚĞǀĞůŽƉƐŚŝƐŝĚĞĂŽĨƚŚĞ “ůĂƚĞĐŽůŽŶŝĂůƐŚŝĨƚ ?Đŝƚ ŶŐĂƌĂŶŐĞŽĨĨŽƌĐĞƐ
that evolved and developed to create the conditions for rapid processes that 
developed following the end of the Second World War (WWII).  He takes care 
to emphasise that WWII did not initiate these forces, but existed as one 
factor among others that accelerated the imperial retreat in the 1950s and 
1960s. 
 
Also, Betts, Raymond F.,  Europe In Retrospect A Brief History of the Past Two 
Hundred Years (Brittania.com LLC, London, 2015), Chapter 14 
 
Betts argues that forces for change in the colonial structures of the world had 
prevailed for some years with Wilsonian ideas of national self-determination 
providing impetus following the end of the First World War (WWI).  The 
excesses of the totalitarian nations during the 1930s and WWII raised moral 
and political questions to which the Empire nations could not readily respond 
and the rapidity of post war decolonisation was the result. 
 
2 See, for example, Reeves, Thomas C.,  A Question of Character, A Life of John 
F. Kennedy (Random House, New York, 1997), 73: 
 
 “dŚĞĂŵďĂƐƐĂĚŽƌďŽĂƐƚĞĚŝŶ ? ? ? ? ? ?/ŐŽƚ:ĂĐŬŝŶƚŽƉŽůŝƚŝĐƐ ?/ǁĂƐƚŚĞŽŶĞ ?/
told him Joe was dead and that it was therefore his responsibility to run for 
Congress. He didn't want to. He felt he didn't have the ability and he still feels 
ƚŚĂƚǁĂǇ ?Ƶƚ/ƚŽůĚŚŝŵŚĞŚĂĚƚŽ ? ? ? 
 
3 See: Papers of John F. Kennedy. Personal Papers. Manuscripts: Why England 
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4 A Robert Wood Johnson Medical School rheumatologist and a clinical 
psychologist ĂƚƚŚĞhŶŝǀĞƌƐŝƚǇŽĨDŝĐŚŝŐĂŶ ?ƐChronic Pain and Fatigue 
Research Center reviewed the impact back pain had on the life and death of 
John F Kennedy in: 
 
Pinals, Robert S.,  MD, Hassett, Afton L.,  PsyD.  Reconceptualizing John F. 
Kennedys Chronic Low Back Pain (Regional Anesthesia & Pain Medicine, 
September/October 2013 - Volume 38 - Issue 5), 442 W446 
 
 In correspondence with the author, Dr Pinals has confirmed that it is likely 
ƚŚĂƚƚŚĞWd ? ? ?ŝŶĐŝĚĞŶƚĞǆĂĐĞƌďĂƚĞĚĚĂŵĂŐĞƚŽ<ĞŶŶĞĚǇ ?ƐďĂĐŬǁŚŝĐŚ ?ƌ
Pinals believes, was originally injured in a sports incident in 1940.  He has 
further suggested that patients recommended for surgery at the time 
Kennedy underwent his various back operations would not have been 
directly involved in decision making regarding treatment regimes. 
 
5 James G. Blight is chair in foreign policy development at the Centre for 
International Governance Innovation (CIGI), an independent think tank based 
in Ontario Canada, and is also professor at the Balsillie School of International 
Affairs (BSIA) and the Department of History at the University of Waterloo, 
Ontario.  Janet M. Lang is a research professor at BSIA and the Department of 
History at the University of Waterloo.  Between them (jointly and 
independently) they have published over a dozen books on the foreign policy 
of Kennedy, including Virtual JFK: Vietnam If Kennedy Had Lived (2009, 
Rowman & Littlefield, Toronto), which The Wall Street Journal claimed to be 
one of the five best books ever written on John F. Kennedy.  On 4th November 







6 PBN5 Opening statement, 1 
 
7 See: Papers of John F. Kennedy. Presidential Papers. President's Office Files. 
Personal Secretary's Files. Articles: By John F. Kennedy in the Hearst 





8 Not all his writings are in the record and some appear to have been lost.  
Within the collection is a letter dated 9th ĞĐĞŵďĞƌ ? ? ? ?ĨƌŽŵ “sŝƌŐŝŶŝĂ ? ?ŶŽ
other deƚĂŝůƐ ?ĂƉĂƌƚĨƌŽŵĂŶĂĚĚƌĞƐƐĂƌĞŐŝǀĞŶ ?ƚŽǀĞůǇŶ>ŝŶĐŽůŶ ?<ĞŶŶĞĚǇ ?Ɛ
ƉĞƌƐŽŶĂůƐĞĐƌĞƚĂƌǇ ?ǁŝƚŚĐŽƉŝĞƐŽĨƚŚĞĂǀĂŝůĂďůĞĂƌƚŝĐůĞƐĞŶĐůŽƐĞĚ ? “sŝƌŐŝŶŝĂ ?
writes: 
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  “Here are the newspaper clippings that the Senator asked for  W or at least as 
much as we have here. ? 
 
 Ibid. Papers of John F. Kennedy 
 
9 Ibid. Papers of John F. Kennedy 
 
10 Ibid. Papers of John F. Kennedy 
 
11 Ibid. Papers of John F. Kennedy 
 
12 Ibid. Papers of John F. Kennedy 
 
13 In an intriguing entry in the diary that he kept at the time he was reporting on 
the Potsdam Conference, Kennedy wrote: 
 
 “dŚĞĐůĂƐŚ ?ǁŝƚŚZƵƐƐŝĂ ?ŵĂǇďĞĨŝŶĂůůǇĂŶĚŝŶĚĞĨŝŶŝƚĞůǇƉŽƐƚƉŽŶĞĚďǇƚŚĞ
eventual discovery of a weapon so horrible that it will truthfully mean the 
ĂďŽůŝƐŚŵĞŶƚŽĨĂůůƚŚĞŶĂƚŝŽŶƐĞŵƉůŽǇŝŶŐŝƚ ? ?
 





News of the atomic bomb was only made public after it had been successfully 
deployed over Japan on 6th August 1945, although Truman famously 
informed Stalin of its existence in the course of the Conference which ended 
on 2nd August.  (Stalin did not react with any great surprise, having been 
informed otherwise of the development programme by Soviet agents).  One 
might speculate on how Kennedy came to learn of its existence before it 
became general knowledge. 
 
14 See Chapter Three, page 51 
 








2 See: Ridinger, Seth M, John F. Kennedy: Public Perception and Campaign 
Strategy in 1946 (Historical Journal of Massachusetts, Summer 2013) 
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ZŝĚŝŶŐĞƌƌĞĨĞƌƐƚŽ<ĞŶŶĞĚǇ ?ƐĂƐƐŝŐŶŵĞŶƚĨŽƌƚŚĞJournal American to cover 
the general election in Great Britain in July 1945.  It was here that Kennedy 
ǁŝƚŶĞƐƐĞĚĂƉĞŽƉůĞ ?ƐĐŽůůĞĐƚŝǀĞĚĞƐŝƌĞĨŽƌĐŚĂŶŐĞĨƌŽŵƚŚĞĨŽƌŵĞƌǁĂǇƐŽĨ
politics.  In the UK this led to the election of the Labour Party into power  W a 
rejection of the Conservative and Coalition politics of the pre-war years that 
were readily identified with hardship, unemployment and depression.  
According to Ridinger this experience convinced Kennedy that US voters 
would also seek a change from the past, but any such reaction would be 
against the dominating Democratic Party of that period.  He therefore 
focused attention on his youth and different approach to politics, away from 
the former ways of patronage and elitism: 
 
  “ “dŚĞŶĞǁŐĞŶĞƌĂƚŝŽŶŽĨĨĞƌƐĂůĞĂĚĞƌ ?ǁĂƐƚŚĞƐůŽŐĂŶ:ŽĞ<ĂŶĞ ?ĐĂŵƉĂŝŐŶ
adviser) came up with to sell their man. Kane adapted the line from the 
ŝŶƚƌŽĚƵĐƚŝŽŶƚŽ<ĞŶŶĞĚǇ ?Ɛ ? ? ? ?ďŽŽŬ ?tŚǇŶŐůĂŶĚ^ůĞƉƚ ?ĐĐŽƌĚŝŶŐƚŽƚŚŝƐ
formulation, the  “ŶĞǁŐĞŶĞƌĂƚŝŽŶ ?ǁĂŶƚĞĚƚŽƐĞŝǌĞƚŚĞƌĞŝŶƐŽĨƉŽǁĞƌĨƌŽŵ
the old politicians that got the nation into World War II. The young voters, 
returning veterans, and other citizens as well wanted to cast out the old and 






4 Ibid. United Nations Membership 
 
5 Remarks of Representative John F. Kennedy at the Philip J. Durkin Testimonial 
Dinner, Salem, Massachusetts, January 30, 1949 
 
Speech source: Papers of John F. Kennedy.  Pre-Presidential Papers. House of 
Representatives Files.  Series 2.2. Boston Office Speech Files, 1946-1952. Box 
95, Folder: "China: Salem, Massachusetts, 30 January 1949 and Congressional 
Record, 21 February 1949" 
 
The speech was initially made in the House of Representatives on 25th 
January 1949. 
 
See: Burns, James MacGregor, John Kennedy, A Political Profile (Open Road, 
Integrated Media, New York, 1960), 15 
 
6  “Mr. Brinkley: Mr. President, have you had any reason to doubt this so-called 
"domino theory," that if South Viet-Nam falls, the rest of southeast Asia will 
go behind it? 
 
The President: No, I believe it. I believe it. I think that the struggle is close 
enough. China is so large, looms so high just beyond the frontiers, that if 
South Viet-Nam went, it would not only give them an improved geographic 
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position for a guerrilla assault on Malaya, but would also give the impression 
that the wave of the future in southeast Asia was China and the Communists. 
^Ž/ďĞůŝĞǀĞŝƚ ? ?
 





7 See, for example: 
Straw, Jack, JFK: Cold Warrior: Debunking Oliver Stone's Mythology (Fifth 
Estate # 339, Spring, 1992) 
 
Also: 
Goldzwig, Steven,(Marquette University), Bostdorff Denise, (Purdue 
University), Idealism and pragmatism in American foreign policy rhetoric: The 
case of John F. Kennedy and Vietnam (Presidential Studies Quarterly, New 
York, Summer 1994, Volume: 24 Issue: 3, Start Page: 515) 
 
Bostdorff and Goldzwig argue that Kennedy viewed the world of his time as a 
conflict between free peoples and those denied freedom for being under the 
ĐŽŵŵĂŶĚŽƌŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞŽĨŽŵŵƵŶŝƐŵ ?<ĞŶŶĞĚǇ ?ƐŝĚĞĂůŝƐŵ ?ƚŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞ ?ŵĞĂŶƚ
facing down Communism and Vietnam provided a proving ground for the will 
and ability of the United States as a leader of the Free World. 
 
8 Taken from: Edmund A. Gullion, recorded interview by Samuel E. Belk, III, July 
17, 1964, (pages 1 - 2), John F. Kennedy Library Oral History Program 
 
9 Ibid. Edmund A. Gullion, 2 
 
10 Ho Chi Minh, Selected Works Vol. 3 (Hanoi: Foreign Languages Publishing 
House, 1960 W62), 17 W21 
 
11 See, for example: 
 
 William O. Douglas, recorded interview by John F. Stewart, November 9, 
1967, (4-6), John F. Kennedy Library Oral History Program 
 
Also: 
Shaw, John T, JFK in the Senate: Pathway to the Presidency (SƚDĂƌƚŝŶ ?ƐWƌĞƐƐ ?
NY, 2013), 29 
 
12 Topping, Seymour, On the Front Lines of the Cold War: An American 
Correspondent's Journal from the Chinese Civil War to the Cuban Missile Crisis 
and Vietnam (Louisiana State University Press, Baton Rouge, 2009), 150 
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 Topping had reported on the civil war in China for the Associated Press (AP) 
and had moved to Saigon in the spring of 1951.  Early into his assignment in 
Vietnam he uncovered a covert operation by CIA cover organisations to move 
arms and equipment through Saigon to a remnant army of the Kuomintang 
which had established a salient in the Yunnan Province, inside Communist 
China.  The supply route for this army, which comprised about fifteen 
thousand men in arms, was fed through bases it had established in north east 
Burma, a factor that caused the government in Rangoon considerable 
distress for fear of a reaction from the Chinese or a Communist rising within 
the country.  According to Topping this matter soured relations between 
Rangoon and Washington for many years, only being finally resolved during 
the Kennedy Administration.  148-150 
 
13 President Truman announced the establishment of diplomatic relations with 
the government of Vietnam on February 17, 1950, when the Consulate 
General at Saigon was raised to Legation status with Edmund A. Gullion as 
ŚĂƌŐĠĚ ?ĨĨĂŝƌĞƐad interim.  On 24th June 1952 the status of the Legation 
was raised to Embassy and Donald R Heath was appointed Ambassador. 
 
14 Topping, On the Front Lines of the Cold War, 153 
 
15 As matters had transpired, de Lattre had returned to Saigon after a three 
months absence, arriving about the same time as Kennedy.  During his time 
away the General had been entreating the French Government to provide 
more in the way of troops, support and armaments, but had not met with 
any great success.  He subsequently visited the White House where he 
received stronger assurances of assistance.  It would not be surprising, 
therefore, that he was less than impressed by American diplomats suggesting 
ways forward that seemed at odds with the pronouncements of senior 
authorities in Washington.  W Topping, 151 
 
16 See page 79 
 
17 Topping, On the Front Lines of the Cold War, 154 
 
18 Topping, On the Front Lines of the Cold War, 154 
 
19 Bao Dai, the son of the former Emperor of Vietnam, Khai Dinh, a vassal of the 
French colonial regime.  The appointment of Bao Dai was a clear indication 
from the French that there was no serious intention of transferring real 
power to the Vietmanese. 
 
20 Topping, On the Front Lines of the Cold War, 154-155 
 
21 See pp38-39 
 
22 Topping, On the Front Lines of the Cold War, 155 
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23 Edmund A. Gullion, recorded interview by Samuel E. Belk, III, July 17, 1964, 
John F. Kennedy Library Oral History Program 
 
24 Ibid. Edmund A. Gullion 4-5 
 
25 Papers of John F. Kennedy. Presidential Papers. President's Office Files. 
Special Events Through the Years. Radio report on trip to Middle and Far East, 
1951.  Kennedy Library 
 
26 Kennedy appeared on the popular current affairs programme on eight 
occasions, this being the first.  Meet the Press was first broadcast as a radio 
programme in 1945, switching to television in 1947.  It is still on air today and 
is the longest running television programme in the United States.  It operates 
to the simple formula of placing prominent representatives of politics and 
other fields before a panel of journalists to respond to questions.  It is not 
scripted, allowing questioners to seek clarification of answers.   Sitting on the 
panel were: Ernest K. Lindley (Newsweek Magazine), May Craig (Guy Gannett 
Newspapers), James Renton (New York Times) and Lawrence Spivak, 
originator of the format and regular panel member.  The session was 




27 This remark was made by Lawrence Spivak in the course of the radio 
broadcast (see endnote 25 above), but no reference given of where or to 
whom the Congressman had made the comment.  Kennedy did not deny 
referring to Foreign Service personnel in this way, but used the opportunity 
to expand upon and explain further what he meant  W that the US 
representatives were remote from indigenous populations and were failing 
to understand their needs and aspirations.  There is mention of the remark 
in: Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr., A Thousand Days, 407, although this re-
references to the cited broadcast. 
 
28 In the course of <ĞŶŶĞĚǇ ?ƐĨŝƌƐƚĞǆƚĞŶĚĞĚǀŝƐŝƚƚŽƵƌŽƉĞĚƵƌŝŶŐƚŚĞƐƵŵŵĞƌ
of 1937 he kept a diary in which he attributed the success of the Fascists in 
/ƚĂůǇĂŶĚƚŚĞEĂǌŝƐŝŶ'ĞƌŵĂŶǇƚŽ “ƚŚĞŝƌĞĨĨĞĐƚŝǀĞƉƌŽƉĂŐĂŶĚĂ ? P 
 
  “There is no doubt about it that these dictators are more popular in the 
ĐŽƵŶƚƌǇƚŚĂŶŽƵƚƐŝĚĞĚƵĞƚŽƚŚĞŝƌĞĨĨĞĐƚŝǀĞƉƌŽƉĂŐĂŶĚĂ ? ?
 
 Kennedy Library, Papers of John F. Kennedy. Personal Papers. Early Years, 
1928-1940. Diary, European trip, 1937: 1 July-3 September (the pages of the 
diary are not numbered) 
 
29  It is appropriate to mention, in this context, the early initiative of the New 
Frontier which established the Peace Corps.  Following an impromptu speech 
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by Kennedy at the University of Michigan on 14th October 1960, the new 
President signed an executive order founding the Peace Corps on 1st March 
1961, just six weeks after the inauguration.  By 1969, under Director R. 
Sargent Shriver, there were over 14,500 volunteers working in 55 countries 
around the world.  The Peace Corps remains a legacy of John F. Kennedy to 





Kennedy and Foreign Affairs 1952  ? 1960 
 
1 Congressional Record, June 30, 1953, 7622 
 
2 Ibid. Congressional Record 
 
3 Ibid. Congressional Record 
 
4 French President Auriol wrote in his diary for October 1950: 
 
 “ƚƚŚŝƐŵŽŵĞŶƚ ?/ŶŽƚŝĐĞĂƌĂƚŚĞƌǀŝŽůĞŶƚĂŶƚŝ-AmĞƌŝĐĂŶŵŽŽĚ ?tŚĂƚƚŚĞǇ
give us for Indochina while they say that we are defending this country 
against Communism is limŝƚĞĚĂŝĚƐŽƚŚĂƚŝƚĚŽĞƐŶ ?ƚůŽŽŬĂƐŝĨƚŚĞǇǁĞƌĞ
abandoning us.  But in reality, they do it to make us go along with their policy 
of total independence.  They give us money, and we pay for it with a piece of 
ŝŶĚĞƉĞŶĚĞŶĐĞ PƚŚĂƚŝƐŝŶĨĂŵŽƵƐ ? ? 
 
Taken from: Grosser, Alfred, The Western Alliance, European-American 
Relations Since 1945 (Random House, New York, 1982), 129 
 
5 In actual fact the amendment was proposed by the conservative Republican 
^ĞŶĂƚŽƌĨŽƌƌŝǌŽŶĂ ?ĂƌƌǇ'ŽůĚǁĂƚĞƌ ?ďƵƚ<ĞŶŶĞĚǇ ?ƐĨŽƌƚŚƌŝŐ ƚƐƉĞĞĐh saw 
him aligned with the proposal. 
 
See: Short, Anthony, The Origins of the Vietnam War (Routledge, Oxford, 
2013), 119 
 
6 General de Lattre passed away in January 1952 following illness and 
command of the French Expeditionary Forces was given to Henri Navarre.  In 
an attempt to lure the Vietminh into more direct conflict Navarre 
concentrated his forces at Dien Bien Phu, but the tactic failed and the French 
found themselves at a disadvantage to the enemy.  In the face of imminent 
defeat there was much discussion in the White House and State Department 
about a possible rescue plan, but the Korean War was still fresh in the minds 
of US planners and Eisenhower held out against proposals to use nuclear 
weapons.  No decision was made and the French military presence in 
Indochina came to an end. 
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7 Kennedy Library.  Remarks of Senator John F. Kennedy on Indochina before 
the Senate, Washington, D.C., April 6, 1954 
 
8 Ibid. Remarks of Senator John F. Kennedy 
 
9 See Shaw, JFK in the Senate, 95-96 
 
10 See Grosser, The Western Alliance, 135 
 
  “ƚƚŚĞƐĂŵĞƚŝŵĞ ?WƌĞƐŝĚĞŶƚŝƐĞŶŚŽǁĞƌƚŽůĚŵĞƌŝĐĂŶũŽƵƌŶĂůŝƐƚƐƚŚĂƚŚĞ
ĐŽƵůĚŶŽƚĐƌŝƚŝĐŝǌĞƚŚĞ'ĞŶĞǀĂƌĞƐƵůƚƐƐŝŶĐĞŚĞŚĂĚŶŽŽƚŚĞƌƐŽůƵƚŝŽŶƚŽŽĨĨĞƌ ? ?
 
11 The terms of arrangements agreed upon by the attendants at the Geneva 
Conference.  Notwithstanding settlements for all parts of Indochina, these 
provided for the division of Vietnam on the 17th parallel until reunification 
through nationwide elections within two years.  The ambivalent position of 
the United States in regard to the Conference meant that it was never a 
signature to these arrangements but pursued a policy of support for the 
government of the South as a bulwark against the spread of Communism 
from the North. 
 
See, for example, Grosser, The Western Alliance, 134-135 
 
12 See, for example: Herring, George C., ŵĞƌŝĐĂ ?Ɛ>ŽŶŐĞƐƚtĂƌ PdŚĞhŶŝƚĞĚ
States and Vietnam 1950  W 1975 (McGraw Hill, New York, 1986), 55 
 
13 Grosser, The Western Alliance, 136-137 
 
14 In the early 1950s Diem had left Vietnam, ostensibly for a few months after 
becoming aware that his life was in danger.  In the eventuality he was absent 
ĨŽƌĂůŵŽƐƚĨŽƵƌǇĞĂƌƐ ?ĂƉĞƌŝŽĚƚŚĂƚďĞĐĂŵĞŬŶŽǁŶĂƐŚŝƐ “ĞǆŝůĞ ? ?,ĞĨŝƌƐƚ
visited Japan where he met a US academic and political scientist named 
Wesley Fishel.  Fishel was influential in government circles in the USA and, 
when Diem later visited the United States, introduced him to a number of 
individuals whom he came to call upon for support in his efforts to become 
the US leader of choice in South Vietnam.  Amongst these individuals was 
Kennedy.  As a result of his friendship with Fishel, and using his position as a 
prominent and well-connected Roman Catholic, Diem was able to create a 
strong basis of support with certain elements in the United States.  The 
American Friends of Vietnam (AVF) was one such expression of this support 
and it drew from a wide range of opinion, attracting political representatives 
both liberal and conservative.  As events transpired, in the 1960s it became 
seen as an increasingly right wing organisation strongly supportive of the 
Johnson policies for escalating the conflict. 
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See: Bradley, Mark Philip, and Young, Marilyn B., (Eds), Making sense of the 
Vietnam Wars : local, national, and transnational perspectives (Oxford 
University Press, New York, 2008): 
 
 “ŝĞŵ ?ƐĂďŝůŝƚǇƚŽǁŝŶŽǀĞƌŝŶĨůƵĞŶƚŝĂůŵĞƌŝĐĂŶƐƵƉƉŽƌƚĞƌƐǁĂƐĂƉƉĂƌĞŶƚĂƚĂ
luncheon held in his honor in Washington on 8th May 1953.  The event was 
hosted by Supreme Court justice William O. Douglas, who had become 
convinced of the need for a Third Force in Indochina during a visit there the 
year before.  Douglas arranged the lunch to introduce Diem to other like-
minded Americans; the guests included US Senators Mike Mansfield and John 
&<ĞŶŶĞĚǇ ?ďŽƚŚŽĨǁŚŽŵǁĞƌĞĚĞƐƚŝŶĞĚƚŽƉůĂǇŬĞǇƌŽůĞƐŝŶŝĞŵ ?ƐĨƵƚƵƌĞ
ƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐǁŝƚŚƚŚĞhŶŝƚĞĚ^ƚĂƚĞƐ ?ƐDĂŶƐĨŝĞůĚůĂƚĞƌƌĞĐĂůůĞĚ ? he left the 
ůƵŶĐŚ “ǁŝƚŚƚŚĞĨĞĞling that if anyone could hold South Vietnam,* it was 
ƐŽŵĞďŽĚǇůŝŬĞEŐŽŝŶŚŝĞŵ ? ? ? 
 
Ibid. Miller, Edward, Vision, Power, and Agency: The Ascent of Ngo Dinh 
Diem, 1945  W 1954 - 135  W 171.  The quotation is taken from page 148 
 
*The author explains that the quotation is taken from an interview that Don 
Oberdorfer conducted with Mike Mansfield on 28th August 1998.  As the 
author clarifies: 
 
 “DĂŶƐĨŝĞůĚůŝŬĞůǇŵĞĂŶƚƚŽƐĂǇ “sŝĞƚŶĂŵ ?ƌĂƚŚĞƌƚŚĂŶ “^ŽƵƚŚsŝĞƚŶĂŵ ? ?ƐŝŶĐĞ
ƚŚĞůĂƚƚĞƌĚŝĚŶŽƚĞǆŝƐƚĂƐĂĚŝƐƚŝŶĐƚƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůĞŶƚŝƚǇŝŶDĂǇ ? ? ? ? ? ?
 
Miller, Vision, Power, and Agency, 148, FN 42 
 
15 Kennedy Library: John F Kennedy Speeches, Remarks of Senator John F. 
Kennedy at the Conference on Vietnam Luncheon in the Hotel Willard, 
Washington, D.C., June 1, 1956 
 
16 Ibid. John F. Kennedy Speeches 
 
17 Ibid. John F. Kennedy Speeches 
 
18 Ibid. John F. Kennedy Speeches 
 
19 In August of 1956 Kennedy sought to secure the nomination as Vice 
Presidential candidate for the Democratic Party Presidential candidate, Adlai 
Stevenson.  In the eventuality he was defeated in a three ballot contest by 
Estes Kefauver of Tennessee. 
 
20 Ibid. John F. Kennedy Speeches 
 
21 Theresa Romahn, writing in 2009, identifies the speech witŚ<ĞŶŶĞĚǇ ?Ɛ
political ambitions: 
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 “For a successful candidate, the road to the US presidency is one that is not 
merely walked in the year before the election. Rather, it is something 
prepared for years prior to the attempt, for some their entire political career 
is aimed towards it, for others, their entire life. In recent memory, no one's 
career speaks more to this fact than America's youngest elected President, 
John F. Kennedy, whose political ambitions are well documented. What is not 
well integrated into this image, however, is how his 1957 Congressional 
Speech criticizing the Eisenhower administration's policy towards the 
aspirations of Algerian nationalists fits into his overall strategy to secure 
himself the Democratic nomination for the 1960 PresidenƚŝĂůĐĂŵƉĂŝŐŶ ? ?
 
Romahn further argues that the speech was given as a subterfuge for 
securing the support of African Americans without having to venture into the 
dangerous waters of Civil Rights (See p101). 
 
 Romahn, Theresa , Colonialism and the Campaign Trail: On Kennedy's 
Algerian Speech and his Bid for the 1960 Democratic Nomination (Journal of 
Colonialism and Colonial History, Volume 10, No. 2, Fall 2009) 
 
22 Speeches of John F. Kennedy, Remarks of Senator John F. Kennedy in the 
Senate, Washington, D.C., July 2, 1957. Kennedy Library 
 
23 KennĞĚǇ ‘ƐƐƉĞĞĐŚŽŶWŽůĂŶĚ ?ƚŝƚůĞĚ"Struggle Against Imperialism, Part II - 
Poland and Eastern Europe ? was delivered to the Senate on 21st August 1957.  
He had signalled his intention of promoting the idea of a new approach to the 
ŶĂƚŝŽŶƐŽĨĂƐƚĞƌŶƵƌŽƉĞ ?ǁŚĂƚŚĞĐĂůůĞĚƚŚĞ “ƐĂƚĞůůŝƚĞƐ ? ?ŝŶĂƐƉĞĞĐŚƚŽƚŚĞ
Overseas Press Club  in New York on 6th May 1957 (a broadcast of the speech 
was made by WNYC on 31st May 1957): 
 
 “/ďĞůŝĞǀĞŝƚŝƐƚŝŵĞ ?ƚŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞ ?ĨŽƌƚŚĞĨŽƌŵƵůĂƚŝŽŶŽĨĂŶĞǁŵĞƌŝĐĂŶƉŽůŝĐǇ
toward the satellites. The basic laws governing our foreign economic policies, 
such as the Battle Act and the Agricultural Surplus Disposal Act, and too much 
of the general public opinion, recognize only two categories of nations in the 
world: nations "under the domination or control" of the USSR or the world 
Communist movement  W or "friendly nations". I suggest to you that there are 
more shades of gray than these black and white definitions would indicate  W 
that there are and will be nations such as Poland that may yet not be our 






24 According to Romahn (see above, endnote 21), Secretary of State Dulles 
commented after the Algeria speech that, "if anyone is interested in going 
after colonialism, there are a lot better places to go after it than the case of 
France in Algeria," suggesting the nations of Eastern Europe as fine examples. 
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Romahn also cites the extensive criticism Kennedy received for the speech, 
including from fellow Democrats, Adlai Stevenson and Dean Acheson. 
 
25 Popular uprisings in East Berlin in July 1953 and Hungary in October 1956 led 




 ? ?ƚŚĞƵƉƌŝƐŝŶŐƉƌŽǀĞĚ ?ŝƌŽŶŝĐĂůůǇ ?ƚŚĂƚZĞƉƵďůŝĐĂŶǀĞƌďŝĂŐĞĂďŽƵƚ
 “ ?ůŝďĞƌĂƚŝŽŶ ?ŽĨƚŚĞ ?ĐĂƉƚŝǀĞŶĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? ?ƐŽƉƌŽŵŝŶĞŶƚŝŶƚŚĞ ? ? ? ?ƉƌĞƐŝĚĞŶƚŝĂů
campaign, was largely empty -- at least as far as near-term prospects for 
aĐƚŝŽŶ ? ? ? 
 
See: Byrne, Malcolm (Ed), Domber, Gregory F.  (Compiler), Uprising in East 
Germany, 1953 Shedding Light on a Major Cold War Flashpoint (National 




In Hungary the CIA controlled Radio Free Europe encouraged the rebels and, 
in some broadcasts, seemed to be promising the imminent intervention of 
Western forces; these proved to be empty statements that led to 
disillusionment about the will of the United States and its allies to take action 
to liberate Soviet dominated nations. 
 
See: Byrne, Malcolm (Ed.), The 1956 Hungarian Revolution, A History in 
Documents (National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book, , Published 




26 See, for example, Tudda, Chris, The Truth Is Our Weapon: The Rhetorical 
Diplomacy of Dwight D. Eisenhower and John Foster Dulles (Louisiana State 
University Press, 2006), 76: 
 
 “ƵůůĞƐ ?ĐĂůůĞĚĨŽƌƚŚĞůŝďĞƌĂƚŝŽŶŽĨĂƐƚĞƌŶƵƌŽƉĞ ?>ŝďĞƌĂƚŝŽŶ ?ŚĞ
ĐŽŶƚĞŶĚĞĚ ?ǁŽƵůĚ “ŵĂƌŬƚŚĞĞŶĚŽĨƚŚĞŶĞŐĂƚŝǀĞ ?ĨƵƚŝůĞĂŶĚŝŵŵŽƌĂůƉŽůŝĐǇŽĨ
 ‘ĐŽŶƚĂŝŶŵĞŶƚ ? ? ?dŚĞhŶŝƚĞĚ^ƚĂƚĞƐ ?ƵůůĞƐǀŽǁĞĚ ?ǁŽƵůĚ “ů ŽŬŚĂƉƉŝůǇ
ĨŽƌǁĂƌĚƚŽƚŚĞŐĞŶƵŝŶĞŝŶĚĞƉĞŶĚĞŶĐĞŽĨƚŚŽƐĞĐĂƉƚŝǀĞƉĞŽƉůĞƐ ? ? ? 
  
27 Acheson was interviewed by Lucius D. Battle on 27th April 1964 as a 
contributor to the Kennedy Library Oral History Program: 
 
 “/ picked out as an example of how not to do something from a speech that 
Dƌ ?<ĞŶŶĞĚǇŵĂĚĞŝŶƚŚĞ^ĞŶĂƚĞ ?ŝŶ ‘ ? ? ?This was a speech about France and 
Algeria, and he said that the Senate should pass a resolution which he had 
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drafted and which he read in his speech which said that France should 
immediately get to work with the Algerian rebels and work out an 
arrangement for independence.  And if they had not done this by the 
following September when the United Nations was to meet, the United 
States would introduce a resolution in the UN in favor of Algeria.  I said this 
seemed to me the wrong way to treat our oldest ally and our most sensitive 
ally - a country which was still smarting under the defeats of World War II 
and a sense of inferiority for what had happened.  I remember using the 
ƉŚƌĂƐĞ “ƚŚŝƐŝŵƉĂƚŝĞŶƚƐŶĂƉƉŝŶŐŽĨŽƵƌĨŝŶŐĞƌƐ ? ? ? ? “ 
 
[Congressional Record, July 2, 1957, p. 10788] 
 
Dean Acheson, recorded interview by Lucius D. Battle, April 27, 1964, (p1),  
John F. Kennedy Library Oral History Program 
 
Acheson acted as a Special Advisor to President Kennedy for foreign affairs 
matters. 
 
28 See: Savage, Sean J, The Senator from New England, The Rise of JFK (State 
University of New York Press, Albany New York, 2015), 144 
 
29 Savage, The Rise of JFK, 144 
 
30 See: Rasberry, Vaughn, JFK and the Global Anticolonial Movement (103-117), 
Andrew Hoberek (Ed.), The Cambridge Companion to John F. Kennedy 
(University of Missouri, Columbia. Publisher: Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 2015) 
  
Rasberry describes the ŝŵƉĂĐƚŽĨƚŚĞůŐĞƌŝĂŶƐƉĞĞĐŚĂƐŚĂǀŝŶŐ “ĞůĞĐƚƌŝĨied 
the Afro-ƌĂďǁŽƌůĚ ? ? ? ? ?
 
31 Slim, Mongi, recorded interview by Lorna Hahn, on May 20, 1965, (pages 3-
4), John F. Kennedy Library Oral History Program 
 
32 Habib Bourguiba, written statement dated November 24, 1963, (pages 1-2), 
John F. Kennedy Library Oral History Program 
 
33 Kennedy, John F., A Democrat Looks at Foreign Policy (Foreign Affairs, 
October 1957: Volume 36, No.1), 44 
 
34 Ibid.  A Democrat Looks at Foreign Policy, 59 
 
35 See page 62 above 
 
36  See, for example, Bryant, Nick, The Bystander: John F. Kennedy and the 
Struggle for Black Equality (Basic Books, New York, 2006), 463: 
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  “ƚƚŚĞƚŝŵĞŽĨŚŝƐĚĞĂƚŚ ?<ĞŶŶĞĚǇŚĂĚŽŶůǇĂƐŵĂůůƌĞĐŽƌĚŽĨ
accomplishment in civil rights.  Progress had been agonizingly slow in voting 
rights and employment reform, the areas where his administration had 
devoted most of its energy.  By 1963, black registration had increase from 
five percent to just 8.3 percent of eligible voters in the 100 counties targeted 
by the Justice Department.  Between 1961 and 1964, the number of blacks 
employed by the federal government had inched from 12.9 percent to 13.2 
percent.  The Plans for Progress, meanwhile, remained an embarrassment.  
Between May 1961 and January 1963, black employment in participating 
companies rose from 5 percent to 5.1 percent.  The black share of white-
collar jobs showed only a negligible gain, from 1.5 percent to 1.6 percent.  
Even so, the president continued to encourage new firms to sign up.  In other 
areas of policy, too, the picture was much the same.  The long-delayed 
ŚŽƵƐŝŶŐŽƌĚĞƌŚĂĚƉƌŽǀĞĚƚŽďĞĂŐůĂƌŝŶŐĨĂŝůƵƌĞŝŶƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞ ?ĨƚĞƌ<ĞŶŶĞĚǇ ?Ɛ
death, Robert Weaver estimated the order had covered less than three 
percent of existing housing.  Most African diplomats continued to look on 
Washington as a hardship posting, because of their difficulties in finding 
ĂĚĞƋƵĂƚĞŚŽƵƐŝŶŐ ? ?
 
37 ĐĐŽƌĚŝŶŐƚŽ:ŽŚŶ^ŚĂǁ ?<ĞŶŶĞĚǇ ?ƐĂŝĚĞĂŶĚĐůŽƐĞĨƌŝĞŶĚdĞĚ^ŽƌĞŶƐĞŶ
 “ ?ĂĐŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞĚƚŚĂƚĂĨƚĞƌ ? ? ? ?<ĞŶŶĞĚǇǁĂƐƉƌŝŵĂƌŝůǇĨŽĐused on the 1960 
ƉƌĞƐŝĚĞŶƚŝĂůĐĂŵƉĂŝŐŶ ? “ 
 
Shaw, JFK in the Senate, 190 
 
38 It should be noted that Kennedy secured acceptance onto the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee in January 1957.  This prestigious appointment, which 
might have been considered a pinnacle of achievement for one so interested 
in foreign affairs, seems to have had little impact on the putative candidate.  
According to Shaw: 
 
 “dŚĞƌĞŝƐůŝƚƚůĞĚŽƵďƚƚŚĂƚ<ĞŶŶĞĚǇƐĞƚĂƐŝĚĞŚŝƐ^ĞŶĂƚĞǁŽƌŬůŽĂĚƚŽĨŽĐƵƐŽŶ
the presidential campaign.  For example, having finally secured a seat on the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 1957, Kennedy was so busy on the 
ĐĂŵƉĂŝŐŶƚƌĂŝůƚŚĂƚŚĞƌĂƌĞůǇĂƚƚĞŶĚĞĚƚŚĞĐŽŵŵŝƚƚĞĞ ?ƐŚĞĂƌŝŶŐƐ PŽĨ ? ? ?
ŵĞĞƚŝŶŐƐŝŶ ? ? ? ? ?<ĞŶŶĞĚǇŽŶůǇĂƚƚĞŶĚĞĚ ? ? ?dŚĞƉĂŶĞů ?ƐĐŚĂŝƌŵĂŶ ?tŝůůŝĂŵ
Fulbright, grumbled that when Kennedy did attend a hearing he spent much 
of the time autographing pictures of himself for his presidential campaign.  
According to a story circulated in the Senate, when Kennedy was asked to 
ĐŚĂŝƌƚŚĞ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶZĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŽŵŵŝƚƚĞĞ ?ƐƐƵď-committee on Africa, he first 
asked if it had to meet.  AppĂƌĞŶƚůǇŝƚĐŽŶǀĞŶĞĚŽŶĐĞ ? ?
 
Shaw, JFK in the Senate, 183 
 
39 Shaw, JFK in the Senate: 
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^ŚĂǁƋƵŽƚĞƐ:ŽŚŶƐŽŶĂƐƐĂǇŝŶŐ P “dŚŝƐ/ĐŽƵůĚŶŽƚĚŽ W for my country or for 
ŵǇƉĂƌƚǇ ?^ŽŵĞŽŶĞŚĂƐƚŽƚĞŶĚƚŽƚŚĞƐƚŽƌĞ ? ? ? ? ? 
 
Chapter Four 
Foreign Affairs Decision-Making in the White House 
 
1 See quotation from Robert Komer, p16 
 
2 Ambrose, Stephen E., Rise to Globalism: American Foreign Policy Since 1938 
(Penguin Books (world wide), Ninth Revised Edition by Douglas Brinkley), 173 
 
3  “dŚĞ<ĞŶŶĞĚǇĂĚŵŝŶŝƐƚƌĂƚŝŽŶ ?ƐĂǇŽĨPigs decision ranks among the worst 
fiascos ever perpetrated by a responsible government.  Planned by an 
overambitious, eager group of American intelligence officers who had little 
background or experience in military matters, the attempt to place a small 
brigade of Cuban exiles secretly on a beachhead in Cuba with the ultimate 
ĂŝŵŽĨŽǀĞƌƚŚƌŽǁŝŶŐƚŚĞŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚŽĨ&ŝĚĞůĂƐƚƌŽƉƌŽǀĞĚƚŽďĞĂ “ƉĞƌĨĞĐƚ
ĨĂŝůƵƌĞ ? ?dŚĞŐƌŽƵƉƚŚĂƚŵĂĚĞƚŚĞďĂƐŝĐĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶƚŽĂƉƉƌŽǀĞƚŚĞŝŶǀĂƐŝŽŶƉůĂŶ
included some of the most intelligent men ever to participate in the councils 
of government.  Yet all the major assumptions supporting the plan were so 
completely wrong that the venture began to founder at the outset and failed 
ŝŶŝƚƐĞĂƌůŝĞƐƚƐƚĂŐĞƐ ? ?
 
 Janis, Irving L., Group Think (Second Edition, Wadsworth Cengage Learning, 
Boston, 1982) 14 
 
 Groupthink provides an explanation for flawed decision making regarding the 
Bay of Pigs incident, but it should not be considered definitive.  Black Swan 
Thinking (see p27) gives an alternatiǀĞĞǆƉůĂŶĂƚŝŽŶĨŽƌ<ĞŶŶĞĚǇ ?ƐƚŚŝŶŬŝŶŐ
and is, in some ways, mutually exclusive with groupthink. 
 
4 ^ĞĞ ?ĨŽƌĞǆĂŵƉůĞ ?,ĞƌďĞƌƚWĂƌŵĞƚ ?ƐĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐŽĨƚŚĞƚŚŝŶŬŝŶŐƚŚĂƚŐŽǀĞƌŶĞĚƚŚĞ
invasion attempt: 
 
 “dŚĞĂŶƚŝ-Castro Brigade had been encouraged to believe that their mission 
would provoke open American military intervention, and that seemed 
essential to the plan.  Dulles later denigrated the supposed reliance on a 
 “ƐƉŽŶƚĂŶĞŽƵƐ ?ƵƉƌŝƐŝŶŐ ?ĂŶĚŝƐƐĞůůŚĂƐĂŐƌĞĞĚƚŚĂƚƚŽŽŵƵĐŚŚĂƐďĞĞŶŵĂĚĞ
of such expectations.  A special national intelligence estimate put out by the 
agency [the CIA] just before the invasion showed abundant disaffection but 
nevertheless cautioned against optimism about a spontaneous uprising.  The 
operative assumption was that such popular support would only be possible 
after substantial military control had been achieved, not before.  Insufficient 
thought was given to anything beyond consolidating the beachhead.  Hope 
rested on stabilizing the foothold as a base from which the B-26s could attack 
ĐŽŵŵƵŶŝĐĂƚŝŽŶƐ ?ƐŽǁĐŽŶĨƵƐŝŽŶĂŶĚ ?ŝŶŝƐƐĞůů ?ƐǁŽƌĚƐ ? “ĐƌĞĂƚĞĂĨůƵŝĚ
ƐŝƚƵĂƚŝŽŶ ? ? ? 
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Parmet, Herbert S., JFK - The Presidency of John F. Kennedy (The Dial Press, 
New York, 1983) 164 
 
5  “tĞŐŽƚĂďŝŐŬŝĐŬŝŶƚŚĞůĞŐ W and we deserved it.  But maybĞǁĞ ?ůůůĞĂƌŶ
something from it. 
 
Schlesinger Jr., Arthur M., 1,000 Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House 
(Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, Boston 1965) 263 
 
6  John F. Kennedy: "Remarks in Miami at the Presentation of the Flag of the 
Cuban Invasion Brigade.," December 29, 1962.  Gerhard Peters and John T. 




7 Robert Dallek identifies Arthur Schlesinger (Special Adviser) and Chester 
Bowles (Undersecretary of State) as opposed to the plan from the outset: 
 
  “,Ğ ?ŽǁůĞƐ ?ďĞůŝĞǀĞĚŝƚďĞƚƚĞƌƚŽƐĐƌĂƉƚŚĞŝŶǀĂƐŝŽŶĂŶĚůŝǀĞǁŝƚŚĂƐƚƌŽ ?Ɛ
ƌĞŐŝŵĞ ? ?
 
 Dallek, Robert, An Unfinished Life, John F. Kennedy 1917  W 1963 (Back Bay 
Books; Little, Brown and Company, New York, 2003), 361 
 
8 Dallek, An Unfinished Life, 360 
 
9  “ ?ƚŚĞĂĚǀŝĐĞƐŽĂƵƚŚŽƌŝƚĂƚŝǀĞůǇƌĞŶĚĞƌĞĚĂŶĚƐŽƌĞƐƉĞĐƚŝǀĞůǇĂĐĐĞƉƚĞĚ ? ? 
  
Schlesinger, 1,000 Days, 285 
  
10 Soon after the failure of the Bay of Pigs Kennedy agreed to the establishment 
of a government sponsored scheme for keeping the prospects of a second 
attempt alive.  Operation Mongoose, as it became known, conveyed the 
impression that Kennedy was supportive of a renewed effort, but in reality it 
was little more than a quieting operation on the part of the President.  
Mongoose never came anywhere near to putting together a new invasion 
force and, following the conclusion of the Cuban Missile Crisis, it was forcibly 
ĚŝƐďĂŶĚĞĚ ?dŚĞƌĞǁĂƐĂĨĞĂƌŝŶƚŚĞtŚŝƚĞ,ŽƵƐĞƚŚĂƚŝƚƐ “ƉŝŶƉƌŝĐŬ ?
operations against Soviet installations in Cuba had raised the stakes in the 
stand-off between Castro and the USA which had contributed to the crisis 
that had taken the world to the brink of thermonuclear war. 
 
11 ŝƐĞŶŚŽǁĞƌŵĞƚǁŝƚŚ<ĞŶŶĞĚǇƚŚĞĚĂǇďĞĨŽƌĞƚŚĞŶĞǁWƌĞƐŝĚĞŶƚ ?Ɛ
inauguration.  Laos was a subject of discussion and, according to the Office of 
the Historian: 
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 ?ƚŚŝƐƐƵƌƉĂƐƐŝŶŐůǇǁĞĂŬƐƚĂƚĞǁĂƐƚŚĞ “ĐŽƌŬŝŶƚŚĞďŽƚƚůĞ ? ?ĂƐŝsenhower 
summarized in his meeting with Kennedy; the outgoing President expected its 
loss ƚŽďĞ “ƚŚĞďĞŐŝŶŶŝŶŐŽĨƚŚĞůŽƐƐŽĨŵŽƐƚŽĨƚŚĞ&ĂƌĂƐƚ ? ?
 




12 See: Busch, Peter, All the Way With JFK? Britain, the US, and the Vietnam 
War  (OUP, Oxford, 2003), 19 
 
13           See: The Office of the Historian, The Laos Crisis, 1960  W 1963 
 
14  “ ?ƚŚĞhŶŝƚĞĚ^ƚĂƚĞƐƵŶĚĞƌĞƐƚŝŵĂƚĞĚWĂƚŚĞƚ>ĂŽƐƚƌĞŶŐƚŚ ?ŽǀĞƌĞƐƚŝŵĂƚĞĚŝƚƐ
own ability to control events in Laos, and refused to ally itself with the forces 
of local nationalism.  The United States tried to contain communist influence 
in Laos by supporting right-wing anticommunists.  However, in General 
Phoumi Washington backed a loser.  This fact should have become apparent 
to the United States before March 1961, when President Kennedy realized it 
ĂŶĚĐŽŶƐĞƋƵĞŶƚůǇĂůƚĞƌĞĚŵĞƌŝĐĂŶƉŽůŝĐǇ ? ?
 
 Goldstein, Martin E., American Policy Towards Laos (Associated University 
Presses, Cranbury, New Jersey, 1973), 281 
 
15 Chester Bowles, Undersecretary of State, argued that the Chinese would not 
tolerate a US military presence in Laos and such a situation would work to 
the benefit of the Soviets. 
 
See, for example: Schaffer, Howard B., Chester Bowles: New Dealer in the 
Cold War (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1993): 
 
  “Bowles thought it possible that the Soviets saw Cold War advantage in 
embroiling the United States with China in Laos, an argument that recalled 
ideas he had advanced a decade earlier about Soviet deviousness towards 
China in the Korean War. ? ? ? ? 
 
16 Kennedy Library, Public Papers, 1961, 214 
 
17 Source: US, Department of State, Foreign Relations Of The United States 
(1961-1963, Volume I, Vietnam, 1961, Washington, DC) 
 
Report of General Edward G. Lansdale following visit to Vietnam, January 2-
14, 1961: 
 
 “'ĞŶĞƌĂů PDevelopments in South Viet-Nam over the past year indicate a 
trend that is adverse to the stability and effectiveness of President Diem's 
government. Beginning in December 1959 and continuing to the present, 
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there has been a mounting increase throughout South Viet-Nam of Viet Cong 
terrorist activities and guerrilla warfare. This activity has included armed 
propaganda and leaflet distribution; taxing of the population for food, 
money, and medicines; kidnapping and murder of village and hamlet officials, 
road and canal ambushes; and armed attacks against agrovilles, land 
development centers, Civil Guard and Self Defense Corps posts, as well as 
small army units. Through the use of these tactics current Viet Cong military 
and political objectives are the overthrow of the Diem Government. Their 
immediate objectives are to eliminate any semblance of GVN control in rural 
areas, particularly the Mekong Delta, and establish so-called "liberated 
ǌŽŶĞƐ ? ? ? 
 
Situation, a) General, 1 
 
18 See, for example: Randolph, Stephen, Foreign Policy and the Complexities of 
Corruption: The Case of South Vietnam (The Foreign Service Journal, June 
2016) 
 
19 See, for example, Gaddis, John Lewis, The Cold War, A New History (Penguin 
Books, New York, 2005) 132-133: 
 
  “ ?ŝĞŵ ?ǁĂƐĂůƐŽĂŶĂƵƚŚŽƌŝƚĂƌŝĂŶ ?ĂŶĚďǇƚŚĞďĞŐŝŶŶŝŶg of the 1960s his 
South Vietnamese government had become an embarrassment to the 
Americans  W and a target for renewed insurgency from North Vietnam.  
ǁĂƌĞƚŚĂƚtĂƐŚŝŶŐƚŽŶ ?ƐĐƌĞĚŝďŝůŝƚǇǁĂƐŽŶƚŚĞůŝŶĞŽŶĐĞĂŐĂŝŶ ?ŝĞŵ W
following the examples of Rhee and Chiang  W warned that his regime might 
ĐŽůůĂƉƐĞŝĨƚŚĞŵĞƌŝĐĂŶƐĨĂŝůĞĚƚŽŝŶĐƌĞĂƐĞƚŚĞŝƌƐƵƉƉŽƌƚĨŽƌŝƚ ? “tĞƐŚĂůů
ŚĂǀĞƚŽĨŝŶĚƚŚĞƚĞĐŚŶŝƋƵĞ ? ?<ĞŶŶĞĚǇĂĚǀŝƐĞƌtĂůƚĞƌZŽƐƚŽǁĐŽŵŵĞŶƚĞĚŝŶ
 ? ? ? ? ? “ĨŽƌďƌŝŶŐŝŶŐŽƵƌŐƌĞĂƚďĂƌŐĂŝŶŝŶŐƉŽǁĞƌƚŽďĞĂƌŽŶůĞĂĚĞƌƐŽf client 
ƐƚĂƚĞƐƚŽĚŽƚŚŝŶŐƐƚŚĞǇŽƵŐŚƚƚŽĚŽďƵƚĚŽŶ ?ƚǁĂŶƚƚŽĚŽ ? ? ? 
  
The Rostow quotation is taken from: Freedman, Lawrence, <ĞŶŶĞĚǇ ?ƐtĂƌƐ P
Berlin, Cuba, Laos and Vietnam (Oxford University Press, New York, 2000), 
308. 
 
20 See: https://www.Kennedylibrary.org/JFK/JFK-in-History/Vietnam.aspx 
 
21 According to the National Archives, recorded deaths were as follows: 
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22 See: Henry Cabot Lodge, recorded interview by Charles Bartlett, August 4, 
1965, John F. Kennedy Library Oral History Program. 
 
23 See pages 87-94 
 
24 Schulimson, Jack, History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff  W The Joint Chiefs of Staff 
and the War in Vietnam 1960  W 1968, Part I (Office of the Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington DC, 2011), ix 
 
25 See, for example: Ridler, Jason S.,  A lost work of El Lobo (2015): Lieutenant-
Colonel Charles T.R. Bohannan's unpublished study of guerrilla warfare and 
counterinsurgency in the Philippines, 1899 W1955 (Small Wars & Insurgencies, 
26:2, 292-312, DOI: 10.1080/09592318.2015.1008088): 
 
 “tŚŝůĞƐĞƌǀŝŶŐǁŝƚŚƚŚĞƌŵǇŽƵŶter Intelligence Corps, investigating 
wartime collaborators, assessing the legality of guerrilla units for postwar 
benefits, and shadowing communist sympathizers in Manila, Bohannan 
struck up a friendship with Major Edward G. Lansdale, an intelligence officer 
who also had a sage and antic mind. In 1950 both men became chief advisors 
to the new Secretary of Defense and future President Ramon Magsaysay, just 
as the Huk threat became manifest. Along with a series of innovative and 
cunning Filipino officers like Napoleon Valeriano and Medardo T. Justiniano, 
the cabal of Magsaysay, Lansdale, and Bohannan devised a series of military 
reforms and unconventional strategies that turned the Huk tide of 1950 into 
ĂƌĞƚƌĞĂƚĂŶĚĚĞĨĞĂƚďǇ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
 
26 See: Nashel, Jonathan, ĚǁĂƌĚ>ĂŶƐĚĂůĞ ?ƐŽůĚtĂƌ (University of 
Massachusetts Press, Amherst and Boston, 2005): 
 
  “>ĂŶƐĚĂůĞ ?ƐƐƵĐĐĞƐƐŝŶƚŚĞWŚŝůŝƉƉŝŶĞƐƉƌŽŵƉƚĞĚƚŚĞƐĞĐƌĞƚĂƌǇŽĨƐƚĂƚĞ ?:ŽŚŶ
Foster Dulles, to despatch him to Vietnam in 1954 to perform the same 
ŵŝƌĂĐůĞ ? “ŽǁŚĂƚǇŽƵĚŝĚŝŶƚŚĞWŚŝůŝƉƉŝŶĞƐ ? ?ƵůůĞƐƚŽůĚ>ĂŶƐĚĂůĞ ? ?
 
 Introduction, 1 
 
27 See: Nashel, ĚǁĂƌĚ>ĂŶƐĚĂůĞ ?ƐŽůĚtĂƌ, 71 
 
28 See, for example: Hilsman, Roger, To Move A Nation, The Politics of Foreign 
Policy in the Administration of John F. Kennedy (Doubleday, New York, 1967), 
419 
 
29 See, for example: Buzzanco, Robert, Masters of War: Military Dissent and 
Politics in the Vietnam Era (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge UK, 1996), 
109 
 
30 See: National Archives, https://www.archives.gov/research/pentagon-papers 
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 “dŚĞWĞŶƚĂŐŽŶWĂƉĞƌƐ ?ŽĨĨŝĐŝĂůůǇƚŝƚůĞĚ ?ZĞƉŽƌƚŽĨƚŚĞKĨĨŝĐĞŽĨƚŚĞ^ĞĐƌĞƚĂƌǇ
of Defense Vietnam Task Force", was commissioned by Secretary of Defense 
Robert McNamara in 1967. In June of 1971, small portions of the report were 
ůĞĂŬĞĚƚŽƚŚĞƉƌĞƐƐĂŶĚǁŝĚĞůǇĚŝƐƚƌŝďƵƚĞĚ ? ?
 
31 See, for example: Cullather, Nick, America's boy? Ramon Magsaysay and the 
illusion of influence (Pacific Historical Review; Aug 1, 1993) 
 
Cullather argues that the image of the US success in the Philippines and, 
thereby, the reputation of Lansdale as an effective operator is illusionary.  He 
asserts that a common aspect of the United States in its dealings with 
developing nations was a belief that it was managing affairs, whereas the 
reality was often the opposite: 
 
 “,ŝƐƚŽrians have readily accepted US officials ? own assessments of their 
influence in the Third World.  They do so in part because the restrictions 
placed on access to state archives in Latin America, the Middle East, and Asia, 
but also because US documents confirm their assumption of US dominance, 
while leaving room for debate as to its origins and purposes.  In the prevailing 
paradigms, cooperation demonstrates influence, while resistance, especially 
armed resistance, marks the limits of US power.  But as James C. Scott 
observes, Third World peoples seldom risk direct confrontation, preferring to 
ƉĞŶĞƚƌĂƚĞĂƵƚŚŽƌŝƚǇďǇŵƵůƚŝƉůĞĂĐƚƐŽĨŝŶƐƵďŽƌĚŝŶĂƚŝŽŶ ? “ŶŽŶĐŽŵƉůŝĂŶĐĞ ?
ĨŽŽƚĚƌĂŐŐŝŶŐ ?ĚĞĐĞƉƚŝŽŶ ? ?dŚĞŽƌŝĞƐŽĨŚĞŐĞŵŽŶǇŝŐŶŽƌĞƚŚĞĚĞŐƌĞĞƚŽǁŚŝĐŚ
leaders of subordinate states demystify US influence and turn it to their own 
ĞŶĚƐ ? ?2. (There is no citation for the James C. Scott reference) 
 
32 The meeting had been called to discuss the developing plans for the insertion 
of US trained exile troops into Cuba, but Kennedy was so impressed by the 
Lansdale report that he added this to the business of the meeting and 
insisted that Lansdale attend.  Also present were Vice President Johnson, 
Secretary of State Rusk, Defense Secretary McNamara, Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, Lemnitzer and CIA Director Allen Dulles, among others. 
 
33 Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K.5-MSP/1-461 
 
34 See: Kaplan, Lawrence S, Landa, Ronald D, Drea, Edward J, History of the 
Office of the Secretary of Defense, Volume V, The McNamara Ascendency, 
1961-1965 (Historical Office, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Washington 
DC, 2006), 35-36 
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35 See: Hearden, Patrick J, The Tragedy of Vietnam (Routledge, Oxford, 2016), 
60-65 
 
36 See, for example, Boot, Max, The Road Not Taken, Edward Lansdale and the 
American Tragedy in Vietnam (Apollo Publishing, Naperville, IL, 2018), 
location 7086: 
 
  “ ?ŚĞ ?>ĂŶƐĚĂůĞ ?ŚĂĚŶŽƚĞnthusiastically and immediately embraced a job 
offer that engendered a predictable opposition within the State Department.  
>ĂƚĞƌ>ĂŶƐĚĂůĞǁĂƐƚŽŚĞĂƌĨƌŽŵŽŶĞŽĨZƵƐŬ ?ƐĂŝĚĞƐƚŚĂƚƚŚĞŶŽƌŵĂůůǇƉĂƐƐŝǀĞ
and deferential secretary of state, a gracious product of rural Georgia and 
Oxford University, had threatened to resign if Lansdale was selected.  Rusk 
ĂƉƉĂƌĞŶƚůǇĨĞůƚƐŽƐƚƌŽŶŐůǇŶŽƚũƵƐƚďĞĐĂƵƐĞŚĞǀŝĞǁĞĚ>ĂŶƐĚĂůĞĂƐĂ “ůŽŶĞ
ǁŽůĨ ?ďƵƚĂůƐŽďĞĐĂƵƐĞ>ĂŶƐĚĂůĞǁĂƐĂŶĂĐƚŝǀĞ-duty military officer as well as 
a former CIA officer, and Rusk, a stickler for diplomatic protocol, did not want 
ĞŝƚŚĞƌŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇŽƌŝŶƚĞůůŝŐĞŶĐĞŽĨĨŝĐĞƌƐĂƐĂŵďĂƐƐĂĚŽƌƐ ? ?
 
37 For a detailed analysis of the intrigues surrounding the Lansdale report, the 
poor relations between Ambassador Durbrow and Diem and the extent to 
ǁŚŝĐŚ<ĞŶŶĞĚǇ ?ƐĂŵďŝƚŝŽŶƐĨŽƌsŝĞƚŶĂŵǁĞƌĞĨƌƵƐƚƌĂƚĞĚƐĞĞ P 
 
 Newman, John M., JFK and Vietnam: Deception, Intrigue, and the Struggle for 
Power (CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform, North Charleston, 
North, South Carolina, 2016), 40-52 
 
38 See: Hearden, The Tragedy of Vietnam, 61: 
 
  “dŚĞhŶŝƚĞĚ^ƚĂƚĞƐŐĂǀĞƚŚĞ^ĂŝŐŽŶŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚĂůŵŽƐƚ ? ?ďŝůů ŽŶďĞƚǁĞĞŶ
1955 and 1959, yet South Vietnam remained economically undeveloped.  
Believing that Diem needed a strong army to maintain control over South 
Vietnamese people, American officials channelled large amounts of money 
into military rather than civilian projects.  In fact, 78 percent of all American 
financial aid to South Vietnam was used for military purposes, while only 1.2 
percent went into industry and mining.  Diem added to the problem by 
importing large quantities of consumer goods rather than machinery needed 
for industrial development.  Diem resisted American advice to reduce 
spending on consumer items because he feared that a lower standard of 
ůŝǀŝŶŐǁŽƵůĚĐƌĞĂƚĞƐŽĐŝĂůƵŶƌĞƐƚĂŶĚƚŚĞƌĞďǇĞŶĚĂŶŐĞƌŚŝƐƌĞŐŝŵĞ ? ?
 
39 Newman, JFK and Vietnam, 54 
 
40 See:  Mike Mansfield, recorded interview by Seth P. Tillman, June 23, 1964, (p 
24), Kennedy Library Oral History Program 
 
41 See Dallek, Robert, Atlantic Monthly, June 2003: 
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 “Kennedy had seen the Boer War, the Russo-Finnish conflict, and the Korean 
War as cautionary tales against getting bogged down in Cuba; now he 
perceived that the lessons of those wars applied even more strongly in 
Vietnam, a less familiar, more distant land with political crosscurrents even 
more formidable than those presented by Havana. He feared that U.S. 
involvement would produce irresistible pressure to do more and more. "The 
troops will march in; the bands will play; the crowds will cheer," he told 
Arthur Schlesinger, "and in four days everyone will have forgotten. Then we 
will be told we have to send in more troops. It's like taking a drink. The effect 
wears off, and you have to take another."  
 
Throughout his tenure in the White House, Kennedy consistently resisted 
proposals to have U.S. forces take over the war. In November of 1961 
Maxwell Taylor, a Kennedy military confidant, reported at a meeting of 
Administration and military officials that Kennedy was "instinctively against 
introduction of U.S. forces." According to notes taken at a meeting of the 
National Security Council that same month, Kennedy "expressed the fear of 
becoming involved simultaneously on two fronts on opposite sides of the 
world," and "questioned the wisdom of involvement in Viet Nam since the 
basis thereof is not completely clear." JFK thought that whereas in Korea the 
United States had responded to a case of clear aggression, the conflict in 
Vietnam was, according to the NSC notes, "more obscure and less flagrant." 
He believed that any unilateral commitment on our part would produce 
"sharp domestic partisan criticism as well as strong objections from other 
nations ... [and] could even make leading Democrats wary of proposed 
activities in the Far East. ? ?   
 
42 See page 17 
 
43 See: K ?ƌŝĞŶ ? Michael, John F. Kennedy, A Biography  ?^ƚDĂƌƚŝŶ ?ƐWƌĞƐƐ ?EĞǁ
York, 2005), 865 - 866 
 
K ?ƌŝĞŶǁƌŝƚĞƐ P 
 
 “dŚĞŵŽƐƚŝŶƚƌŝŐƵŝŶŐƌĞĐŽůůĞĐƚŝŽŶŝŶǀŽůǀĞĚ<ĞŶŶĞĚǇ ?ƐĐŽŶǀĞƌƐĂƚŝŽŶǁŝƚŚ
Senator Mike Mansfield, whose integrity and probity are unquestioned.  In 
the spring of 1963, Mansfield criticized the U.S. involvement in the Vietnam 
War at a congressional leadership breakfast at the White House.  Afterward, 
ĂĐĐŽƌĚŝŶŐƚŽ<ĞŶK ?ŽŶŶĞůů ?ƚŚĞWƌĞƐŝĚĞŶƚŝŶǀŝƚĞĚDĂŶƐĨŝĞůĚƚŽŚŝƐŽĨĨŝĐĞĨŽƌĂ
ƉƌŝǀĂƚĞƚĂůŬ ? ?K ?ŽŶŶell listened to the conversation.)  The President told the 
majority leader that he had come to agree with Mansfield on the need for 
ƚŚĞhŶŝƚĞĚ^ƚĂƚĞƐƚŽǁŝƚŚĚƌĂǁ ? “Ƶƚ/ĐĂŶ ?ƚĚŽŝƚƵŶƚŝů ? ? ? ? W after I am re-
ĞůĞĐƚĞĚ ? ?<ĞŶŶĞĚǇƐĂŝĚ ?/ĨŚĞĂŶŶŽƵŶĐĞĚĂǁŝƚhdrawal before the 1964 
election, conservatives would castigate him during his re-election campaign. 
 
ĨƚĞƌDĂŶƐĨŝĞůĚůĞĨƚƚŚĞŽĨĨŝĐĞ ?ĂĐĐŽƌĚŝŶŐƚŽK ?ŽŶŶĞůů ?ƚŚĞWƌĞƐŝĚĞŶƚƐĂŝĚƚŽ
ŚŝƐĂŝĚĞ P “/Ŷ ? ? ? ? ?/ ?ůůďĞĐŽŵĞŽŶĞŽĨƚŚĞŵŽƐƚƵŶƉŽƉƵůĂƌWƌĞƐŝĚĞŶƚƐŝŶ
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hisƚŽƌǇ ?/ ?ůůďĞĚĂŵŶĞĚĞǀĞƌǇǁŚĞƌĞĂƐĂŽŵŵƵŶŝƐƚĂƉƉĞĂƐĞƌ ?Ƶƚ/ĚŽŶ ?ƚ
care.  If I tried to pull out completely now from Vietnam, we would have 
ĂŶŽƚŚĞƌ:ŽĞDĐĂƌƚŚǇƌĞĚƐĐĂƌĞŽŶŽƵƌŚĂŶĚƐ ?ďƵƚ/ĐĂŶĚŽŝƚĂĨƚĞƌ/ ?ŵƌĞ-






45 See: Newman, JFK and Vietnam, 60  W 70 
 
46 See: Office of The Historian, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961 W




47 Kennedy Library, White House Audio Collection 
 
48 Jones, Howard, Death of a Generation, How the Assassinations of Diem and 
JFK Prolonged the Vietnam War (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2003) 439 
 
49 Dallek, An Unfinished Life, 64 
 
50 Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, 997 
 
51 Henry Cabot Lodge, recorded interview by Charles Bartlett, August 4, 1965, 
(pages 6-8), John F. Kennedy Library Oral History Program 
 
52 Ibid. Henry Cabot Lodge, 11 
 
53 Ibid. Henry Cabot Lodge, 15 
 
54 Shaw, Geoffrey D. T., The Lost Mandate of Heaven, The American Betrayal of 
Ngo Diem, President of Vietnam (Ignatius Press, San Francisco, 2015), 29-30, 
51 
 
55 See pp85-86 
 
56 /ƚŝƐŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚŝŶŐƚŽŽďƐĞƌǀĞƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƚĞƌŵ “ŐƌĞĞŶůŝŐŚƚ ? ?ĂƐƵ ĞĚďǇ,ŽǁĂƌĚ
Jones (see p87), was also employed by Secretary of State Dean Rusk when 
ŝŶƚĞƌǀŝĞǁĞĚĂďŽƵƚƚŚĞĐŽƵƉĚ ?ĞƚĂƚŝŶ ? ? ? ? P 
 
 “I tend to be of the impression that we were ourselves not trying to stimulate 
a coup and that we were not going to give the green light to anybody to 
overthrow President Diem. ? 
 
Dean Rusk, recorded interview by ĞŶŶŝƐ: ?K ?ƌŝĞŶ ?ĞĐĞŵďĞƌ ? ? ? ? ? ? 
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(p46), John F. Kennedy Library Oral History Program 
  
57 See page 89 
 
58 See quotation from Dean Rusk, Secretary of State, above, endnote 56.  The 
quotation continues: 
 
 “/ŵŝŐŚƚƐĂǇthat the details of these exchanges might be found in President 
Johnson's papers at the Johnson Library because an effort was made to 
ƌĞĐŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƚƚŚŝƐĞƉŝƐŽĚĞĂŶĚƚŚĞĞǀĞŶƚƐǁŚŝĐŚĨŽůůŽǁĞĚŝƚ ? ?
 
Ibid. Kennedy Library (p46) 
 
59 Roger Hilsman joined the Kennedy administration in its early days as 
Assistant Secretary for Research and Intelligence.  In April 1963 Averell 
Harriman was removed from his position of Assistant Secretary of State for 
Far Eastern Affairs and Hilsman was appointed in his place. 
 
In February 1983 the University of Southern California hosted a conference 
ƚŝƚůĞĚ “sŝĞƚŶĂŵZĞĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĞĚ ?ŝŶƚŚĞĐŽƵƌƐĞŽĨǁŚŝĐŚZŽŐĞƌ,ŝůƐŵĂŶǁĂƐ
interviewed by Los Angeles news reporter Clete Roberts.  In the opening part 
of the interview Hilsman confirmed the different approach to Vietnam taken 
ďǇ:ŽŚŶƐŽŶĨŽůůŽǁŝŶŐ<ĞŶŶĞĚǇ ?ƐĚĞĂƚŚ P 
 
 “lete Roberts: 
Let's see. When you were Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs 
what was going on in Vietnam at that particular time? 
 
Roger Hilsman: 
Well, I started off with the Kennedy administration as being Assistant 
Secretary for Research and Intelligence, and then when Averell Harriman was 
promoted to be Under Secretary, I became Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern 
Affairs. So the last 14, 15 months of the Kennedy administration, I was head 
of the Far East. What was going on was that Kennedy had followed the 
Eisenhower policy of giving aid and advisors to the South Vietnamese, but 
Kennedy was absolutely opposed to bombing North Vietnam or sending 
American troops. Kennedy was killed, I stayed on and I pursued Kennedy's 
policy and Mr. Johnson, President Johnson disagreed. He and I quarrelled 
about this, he wanted to bomb the North and send American troops in, I was 
opposed to it. As it happened, I resigned, but I beat him to the punch by 
about two hours. I think he would have fired me if I hadn't resigned. So that 
gives you the basic picture. 
 
Roberts: 
Well, I suppose this question ought to be asked.  Who got us into the 
Vietnam War? 
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Hislman: 
Well, you can ... If you start at the very beginning, in the middle of World War 
Two, OSS, which I was a member of, had liaison officers with Ho Chi Minh and 
we were helping Ho Chi Minh. Then as the Cold War heated up, or the Cold 
War got involved, increasingly Vietnam got involved with the Cold War. And 
during the Truman administration, we began to help the French and so on. In 
the Kennedy administration, Kennedy started off something of a hawk, but as 
things progressed, he became convinced of two things. One is that it was not 
a world communist thrust, that it was a nationalist Vietnamese anti-
colonialist thing, and that therefore we should help the South Vietnamese 
with aid and maybe advisors, but that we should never get American troops 
involved. 
 
When Kennedy was killed the balance of power shifted to a group of people, 
Lyndon Johnson, Walt Rostow, Dean Rusk, Bob McNamara, who saw it not as 
an anti-colonialist nationalist movement, but as a world communist 
movement, you see. And they, for ideological reasons or, I would argue, for a 
misunderstanding of the nature of the struggle, made it an American war. So 
is that a capsule version? 
 
 See: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Og0Q0FF-j0E 
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various agencies of government and to authorise the release of material over 
and above any objections that may have been raised by them. Several 
millions of pages of documents were made publicly available as a 
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